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ABSTRACT 
Malware is a major threat as they induce multiple risks to infected organizations. 
Current Anti-Malware solutions meant to keep Malware away are challenged on how to 
keep the risks at bay effectively. When a Malware manages to penetrate an organization’s 
defences, there is a need to effectively contain the Malware and retain control over the 
organization’s IT assets before the risk escalates. In response, Malware Remediation is 
supposed to contain the effects of the Malware infiltration or outbreak. However Incident 
Responders face many challenges to contain the malice. One challenge is the logistics of 
how  to  coordinate  a  distributed  and  timely  containment.  Another  is  the  need  of  an 
effective technique to defunct the Malware as they are able to overcome conventional 
countermeasures. The final challenge is how to maintain the level of effectiveness of the 
containment tools in the face of self-preservation attacks by the Malware. This research 
study evaluates the use of Malware techniques to address the three challenges as a part of 
Malware  Remediation  in  order  to  restore  control  over  the  IT  assets  back  to  the 
organization.  
In this thesis, the first proposition to the challenge of coordinating a distributed 
incident  response  plan  is  to  use  the  distributed  and  coordinated  characteristics  of  a 
command  and  control  botnet.  In  order  to  validate  this  proposition,  an  agent  based 
simulation model was developed to show that a good (non-malicious) botnet with its 
distributed  and  coordinated  containment  approach  will  result  in  faster  Malware 
containment and reduce the effects of a Malware outbreak compared to conventional   iv 
 
manual containment techniques. The proposed solution to the second challenge is to use 
the  offensive  techniques  used  by  Malware  to  defunct  the  targeted  Malware.  The 
evaluation is done through three experiments using three different offensive techniques 
against live Malware. One of the three experiments involved a smartphone Malware as 
this  form  of  Malware  is  becoming  increasingly  prevalent  in  recent  times.  All  three 
experiments  showed  that  offensive  techniques  could  effectively  defunct  the  targeted 
Malware  in  the  infected  devices.  The  proposition  to  the  final  challenge  is  to  adopt 
Malware resilient designs. The latter is used by Malware to protect themselves against 
Anti-Malware  solutions  and  attempts  to  defunct  them.  The  proposal  is  evaluated  by 
conducting three experiments where a custom developed application that incorporated 
Malware resilience designs was attacked using Malware offensive techniques. All three 
experiments demonstrated that Malware resilient designs could aid Malware Remediation 
tool developers or Anti-Malware solution developers to protect their products against 
self-preservation attacks of Malware.  
In  order  to  facilitate  the  adoption  of  the  three  research  proposals  by  Incident 
Responders,  the  last  proposition  in  this  thesis  is  to  package  the  knowledge  of  using 
Malware techniques for Malware Remediation into Malware Remediation patterns. The 
latter  uses  a  pattern  template  derived  from  common  security  pedagogical  patterns. 
Samples of the Malware like Malware Remediation patterns are included in the thesis. 
The thesis concludes with a consideration into future research directions with respect to 
all the research proposals mentioned in the study.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the research proposition and structure of this 
thesis.  
1.1  SUMMARY BACKGROUND 
Malware, a form of software that contains malicious code, is a major problem to 
the  Internet,  nations  and  organizations  according  to  a  report  commissioned  by  the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2007 [1]. The Australian 
government noted this escalating risk. In response, it will establish a new Cyber Security 
Centre by end 2013 to deal with such threats [164]. According to the report, billions of 
dollars have been incurred to manage this malice. This threat is growing significantly in 
numbers over the past few years. McAfee [2] has catalogued more than 10 million new 
variants of Malware code in the first half of 2010. In McAfee’s third quarter’s threat 
report for 2011, it estimates that there will be 75 million Malware by the end 2011 [3]. 
This is an explosive growth. Malware is advancing in sophistication in many ways such 
as its ability to evade detection [4] and outwits humans [5]. Malware and their variants 
have  been  advancing  in  their  ability  to  resist  containment  and  eradication  too.  More 
recently,  targeted  Malware  designed  specifically  to  attack  specific  individuals  or 
organizations has been lurking around in increasing numbers [6]. The characteristics of 
such Malware include a targeted strategy, bespoke development approach and narrowly 
focused approach to infect the targets within its protected environment [6]. Such Malware   2 
is unknown to Anti-Malware companies when it attacks its victims, hence it will render 
the Anti-Malware defences ineffective [163]. When infiltration is successfully carried out 
against  its  victim  and/or  organization,  a  new  line  of  defence  for  the  organization  is 
required to deal with the threat. This new line of defence for the organizations is the 
security incident response team or CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team), 
which  will  be  referred  to  as  Incident  Responders  for  the  rest  of  the  thesis,  whose 
objective is to promptly manage the incident originating from the Malware infiltration. 
The US Department of Homeland Security [7] advocates the use of five key processes as 
part  of  incident  management.  The  processes  are  to  “Prepare”  in  order  to  establish, 
sustain, and improve the incident response; to “Protect” in order to build up or make 
changes in the infrastructure to protect the organization’s computing assets; to “Detect” 
in enabling the organization to recognize and deal with security incidents or events; to 
“Triage” that is to categorize, correlate, and prioritize events and follow up with further 
investigation and finally; to “Respond” which defines the planning, coordination, and to 
carry out effective response to incidents. The focus of this research project is on the 
“Respond” process where the objective is to contain the Malware infection and its risk 
impact to the organization. This is known as Malware Remediation [8] that will be the 
term used throughout the rest of this thesis. The ability to carry out an effective Malware 
Remediation will not only aid in containment of the spread or attack of the Malware, but 
also to restore control over the IT assets back to the organization. Prolonged control by 
the  Malware  over  IT  assets  could  introduce  significant  risks  and  liabilities  to  the 
organization. This could be in the forms of data leakage, disruption to business continuity   3 
and tarnished corporate image. As concurred by Chakraborty [9], a Malware incident can 
cause significant damage to an unprepared organization. In order to effectively respond 
and contain the Malware infection or outbreak, the Incident Responders has a number of 
challenges to overcome. This project therefore seeks to address the noted challenges. 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There  are  three  noted  challenges  faced  by  Incident  Responders  to  contain  a 
successful Malware infection and restore control over an organization’s IT assets. Firstly, 
the Incident Responders are likely to be challenged logistically in its effort to implement 
its  containment  plan.  A  successful  infection  may  grow  from  a  single  infection  into 
massively  distributed  problem  through  its  aggressive  spread.  Patzakis  [10]  states 
‘Computer security incidents are like cancer— early intervention and containment are 
critical  in  order  to  prevent  the  spread  of  the  problem’.  Also  Malware  is  known  to 
respond immediately when a containment activity is initiated through data destruction of 
the  infected  computer  or  causing  outage  to  crucial  computer  services.  Such  reaction 
induces  more  risks  to  the  organization.  Additionally,  a  significant  amount  of  time  is 
required in a time challenged situation to conduct the analysis on the Malware involved 
in order to identify the appropriate mitigation or remediation plan. Such analysis involves 
digital forensics, detailed information of past Malware, knowledge in different areas in 
Information Technology like operating systems, networking and skilful handling of wide 
variety of tools [11]. Besides the overall duration to identify the containment plan and to 
execute the plan is crucial too as the Malware may launch a counter response or initiate   4 
re-infection.  According  to  Verizon’s  2010  Data  Breach  Investigation  report  [12], 
containment  response  to  a  Malware  incident  typically  takes  days  to  months.  This  is 
significantly  longer  compared  to  the  seconds  to  minutes  required  by  the  Malware  to 
infect. Incident responders are over-stretched by the demand for a coordinated response 
as  noted  by  Kossakowski  [13].  There  are  a  number  of  research  propositions  to  use 
distributed intelligent agents to aid in responding to a Malware outbreak or incident [90], 
[91]. However there is no noted evaluation done to validate the effectiveness of such 
propositions. Hence the challenge here is how to enable Incident Responders to effect a 
distributed, coordinated and timely execution of its containment plan. 
Secondly, Malware is now more adept to circumvent conventional containment 
techniques like sink-holing of malicious traffic and cleaning infected computers through 
their sophisticated resilient properties. Conventional containment techniques are openly 
known  to  all  including  Malware  developers  hence  Malware  can  be  developed  to 
circumvent such techniques. Leder et al. [14] advocates the use of offensive techniques 
along with convention techniques. However such offensive counter hacking techniques 
are not part of the standard containment procedures or practices. Hence the question 
under consideration is how offensive counter attacks can be used as part of the Incident 
Responders’ response.  
Finally, Malware has been advancing in its approach to protect itself from Anti-
Malware  solutions.  It  can  aggressively  defunct  Anti-Malware  defences  and  limit 
containment  attempts  in  order  to  protect  itself  [15].  Xue  suggested  that  a  number  of 
vulnerabilities  in  Anti-Malware  solutions  and  suggested  secure  software  development   5 
approach  to  protect  such  solutions  from  being  exploited  [93].  However  Malware  are 
known for exploiting zero day vulnerabilities hence leaving the Anti-Malware solutions 
exposed. Hence the challenge is how to preserve the effectiveness of containment tool 
before they are rendered useless by the self-preservation attacks of Malware. Given these 
three  challenges,  the  research  question  is  how  to  overcome  this  threat  and  provide 
organization’s Incident Responders with the necessary means to contain and defunct the 
Malware before the execution of its attack or continued attack against the organization. 
1.3  PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  assess  the  hypothesis  that  characteristics  and 
techniques used by Malware, to defeat deployed defences used by organizations to keep 
Malware out, can be used in Malware Remediation. Specifically, this research identifies 
techniques  used  by  Malware  to  in  turn  apply  them  to  address  the  three  identified 
challenges  faced  by  Incident  Responders  when  managing  a  Malware  incident.  The 
following  table  summarizes  the  research  solution  strategy  to  be  undertaken  in  this 
research project.  
Table 1.1: Research Need and Proposal 
Challenge  Need  Solution Proposal 
To coordinate response 
activities over 
geographically distributed 
ICT assets in a timely 
manner 
Coordinated, timely and 
distributed containment 
before Malware induces re-
infection, harden its 
infection hold or initiate 
Adopt the modus operandi 
of Botnet specifically with 
its coordinated and 
distributed characteristics of 
as part of Malware   6 
follow-up attack vector  Remediation  
Current conventional 
countermeasures have 
limited effectiveness in 
Malware containment 
Effective inactivation 
techniques that can defunct 
the Malware or stop 
inducing further risks to the 
organization 
Adopt the use of Malware’s 
offensive techniques against 
Malware 
Malware has evasive, 
offensive and anti-forensic 
techniques for self-
preservation 
Defence mechanisms or 
remediation tools need to 
have self-preservation 
capabilities otherwise they 
will be rendered useless 
Adopt Malware’s resilience 
design into defence and 
remediation tools 
 
The intended outcome of the proposed research solution is to aid the restoration of 
control over the organization’s IT assets during a Malware infection or outbreak in the 
“Respond” or Remediation stage of the Malware containment effort while addressing the 
requirements posed by challenges to Incident Responders to have a timely coordinated, 
distributed and functionally effective means.  
1.4  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives of this study are thus: 
1)  To  investigate  the  effects  of  coordinating  Malware  Remediation  when 
using coordinated and distributed techniques used by Malware Botnet. 
2)  To investigate the effects of using offensive techniques used by Malware 
to defunct a Malware. 
3)  To  investigate  the  effects  of  using  resilient  designs  incorporated  into 
Malware to harden software against Malware’s self-preservation attacks.   7 
In order to enhance the adoption of such practices in Malware Remediation, it is 
proposed that the new found knowledge be packaged into patterns to facilitate adoption 
by Incident Responders and to ensure that such knowledge repository remain relevant in 
order to protect an organization’s IT assets. 
1.5  RESEARCH APPROACH 
The approach adopted in this Doctor of Information Technology (DIT) project is 
to carry out a research strategy and an associated research analysis technique for the 
solution to each of the three identified challenges. Hence three strategies will be used 
throughout this project and the following diagram summarizes the approach to be taken. 
Table 1.2: Research Strategy 
Research 
Component 
Research Strategy  Data Generation  Data Analysis 
Distributed 
& 
Coordinated 
Use past spread analysis 
reports to construct model to 
validate the need to have 
same level of effectiveness 
in containment 
Observation of 
model result 
Quantitative 
analysis through 
modelling 
Offensive 
Containment 
Conduct experiments on the 
use of offensive techniques 
to defunct Malware in 
infected hosts 
Functional tests to 
demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the 
proposal 
Analysis of 
functional tests 
results 
Resilient 
Containment 
Conduct experiments on the 
use of Malware resilient 
design to harden defence 
and remediation tools 
Functional tests to 
demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the 
proposal 
Analysis of 
functional tests 
results 
 
The knowledge acquired from these research works are then structured into a 
pattern template to facilitate the management of knowledge in Malware Remediation.   8 
1.6  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
SCHOLARLY CONTRIBUTION 
Conventional response and containment techniques and tools used by Incident 
Responders are being challenged by the effectiveness of Malware attacks and resilience. 
The  scholarly  contribution  of  this  research  is  to  develop  new  approaches  to  contain 
Malware and to evaluate the effectiveness of such approaches. The unique attribute of the 
approaches  proposed  in  this  thesis  is  the  adoption  of  Malware  characteristics  and 
techniques. This will contribute towards the theoretical knowledge on the battle against 
Malware and development of new practices in dealing with Malware. 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROFESSION 
The  solutions  identified  and  reported  through  this  research  will  aid  Incident 
Responders  to  address  the  challenges  faced  when  attempting  to  execute  a  Malware 
Remediation plan against a Malware infection or outbreak. This will be achieved through 
the  introduction  of  new  techniques  that  may  be  used  by  Incident  Responders  to 
coordinate their remediation plan and to defunct active Malware. Additionally to preserve 
the effectiveness of containment tools against Malware’s self-preservative attacks. To 
enhance its adoption, the new knowledge will be packaged into pedagogical patterns.   9 
1.7  THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is presented in seven chapters. The figure below is a visual overview 
of  the  structure  of  this  thesis.  As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  three  research 
strategies have been adopted as part of this research work and the knowledge acquired 
from the work done is mapped into a Malware Remediation pattern template to facilitate 
the management of such knowledge. 
Figure 1.1: Thesis Structure Overview   10 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the problem that organizations face with modern Malware and 
describes how Incident Responders are now the last line of defence for the organization   11 
when  the  Malware  successfully  penetrates  through  deployed  defences.  Details  of  the 
challenges faced by Incident Responders, when attempting to contain a Malware outbreak 
or successful Malware penetration, are then covered. This chapter also reviews other 
relevant research work done on the identified challenges as part of literature review. As 
there  are  three  identified  challenges  mentioned  in  this  research,  the  literature  survey 
covers related research reported on those challenges.  
Chapter 3 details the research solution proposition to the first challenge, which is 
the  coordination  challenge  faced  by  Incident  Responders  when  there  is  a  Malware 
outbreak. A review of similar approach used in biological disease research is included. 
An evaluation model using Agent Based Modelling (ABM) simulation is defined. This 
model, which is the first of its kind, is evaluated against a generic and popular epidemical 
mathematical model. The Agent Based Model was used to quantitatively evaluate the 
effectiveness, in terms of time taken to completely contain the Malware, of using Botnet 
like approach to remediate a Malware outbreak. The Agent Based Model was further 
extended to compute another form of quantitative measurement to Malware Remediation. 
The form is the amount of data loss induced by the Malware incident. Three sets of 
experiments have been carried out. The first set was to validate the Agent Based Model. 
The second set associated with the conventional containment techniques. The third set 
was to validate the use of Malware like containment approach, specifically that of Botnet. 
Both types of quantitative measurement techniques of time and data loss were used in 
each  test  set.  Details  of  the  experiments  are  covered  in  the  chapter  followed  by  the   12 
analysis of each and every experiment. A discussion about the findings is deliberated here 
and finally a conclusion to complete this part of the research work. 
Chapter 4 details the research solution proposition to use offensive techniques 
used by Malware to defunct defensive tools against the Malware as part of Malware 
Remediation. A review into similar biological disease research approaches is detailed 
here. A description of the evaluation method used is described in this chapter followed by 
details of how the three experiments were carried out. The results from the experiments 
are  then  covered.  A  summary  analysis  is  included  to  review  the  experiments  and 
recommend  possible  areas  of  improvements  and  issues  to  address.  This  is  finally 
concluded with a conclusion. 
Chapter  5  details  the  research  solution  proposition  to  adopt  Malware  resilient 
software designs to harden defensive tools including Malware Remediation tools. A study 
into similar biological research work is described and detailed description of the methods 
of evaluation are covered. This is followed by details of the results of three experiments. 
Analysis of the three experiments is detailed here. A discussion on the use of Malware 
software resilience design follows and a conclusion to finish off this part of the research 
work is offered. 
Chapter 6 details the research solution proposition to use a Malware Remediation 
pattern template to establish a repository of Malware like Malware Remediation patterns. 
A  literature  survey  of  current  approaches  used  to  document  Malware  Remediation 
knowledge, skills and experiment to facilitate adoption is covered here. A study into 
knowledge  management  techniques  for  Malware  Remediation  is  included.  This  is   13 
followed by a list of Malware Remediation patterns based on the results of research work 
covered in thesis namely from the previous chapters of 3, 4 and 5. A discussion and 
conclusion end this chapter.  
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter to the thesis that summarizes the completed 
research work detailed in this thesis. The chapter also includes a concluding discussion to 
the research solution proposition. Future research direction for each and every research 
propositions then follows and concludes this thesis. 
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2  BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This chapter details the background to the problem done through literature survey. 
This  chapter  also  discusses  the  related  research  work  done  thus  far  to  address  the 
problem. 
2.1  PROBLEM – MALWARE EPIDEMIC 
This section of the thesis looks at the current state of the extent of the Malware 
problem  and  its  implication  to  organizations.  This  section  considers  the  direct 
organizational impact from Malware and how the Malware affects the digital economy 
that exists around the organizations. 
2.1.1  MALWARE RISK TO ORGANIZATIONS – LOSS OF CONTROL 
The objective of the Malware is to gain control over the organization’s IT assets 
in  order  to  achieve  its  malicious  objectives.  Control  of  IT  assets  may  involve 
manipulating the involved assets to the controller’s intended purposes. Examples include 
making  copies  of  important  data  or  disrupting  IT  services.  Control  of  IT  assets  is 
important to organizations. Many organizations are consciously or unconsciously aware 
of  its  dependence  on  such  control.  There  are  many  recent  incidents  in  which 
organizations suffered heavily for the loss of control over its IT assets. An example of 
such is the 2011 data breach incident with Sony Playstation Network [21]. This led to the   15 
increased  emphasis  to  establish  adequate  security  measures  and  incident  response 
capabilities.  
The  deployment  of  Anti-Malware  security  products  highlights  the  evidential 
reason by organizations’ intent in maintaining control over its IT assets. However the 
extent of risk induced by a Malware infiltration to the organization is portioned to the 
extent of control an organization has over its IT assets. The following table illustrates this 
premise with a qualitative analysis. 
Table 2.1: Risk Analysis Of Control Over IT Assets 
Security Risks  Organization having More 
Control 
Malware having More Control 
Confidentiality  Reduces data leakage, protects 
confidentiality  
Increases data leakage, losses 
confidentiality 
Integrity  Improves security posture, 
improves reliability of IT assets 
Degrades security posture, 
degrades reliability of IT assets 
Availability  Improves resiliency, enhances 
business continuity 
Degrades resiliency, affects 
business continuity 
 
Malware  incurs  a  financial  burden  to  organizations.  According  to  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  [1],  billions  of 
dollars  were  reportedly  incurred  in  the  management  of  this  malice.  According  to 
McAfee’s 2007 report [16], it noted that an estimated US$ 67.2 billion are bearing direct 
and indirect Malware impact on US businesses alone. In 2009, the world is estimated to 
have incurred up to US$ 130 billion to manage Malware and its infectious impact [17]. A 
survey done recently on 45 US organizations estimates each organization incurs between   16 
US $1 million to US$ 52 million annually [18]. It is undeniable that organizations need to 
invest considerable amount of resources to address the threat from Malware.  
2.1.2  MALWARE’S IMPACT TO DIGITAL ECONOMY  
Today the digital or online space is an important aspect in the modern society and 
economic system. Many business or organizational activities are now entirely dependent 
on  IT  enabled  online  services  such  as  e-Commerce  or  e-Business,  m-Commerce, 
electronic  communication and  collaboration.  In  order  for  online activities to  flourish, 
online trust is vital. However it seems that Malware stands in the way of that intent. This 
section  explores  how  Malware  affects  the  various  organizational  actors  directly  and 
indirectly. The organizational actors include the followings.  
a.  Private  or  public  organizations  offering  online  services  to  their 
stakeholders.  
b.  Intermediaries that aid in realizing the online services as ISP and payment 
gateway. 
c.  Critical Essential Infrastructure operators providing essential supplies like 
power supply and the communication network. 
There  are  many  reasons  why  Malware  attacks  occur  against  online  activities. 
They include extortion, corporate warfare or political reasons. There are measures that 
can  be  taken  to  overcome  the  negative  impact  of  Malware  [80].  For  example, 
organizations can deploy enterprise layered security defences or security management 
services. However such measures are not holding up well against Malware attacks. In   17 
fact,  there  are  reports  claiming  that  majority  of  Malware  attacks  may  have  gone 
undetected [19]. One report by PC World advocates that the war may be working in 
favour of the Malware developers rather than the Anti-Malware developers [20].  
2.1.2.1  Direct Impact by Malware 
When  a  Malware  attack  is  underway,  its  impact  is  typically  significant  and 
immediate. The following surveys the impact to each organizational actor. 
ACTOR – PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ORGANIZATION 
Malware has been used to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on 
organizations [1]. They were used against both private and public organizations. Banks 
offering e-banking facilities to its customers are also targets of Malware attacks. Malware 
has further been advanced to attack the security defence mechanism put up by the banks. 
There are Malware designed specifically for a particular business. Recently the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation of USA issued a warning about Malware ‘Gameover’ that targets 
bank  customers [20].  Noticeably,  the two most  popular  forms of  attack  done  against 
organizations is to disrupt the availability of business services offered online and stealing 
data from the organizations. Another form of attack is to defame the target or the victim.  
ACTOR – ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
Malware has attacked intermediaries that offer services or infrastructure needed to 
fulfil  online  activities.  Such  intermediaries  include  payment  gateways,  Certificate 
Authorities, Internet infrastructures like DNS, network connectivity service providers, 
etc.  The  impact  of  an  attack  on  any  of  these  dependent  intermediaries  would  have   18 
significant impact to online activities. An example of such an attack is the DDoS attack in 
Dec  2008  on  AlertPay.com  that  disrupted  millions  of  businesses  using  this  payment 
gateway service [22].  
ACTOR – CRITICAL ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Another major risk posed by Malware is attacks against organizations associated 
with government bodies or critical infrastructure that has significant downstream impact 
to all online and offline constituents. An example is Malware attack on essential and 
critical infrastructure like power generation plants. In 2005, UK’s National Infrastructure 
Security  Co-ordination  Centre  (NISCC)  reported  that  there  had  been  a  long-running 
series of attacks using targeted Trojans on companies that formed part of UK’s critical 
national infrastructure like water and power [23].  
2.1.2.2  Indirect Impact by Malware 
Beyond the direct impact that Malware has made on organizations, Malware’s 
activity will induce indirect or residual impact to its targeted actors. The impacts include 
stakeholders’ reduced trust towards the organization, tarnished corporate image and even 
demise  of  the  organizations  [24].  Such  impacts  are  typically  reactionary.  A  typical 
organizations’ counter response to this effect is to increase resource investment in use of 
Anti-Malware solutions and image restoration to restore confidence and trust.   19 
2.2  PROBLEM – SOPHISTICATION OF MALWARE  
Malware is a frequently used arsenal by perpetrators of cybercriminal activities. 
There  is  a  whole  underground  online  economy  that  exists  to  support  the  continue 
development of this powerful arsenal [25]. The Malware product is well supported by 
various actors from software developers to traders of Malware and providers of Malware 
related  services  in  this  underground  economy.  This  section  considers  the  advance 
technologies  being  incorporated  into  Malware  and  complex  development  lifecycle  of 
Malware. 
2.2.1  ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES IN MALWARE DESIGNS 
Malware is known to incorporate various forms of advanced technologies and 
techniques in their designs. This is to enhance its ability to evade and stay operationally 
destructive and the ability to conduct intelligent interaction to deceive their victims. This 
section covers details of such capabilities. 
2.2.1.1  Evasive Malware 
The  ability  for  Malware  to  evade  defences  of  organizations  is  essential  to 
Malware developers. The first noted form of advancement is Malware with Artificial 
Intelligence technologies incorporated.  One such reported example [4] is the Malware 
named Zellome that incorporated genetic algorithms (GA) to optimise the brute-force 
approach to generate decryptor routine to facilitate its polymorphic behaviour.    20 
Another form advancement is the noted intelligent-like behaviours. Studies into 
the behaviour of Malware have led researchers and Anti-Malware developers to note 
some software are exhibiting intelligence [26] such as non-predictive behaviours [27]. 
There are Malware such as Storm that exhibits some forms of intelligent capabilities like 
automatically  adapting  its  defensive  techniques  to  counter  any  measures  to  stop  its 
propagation [26].  
The  third  form  is  Malware  behaving  like  biological  equivalents.  There  are 
Malware that behave like biological equivalents / disease analogies or having attributes of 
artificial life. Studies [28] found that there are noticeably strong similarities between 
biological viruses that living organisms and their computer counterparts. For example, a 
study  by  Kienzle  and  Elder  [29]  noted  that  the  majority  of  the  computer  worms  are 
behaving like worms found in nature. Examples of similarities include infecting their host 
through an opening and replicating themselves at the expense of the hosts. Both have 
abilities to spread autonomously without any human intervention. Both are able to remain 
dormant  for  a  period  of  time  before  striking.  Both  behaviours  are  becoming  more 
malignant  when  combining  capabilities  of  other  like  entities.  An  example  for  such 
Malware is the Nimda worm [29] that is a combination of two other worms that were 
launched after the 9/11 attack against the United States. Malware has also known to 
exhibit parasite-like biological behaviours. Interestingly, according to Furnell and Ward 
[30], it has been noted that there has been a rise in Malware with parasitic characteristics 
with  less  destructive  payload  loaded  in  them.  Researchers  have  attempted  to  model 
characteristics  on  the  spread  of  Malware  infection  using  biological  epidemic  models.   21 
According  to  Chen  and  Ji  [31],  a  homogeneous  epidemic  model  simulated  the 
propagation patterns of random-scanning worms. Some researchers have gone further to 
advocate that Malware like viruses are possibly a form of artificial life with properties 
such  as  self-reproduction,  information  storage  of  its  own  representation,  growth 
capabilities  and  evolutionary  capabilities.  Spafford  [32]  argued  that  computer  virus 
exhibits close similarities to some of the defined artificial life properties like information 
of its self-representation. However the author stops short to crediting computer virus as 
an artificial life as there are a number of significant deficiencies, like the dependence of 
computer virus on its host.  
The final form noted is Malware behaving like humans or intelligent behaviours 
more specifically in the ability to interact.  There is significant technology development 
in  enabling  computers  to  interact  with  humans  like  Goh  and  Fung  [33],  with  their 
interactive human-like artificial intelligence Chatterbot called AINI (Artificial Intelligent 
Neural-network  Identity).  A  study  to  use  AINI  to  interact  with  humans  via  Instant 
Messenger showed that it did well in imitating human conversations and conversing with 
human-like artificial intelligence. AINI drew much interest and excitement from humans 
with its interactive capabilities [34]. A Chatterbot named Natachata, written by a former 
rocket scientist Simon Luttrell, is used widely by porn chat merchants to provide mobile 
dirty talk through SMS text messages [35]. The customers are led to think that they are 
communicating with a person of their desire. Chatterbot has also been reported to engage 
in  email  exchanges.  Epstein [36]  cited  how  he  was  fooled  into  thinking  that  he  was 
conversing  with  a  Russian  lady  by  the  name  of  “Amélie  Poulain”.  The  conversation   22 
lasted months before he discovered he was conversing to a computer program. Such 
technology exists and could potentially be used by Malware developers in fooling the 
victims. Researchers in socially adept technologies have found that humans are generally 
not receptive towards such virtual peers. According to Angeli et al. [37], one reason for 
this is the lack of common grounds between the human and virtual entity. However in the 
case of Malware, its social interactive capability may have some advantage as it could 
focus on a specific common ground like lust and greed to lure or entice the unwitting 
victims. This form of social interactivity known as social engineering, has already been 
popularly used by hackers and cybercriminals. An instance of such Malware is Koobface 
[38]. Kaspersky Lab noted this worm and its variants infected Facebook and Twitter 
accounts by sending a range of malicious commentaries or messages to friends’ accounts 
with the intent to mislead them to websites containing Malware. 
2.2.1.2  Anti-forensic Malware 
Malware authors are also devoting much effort to prevent their software from 
being analysed through the use of anti-forensic features [39]. Examples of such evasion 
techniques  include  code  obfuscation,  encryption,  dummy  code  infusion,  anti-
virtualization, anti-debugging and anti-reverse code engineering. Malware are known to 
exploit flaws in analysis tools to prevent any means to gather useful analysis reports or 
artefacts used in analysis [39]. Another forensic analysis avoidance technique is to induce 
system destruction when analysis is being done [40]. Malware can be delivered to the 
infected  hosts  with  parts  encrypted  that  will  make  most  analysis  or  detection  tools   23 
useless. Another advancement incorporated into Malware is self-modifying codes, code 
that makes execution jumps into data segments and fusion of the boundary between code 
and  data  segments.  Such  forensic  analysis  avoidance  techniques  pose  significant 
challenge to adversarial software analysis [41].  
2.2.2  TARGETED MALWARE AGAINST ORGANIZATIONS 
There is a recent arsenal from the cybercriminal community that is giving them an 
advantage [6]. Unlike notorious mass attacks induced by highly publicized Malware, this 
new  form  of  Malware  is  conducting  discrete  attacks  on  specific  organizations  or 
individuals. Their goal is to minimize publicity in order to achieve their malicious intent 
on specific target or targets. The trend towards using such targeted Malware is growing 
[42].  An  example  is  an  attack  made  against  Hannaford  Bros,  grocery  stores  in  New 
England USA. A Malware developed specifically against them and to circumvent their 
security measures stole four million records of their credit and debit card numbers. A 
more recent incident was with the security company RSA [157]. According to a research 
group, such targeted Malware attacks is becoming a norm now [43]. A new definition for 
such form of Malware is called Advanced Persistent Threat (or APT) [44]. This form of 
Malware,  or  Boutique  Malware,  is  a  notable  change  from  the  ‘write-once-attack-all’ 
approach  that  seeks  to  infect  as  many  as  possible  towards  a  ‘write-once-attack-one’ 
approach  of  where  damage  caused  from  the  cyber  assault  is  focused.  An  analogy  to 
conventional weaponry would be smart bombs over conventional bombs. This Boutique   24 
Malware  has  a  number  of  unique  characteristics  when  compared  to  conventional 
Malware. It has the following features: 
a.  Targeted strategy 
b.  Bespoke development approach  
c.  Narrowly focused approach to infect the targeted 
d.  Customized attack techniques used to suit the environment 
TARGETED STRATEGY 
Professional  cybercriminals  are  using  subtle  approaches  in  their  Malware 
infections and attacks. They are kept intentionally elusive to stay below the radar of the 
security and law enforcement communities. Staying totally evasive as long as possible is 
their key objective [45]. It would be mission failure if the Malware gained fame and 
publicity. The Malware is also required to slip through cracks found in the multiple layers 
of defence to get through to its target. Mission goals are typically financial gains or 
politically motivated objectives rather than fame.  
Boutique  Malware  focuses  on  specific  organizational  targets.  They  include 
government entities [46], schools [47], banks [48], military organizations [49], political 
entities [50], corporate CEO [51] and other high salaried workers at selected corporations 
[52].  Such  Malware  also  targets  specific  type  of  users  that  are  associated  with  the 
targeted organization. An example is the customers doing online banking with specific 
bank or banks [53]. 
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BESPOKE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
The design of such Malware is more elaborate compared to the common wild fire 
Malware.  A  customized  based  development  approach  is  used  to  develop  Boutique 
Malware. According to Horenbeeck [54], these tailored made Malware are developed in 
the following manner. 
a.  Identify the specific actors involved including the targeted. 
b.  Find logical associations between communities that the identified actors 
associate with often. 
c.  Gather information about the targeted’s operating environment.  
d.  Design and develop the Malware to infiltrate the actor’s protected space 
and information store. 
e.  Send  the  uniquely  developed  Malware  to  the  targeted  and  deceive  the 
latter into installing the Malware. 
Such sequence of activities is similar to the techniques used by hackers as part of 
their hacking cycle. The extensive amount of reconnaissance done on the targeted to 
identify vulnerabilities and operating patterns would incur more time and effort in the 
development of Boutique Malware design than the typical Malware [45]. Schouwenberg 
[55],  who  did  a  study  into  Boutique  Malware  that  targeted  banks,  noted  that  such 
Malware  are  modifications  or  derivatives  of  a  common  species  or  past  variants  of 
Malware. They were custom designed to infect its targeted then manoeuvre around the 
bank’s security defences. A group of researchers recently discovered a targeted Malware 
compromising of over 87,000 Malware variants [56]. Boutique Malware is creating a new   26 
form  of  business  for  Malware  developers  from  creating  Malware  for  the  masses  to 
bespoke Malware where the finished product is custom made to operate ‘effectively’ 
within the target’s operating environment. 
NARROWLY FOCUSED INFECTION APPROACH 
The infection vector used in such Malware is focused on specific persons or group 
of interest. Here the intent is to infiltrate the target’s operating environment. However 
such  targets  would  likely  have  a  comprehensive  set  of  defence  measures  in  place  to 
protect  them.  Boutique  Malware  are  adapted  to  slip  through  the  layers  of  defence. 
Targeted deceive techniques are normally used. For example, they use specific references 
to address their targets to deceive the targets. References like name, title and company 
name of the targeted are used. According to Germain [52], it seems unlikely that emails 
used  in  such  malicious  attack  are  automatically  sent  by  software  bots.  Such  targeted 
phishing  attacks  made  by  cybercriminals  against  specific  individuals  or  entities  are 
known  as  Spear-phishing.  Such  forms  of  social  engineering  attacks  are  not  easily 
detectable [57]. Such assaults may result in the victim not being aware that a breach has 
even occurred, as the victim may deem the activity legitimate.  
The key notable characteristics of specific infection strategy used include: 
a.  Specific references that use knowledge of the personal information of a 
specific individual or organization [58].  
b.  The focus is on individuals or organizations within a specific region [48] 
with language localization made to the malicious communiqué sent to the 
targeted [47].    27 
c.  Timing on the execution of infection attempt is deliberately chosen. An 
example is malicious emails being sent on weekends instead of weekdays 
[46].  
d.  Specific infection tools or platform that best suit the targeted are used. For 
example,  using  Microsoft  Office  exploits  with  Microsoft  Word  and 
Microsoft Powerpoint documents [46].  
e.  Use of social engineering techniques to deceive the victim into thinking 
that the email is legitimate [52]. An example is to falsify the origins of the 
email indicating that it is from a government entity.  
In  order  to  minimize  the  chances  of  the  Malware  from  being  detected, 
cybercriminals are evolving their infection vector to the next level. They now deploy 
their Malware in websites and have their victims surf those websites [55], this is known 
as “drive-by download”.  
Malware is not only specifically targeting those in it intends to infect, it is also 
avoiding those it does not intend to. The early variant of Conficker (Conficker A) will 
abstain from attacking any computer who has a Ukrainian Keyboard [59]. Also, it would 
prevent itself from attacking any hosts with a Ukraine’s IP addresses based on GeoIP 
database. 
CUSTOMIZED ATTACK APPROACH 
The  types  of  attacks  used  by  Boutique  Malware  are  customized  to  suit  the 
environment that it needs to operate to achieve its objectives. Here the intent is to have 
the attack adapted to suit the operating environment of the targeted to avoid detection   28 
while maximizing effectiveness.  One such example is the Trojan Horse software, named 
‘Trojan.SilentBanker’,  that  specifically  targets  banking  systems  with  two  factor 
authentication. The Trojan’s attack intent is to capture specific sensitive data like names, 
passwords and account information [52]. Over 400 banks are at risks due to this Trojan 
[60]. 
The technique of attack that is commonly used by Boutique Malware is known as 
Man-In-The-Endpoint (MitE) where the malicious control occurs at the client or local 
system of the victim. This is different from the notorious Man-In-The-Middle (MitM) 
attack technique where the interception occurs within the connectivity path between two 
endpoints. The focus of this MitE is to perform the malicious act prior to entering into the 
secure HTTPS tunnel [55].  
2.3  PROBLEM – FACED BY EXISTING ANTI-MALWARE SOLUTION  
There are many Anti-Malware solutions available. In fact, a significant part of the 
IT industry specifically the IT security sector is made profitable or possible because of 
Malware.  However  these  solutions  are  challenged  by  the  advancement  of  Malware 
development [162]. Malware are able to evade Anti-Malware solutions’ detection and 
eradication.  Malware  have  gone  further  to  defunct  these  solutions.  Any  attempts  to 
counter defunct these Malware will face much resistance and counter offensives. This 
section covers the details about the state of warfare here.   29 
2.3.1  DEFECTIVE ANTI-MALWARE DEFENCES 
One of the most popular ways to eradicate malicious software is the use of Anti-
Virus products. Such products are developed from information or data gathered from past 
Malware attacks and from the public. Signatures are developed and updated into their 
products through signature updates. However AUSCERT reckons that 80% of the Anti-
Virus solutions are ineffective in detecting and removing Malware [61]. In a report by 
MessageLab,  it  noted  that  out  of  31  Anti-Virus  companies,  only  6  recognized  the 
malicious file that contains a Malware [46]. According to another report by Cyveillance 
[62] a company that focuses on cyber intelligence, they reported that a test conducted on 
thirteen popular Anti-Virus solutions found that such solutions could detect less than half 
of the latest Malware threats identified by the company. The report further commented 
that those Anti-Malware solutions were dependent on their knowledge of the existence of 
the Malware. It can be said that boutique Malware is not being caught effectively by traps 
laid out by Anti-Virus companies. An example is the ‘Trojan.Clampi’ Malware that first 
existed in 2007 but only in 2009 that the Malware was detected and acted upon by Anti-
Virus  solutions  [63].  Kotadia  [64]  commented  that  if  the  Malware  is  targeting  only 
specific  individuals  or  organizations  and  it  is  not  wide  spread,  some  Anti-Virus 
companies are less inclined to produce signature updates for them. Boutique Malware 
could qualify itself to be a zero-day Malware for a prolonged period if the Malware is 
able to stay away from the attention of the Anti-Virus companies. Another challenge 
posed  to  Anti-Virus  solutions  is  the  pace  in  which  Malware  developers  change  or 
upgrade  their  software  to  evade  detection.  An  example  of  one  such  Malware  is  the   30 
‘Trojan.SilentBanker’ [65], the percentage of this financial Malware being detected was 
dropping month by month and this fall could be caused by undetectable variants.  
The most popular form of security defences against Malware and hackers is to use 
layered  defences  or  defence  in  depth  strategy.  However  contemporary  Malware  with 
customized infiltration mechanism can circumvent security defences. Additionally the 
weakness  part  of  the  layered  defence  is  behind  the  hardened  digital  walls  with  the 
individuals who could have allowed penetration of the Malware into the environment due 
to ignorant or erroneous behaviour. One went as far as to call this human stupidity [66]. 
2.3.2  ANTI-MALWARE DEFENCES BECOMING VICTIMS 
Anti-Malware products are now becoming victims of Malware attack. Malware 
preserves itself by attacking Anti-Virus software and rendering the latter defunct. Such 
Malware are known as retrovirus or retroworm [67]. They are also known as “armored” 
Malware [68]. A detailed analysis report on Conficker [59] reported that the variant C of 
the Malware explicitly terminates running security software. Malware are also exploiting 
the vulnerabilities of Anti-Virus solution (AV) in order to defunct the defences [69], [70]. 
According  to  Landesman  [71],  since  July  2001,  ‘ApBot’  worm  was  among  the  first 
Malware  that  targeted  a  range  of  Anti-Virus  software,  Trojan  detectors  and  firewall 
products. Besides eradicating the AV as a means to preserve the Malware, the latter had 
induced a false negative impression to defences by putting the AV into a ‘brain dead’ 
state.  According  to  Vass  about  Storm  Worm  [72],  this  was  done  to  circumvent  the 
network access control (NAC) with quarantine capability that will inhibit unsecure clients   31 
from connecting to the network. Anti-Malware companies are developing solutions to 
protect their products from Malware attacks, but on the other hand, Malware developers 
are also responding accordingly.  
2.4  PROBLEM – FACED BY THE NEW LINE OF DEFENCE  
When  a  Malware  gets  pass  the  deployed  defences,  Malware  Remediation  by 
Incident Responders becomes the new line of defence. This entails using containment 
processes  and  tools  to  facilitate  the  containment  of  the  raging  or  defiant  Malware. 
However it is challenged by the sophistication and effectiveness of modern Malware. 
Incident  responders  need  to  overcome  these  challenges  to  effectively  coordinate  the 
execution of its mitigation plan in a timely and distributed manner considering the rate of 
execution of the infection, eradicating the Malware which is becoming more resilient 
against containment efforts and preserving the effectiveness of the mitigation plan against 
self-preservation attacks of the Malware. 
2.4.1  COORDINATION CHALLENGE 
Big organizations generally have a geographically distributed IT infrastructure 
setup. This enables support of distributed business operations, connectivity to partners, 
support  of  remote  computing  facility,  etc.  In  larger  organizations  like  banks, 
multinational corporations and government bodies, their IT setup would likely to be in 
this manner. In addition to its distributed setup, large organizations would have a sizeable 
amount of deployed IT assets, a variety of computer resources and diverse configurations.   32 
Enterprise security would then have many fronts to protect and fend off attacks from 
Malware. According to Killcrece et al. [73], when a Malware successfully penetrates the 
defences  and  may  be  even  initiate  an  outbreak  or  attack  vector  such  as  a  Denial  of 
Service attack, a challenge to the Incident Responders is their ability to coordinate an 
effective remediation plan. The coordination effort would include an effective means to 
organize  remediation  efforts  among  all  affected  and  support  elements  within  the 
organization including those from remote sites. Any inability to effectively coordinate 
activities  to  contain  this  Malware  risk  could  result  in  an  ineffective  and  prolonged 
remediation execution which in turn could cause continued data loss / leakage, disruption 
to business continuity, affect business and operational effectiveness.  Such coordination 
efforts  will  put  a  significant  stress  on  Incident  Responders.  Hence  as  noted  by 
Kossakowski [13], these teams are over-stretched by such circumstance. What the team 
requires  is  a  means  to  enable  them  to  effect  incident  response  activities  in  a  tightly 
coordinated and distributed manner. 
A key benefit to have a tightly coordinated and distributed containment approach 
is  the  ability  to  do  so  in  a  timely  manner.  When  an  infection  occurs  with  a  single 
computer that is now being controlled by the Malware, the rate of infection could grow 
exponentially turning the mass computing resources into a ‘monster’ under the control of 
the Malware [74] and the perpetrator who launched the Malware attack. Hence the ability 
to effect the defined Malware Remediation plan in a timely manner is vital to prevent it 
from growing into an epidemic. To do so, Incident Responders as part of the security 
incident management, is required to understand the behaviour of Malware involved [75].   33 
The outcome of this activity will aid in defining mitigation steps needed to contain the 
outbreak  and  eradicate  the  threat.  However  the  analysis  of  the  Malware  is  time 
consuming  in  time  sensitive  Malware  related  incident.  The  team  has  a  number  of 
limitations  that  it  needs  to  overcome  to  quickly  analyse  the  Malware.  Firstly,  if  the 
Malware were unknown to Anti-Malware products, the latter would render little or no 
assistance in identifying the Malware and its associated characteristics. Also any analysis 
to be done would likely to occur over infected computers and is less likely over the 
original source malicious file that may contain useful information. Even if the original 
source  file  can  be  found,  a  successful  infection  would  likely  to  have  morphed  the 
Malware to other form with further updates from the Malware developer. An example is 
the transformation from a trojan horse to a Bot. This will render the original file useless 
in the identification of a suitable containment plan. Analysis of Malware is a highly 
skilled  activity  requiring  extensive  experience  in  Malware  analysis  techniques, 
knowledge covering vast areas in information technology and skilful handling of a wide 
variety of tools [76]. The need to continually improve in order to be able to manage the 
increasing  sophistication  of  attacks  and  attackers  [13]  adds  further  demands  on  the 
responders. The administration of a wrong mitigation plan could worsen the situation 
when the Malware is able to detect the containment effort that could result in further risk 
escalation. Identifying a suitable mitigation plan is a time consuming yet an important 
activity  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  plan  as  part  of  ‘Respond’  process  or  Malware 
Remediation. According to Khurana et al. [77], an effective way to Malware incident 
management is to adopt an iterative approach to identification stage of the Malware and   34 
containment  stage  as  the  resolution  to  contain  the  Malware  may  require  iterative 
refinement. Hence there is a need to shorten the overall duration of incident management 
while  noting  time  is  required  to  analyse  the  Malware  and  to  identify  the  required 
remediation  solution.  Therefore  it  is  imperative  that  the  time  taken  to  effect  the 
containment  package  should  be  kept  to  a  minimal  and  giving  precious  time  to  the 
identification of the appropriate mitigation plan.  
In a case study reported by Logan and Logan [78], in which a Malware incident 
which took seven days to remediate, the Malware outbreak had incurred significant costs 
and resources in order to recover from such outbreak. It is also noted from the paper that 
the  case  study  took  significant  amount  of  time  before  the  Malware  outbreak  was 
contained  and  restored  the  business  operations.  In  Verizon’s  2010  Data  Breach 
Investigation report [79], it was reported that containment typically takes days to months 
to contain a Malware infection. This is significantly longer than the seconds to minutes 
required for the infection to occur. Such time gap from the time of first infection to the 
subsequent containment creates a large risk exposure to the organization. This time gap 
needs to be shortened. Hence what is required is to effect containment packages within 
minimal time duration and through distributed and coordinated structures, in order to 
provide more time to vital Malware analysis and to reduce the overall risk exposure. 
2.4.2  CONVENTIONAL TECHNIQUES NEED UPDATE 
Incident responders typically contain a Malware incident using a limited range of 
countermeasures  techniques  through  user  participation,  automated  detection,  disabling   35 
services  and  disabling  connectivity  [80].  Other  countermeasures  to  contain  Malware 
include sink-holing or taking down the Command and Control (C&C) server. However, 
according  to  Leder  et  al.  [81],  such  conventional  or  classical  techniques  have  their 
limitations as there are mechanisms built into Malware to overcome them. Leder et al. 
cited  that  during  containment,  there  might  be  cross  boundary  limitations  that  will 
constraint containment efforts. This is especially true when there are external entities that 
control in-between infrastructure and are used by the organization’s computing platform. 
An  example  of  such  condition  is  when  remote  or  mobile  computing  is  used.  Such 
computing  assets  have  limited  protective  coverage  unlike  computing  hosts  operating 
within the confinement of the organization where the IT infrastructure like ingress or 
egress networks are managed by the organization hence enabling containment techniques. 
Mobile or remote computing will typically operate outside of such protected or controlled 
environments.  
Conventional containment techniques are openly known to all including Malware 
developers  hence  this  gives  the  Malware  developers  an  edge  to  incorporate  counter-
measure against such known techniques or mechanisms into their Malware products.  
2.4.3  REMEDIATION TOOLS: ANOTHER VICTIM OF MALWARE 
Malware  are  being  developed  to  withstand  containment  or  response  measures 
taken  against  them  [82].  The  tools  used  for  remediation  are  being  attacked  or  made 
defunct  by  the  Malware.  An  example  is  the  ‘W32/Sality.gen.c’  virus  (according  to 
Mcafee) [83] that disables the use of Task Manager and Windows registry editors on   36 
infected  computer.  Such  tools  are  required  to  facilitate  Malware  remediation.  The 
notorious Conficker or ‘W32/Conficker.worm’ worm (according to Mcafee) [84] makes 
explicit  attempts  to  find  Malware  analysis  tools  like  wireshark  (network  packet 
monitoring tool), tcpview (network packet tool monitoring tool), procmon (Sys internals 
registry monitoring tool) and gmer (rootkit detection tool). Malware are also exploiting 
vulnerabilities  in  tools  used  by  Malware  analysts  or  Incident  Responders  to  launch 
another offensive attack [39]. 
An obvious and repeated reason for losing the effectiveness of the Anti-Malware 
solution and remediation processes or tools to contain them is that the approaches used by 
the defenders are openly known or easily acquired by the Malware developers. The latter 
can develop mechanisms to overcome or defunct the defences resulting in the defences 
becoming victims of Malware self-preservation attacks instead of being protectors. Anti-
Malware  solution  developers  and  Incident  Responders,  tasked  to  salvage  Malware 
infiltration incident, need a means to level off the face-off with Malware developers. The 
element  of  known  and  unknown  gave  Malware  developers  an  advantage,  and  the 
defenders also need an edge over the attackers too. 
2.5  THE RESEARCH NEEDS 
The  following  table  summarizes  the  challenges  faced  by  Malware  Incident 
Responders and what are required in the research solution.   37 
Table 2.2: Research Needs 
Challenges  Needs 
To coordinate response activities over 
geographically distributed IT assets in a 
timely manner 
Tight and distributed coordination before 
Malware induces re-infection, harden its 
infection hold or initiate follow-up attack 
vector 
Current conventional countermeasures 
have limited effectiveness in Malware 
containment 
New techniques that can defunct the 
Malware or stop inducing further risks to 
the organization 
Malware have evasive, offensive and anti-
forensic technique for self-preservation 
Defence mechanisms or remediation tools 
need to have self-preservation capabilities 
otherwise they will be rendered useless 
 
Based on the noted requirements from Incident Responders in containment of 
Malware  outbreak  or  infiltration  as  part  of  Malware  Remediation,  this  research 
proposition  advocates  leveraging  on  the  innovative  techniques  used  by  the  infamous 
“successful” Malware to address the containment requirements over Malware infected IT 
assets that belong to an organization. The following table summarizes the challenges 
faced by Incident Responders during the respond stage of Malware incident management, 
what are required and the research solution proposals. 
Table 2.3: Research Needs And Proposal 
Challenges  Needs  Solution Proposal 
To coordinate response 
activities over 
geographically distributed 
ICT assets in a timely 
manner 
Coordinated, timely and 
distributed containment 
before Malware induces re-
infection, harden its 
infection hold or initiate 
follow-up attack vector 
Adopt the modus operandi 
of Botnet specifically with 
its coordinated and 
distributed characteristics of 
as part of Malware 
Remediation 
Current conventional 
countermeasures have 
Effective inactivation 
techniques that can defunct 
Adopt the use of Malware’s 
offensive techniques against   38 
limited effectiveness in 
Malware containment 
the Malware or stop 
inducing further risks to the 
organization 
Malware 
Malware has evasive, 
offensive and anti-forensic 
techniques for self-
preservation 
Defence mechanisms or 
remediation tools need to 
have self-preservation 
capabilities otherwise they 
will be rendered useless 
Adopt Malware’s resilience 
design into defence and 
remediation tools 
 
The following diagram illustrates how the research proposal may be applied in 
Malware Remediation. 
Figure 2.1: Research Solution Illustration 
 
The use of Malware approaches may introduce ethical and legal concerns. Hence, 
the  context  of  the  solution  is  limitedly  applied  within  an  organization  where  the 
ownership  of  the  devices  or  equipment  is  solely  belonging  to  the  entity.  Also  to   39 
enable the use of such approaches, a formal endorsement from management and owners 
of the organizations will be required. This could be done so through the organization’s 
security  and  management  policy.  The  intended  outcome  of  the  proposal  is  to  restore 
control over the organization’s IT assets during a Malware infection or outbreak which is 
deemed to be a higher priority for the organisation than access of the IT resources by the 
individuals. 
2.6  RELATED WORK 
This section looks into existing solutions or research development on the noted 
challenges  faced  by  Incident  Responders  during  the  ‘Respond’  process  as  part  of 
Malware Remediation. 
2.6.1  RELATED WORK ON COORDINATED CONTAINMENT 
Noting the effects of Malware, efficiency of infection propagation, and the limits 
of traditional approaches of reliance on signatures, manual containment and quarantine, 
the  Distributed  Computing  Systems  Laboratory  at  FORTH-ICS  initiated  two  funded 
projects namely LOBSTER and NoaH in Europe [85]. However, both projects are based 
on passive monitoring of Internet traffic and honeypot technologies to aid in detection of 
Malware  outbreak  instead  of  containment.  Most  research  done  on  distributed  Anti-
Malware solutions either focus more on detection of Malware, or on containment carried 
out in an uncoordinated manner.   40 
Cai et al. [86] proposed a scalable security overlay architecture to enable fast 
containment of Internet worm outbreaks. It is based on distributed P2P design patterns 
that overlay on top of multiple edge networks. However, as acknowledged by the authors, 
the research challenges still rely in the execution of containment. Also, the solutions 
narrowly focused on network layer and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are 
not able to fully support varied tactical needs of Incident Responders’ operations.  
Dixon [87] proposed the use of a Botnet like solution, the Phalanx, with swarms 
of  good  computers  to  neutralize  the  onslaught  attacks  of  malicious  Botnets.  Their 
approach is to use the ‘good’ computers in content distribution network (CDN) to provide 
a  protective  shield  over  the  targeted  of  the  malicious  Botnet  by  channelling  the 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) or spams onto itself. According to Inman [88], such 
approach makes sense in that such CDNs are sizeable to fend off attacks from Botnets 
that are significantly large. The Phalanx has specific network design requirements like 
filtering ring at the border routers at the tier-1 ISP. However, this approach may be useful 
only at where the origins of attacks reside – external to the organization or enterprise. It 
therefore lacks applicability for infection occurring within the organization. Stytz and 
Banks [89] advocated the use of a defensive Botnets (DBNs) to assess and counteract 
cyberattacks autonomously. However they stop short of proposing how the DBNs will be 
designed and developed. It focused on the creating a simulation testbed to effectively 
evaluate DBN. A proposition by Curtis et al. [90] advocated the use of intelligent agents 
to provide automated intrusion response to incidents. However there is no attempt to 
validate such distributed agents could aid in the containment of an infectious outbreak.   41 
A  research  being  led  by  Cyberspace  Sciences  and  Information  Intelligence 
Research Group, USA [91] looked into developing a framework to support distributed 
detection and containment. However there is no noted model to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a distributed framework. 
2.6.2  RELATED WORK ON OFFENSIVE CONTAINMENT 
Leder et al. [81] argued that due to the advancement of Malware, conventional or 
classical containment techniques need to be complemented with offensive approaches. In 
their research, it has been shown that offensive techniques like counter hacking, which 
are proactive countermeasures, are effective in combating Malware. However its research 
study  did  not  advocate  the  use  of  Malware’s  offensive  techniques  for  Malware 
Remediation. Szor commented [67] that launching a counterattack that includes the use 
of exploit codes or network messages against infected machines is considered a network 
level defence strategy. However there are concerns about using such techniques against 
remote systems that do not belong to the organization. This is not applicable in this 
context as the intended techniques are meant to be used within an organization that 
has full control over all its IT assets. Leder et al. [81] noted the constraints brought 
about  by  ethical  and  legal  concerns  in  the  use  of  such  offensive  techniques.  In  this 
context, such techniques can be authorized through the organization’s policy and invoked 
only within the context of the organization. Hence the ethical and legal concerns may not 
apply as such measures are applied if the IT equipment and information involved belongs 
to individuals or an organization. According to Alsagoff [92], the researcher advocated   42 
that while Anti-Malware solutions are ineffective against Malware, manual removal of 
Malware that includes termination of Malware process, removal of Malware start-up and 
removal of Malware files are still relevant. This is a form of offensive containment or 
remediation.  Again  there  is  no  reference  to  Malware’s  characteristics.  Hence  what  is 
needed is a study into offensive techniques, specifically those used by Malware, that may 
be used to overcome the resilience of Malware in order to defunct them before they 
induce further damage.  
2.6.3  RELATED WORK ON RESILIENT CONTAINMENT 
There is a number of research work done that concentrated on how to harden or 
protect the defences or remediation tools after attacks. According to Xue [93], there are 
vulnerabilities in Anti-Virus software and the author noted four kinds of vulnerabilities in 
such software. Firstly, they are local privilege escalation where the Anti-Virus software 
like other software is at risk of being exploited to gain uncompromised access to the 
Operating System. Secondly, the underlying technology vulnerabilities like ActiveX have 
been  exploit.  Anti-Virus  software  that  uses  such  technology  is  exposed.  Thirdly  the 
engine of the Anti-Virus software is complex due to the complexity of the adversary that 
it is trying to defeat. However, with such complexity, there will be vulnerabilities in them 
that can be exploited. Finally, most Anti-Virus software has management components to 
facilitate the administration of such software. Typically they use client server designs to 
develop these components. Such design uses various forms of TCP/IP communication 
protocols to communicate which in turn have vulnerabilities. Xue’s recommendation to   43 
mitigate  the  risks  of  vulnerability  exploitation  in  Anti-Virus  software  was  to  adopt 
security  development  lifecycle  into  the  development  of  Anti-Virus  software  and  to 
conduct audits and fuzz test, that involves providing invalid or random data to inputs, on 
the software products. Finally, Xue suggested the setting up of an avenue for updates to 
be pushed down in a timely manner. Another researcher, Srinivasan, advocated that Anti-
Virus  software  can  be  protected  against  Malware  attacks  by  hiding  the  Anti-Virus 
software  from  other  processes  including  those  belonging  to  the  Malware  [70].  His 
solution entails changing the names of the files, registry entries and using a different 
name. His proposition matches that of the behaviour of Malware. However he stopped 
short of stating that similar techniques are also used by Malware. Kerivan and Brothers 
[94] conducted a series of attack tests, liken to those initiated by Malware, against a few 
security software namely IPS and Anti-Virus.  Their test demonstrated that none of the 
security software could fend themselves against such forms of attacks, however the IPS 
was more robust than the Anti-Virus software.   
None of the above mentioned researches explicitly studied Malware’s resiliency 
designs or mechanisms and assessed whether they can be incorporated into defence tools 
used  in  prevention  and  containment  to  enhance  its  resilience.  This  provided  the 
motivation  and  justification  of  the  research  strategies  and  adopted  approaches  being 
described in the subsequent chapters. 
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3  DISTRIBUTED AND COORDINATED CONTAINMENT 
This  chapter  details  the  research  proposition  on  the  use  of  Distributed  and 
Coordinated modus operandi of a Botnet to contain a Malware incident. 
3.1  RESEARCH PROPOSITION  
This proposal suggests mimicking the distributed and coordinated behaviour of 
Malware, more specifically of the C&C Botnet, as part of the Malware Remediation 
strategy. The proposition is to leverage on the distributed and coordinated characteristics 
of participating Bots in Botnet and their ability to execute their tasks as a collective 
action.  The  distributed  characteristic  entails  having  the  non-malicious  or  good  Bots 
spread infectiously among computing hosts. The coordinated characteristic entails having 
the Bots’ activities directed centrally. The Malware Remediation Bots mentioned in this 
section will be referred to as Good Bots and collectively they are referred to as Good 
Botnet. 
3.2  RELATED BIOLOGICAL DISEASE RESEARCH  
In  the  area  of  biological  disease  research,  there  is  a  commonly  used  method 
known as viral vector that is used by molecular biologists to deliver genetic materials into 
cells  using  pathogenic  virus  (or  an  infectious  germ).  These  viruses  are  modified  to 
minimize the risk of handling or using them. The risk is removed through the removal of 
genes in the virus that induces harm or disease. They are substituted with genes coded to   45 
provide the intended outcome of the applier. This is also known as transduction. This 
technique was first used in 1976 by Paul Berg [95] that involved the modification of 
SV40 virus containing DNA from the bacteriophage lambda to infect monkey kidney 
cells maintained in culture. In a way, it is viewed as using pathogenic proteins to counter 
other pathogens. 
Viral  vector  has  been  developed  to  be  as  an  alternative  to  other  pathogenic 
treatment methods like transfection which is the process of introducing nucleic acids 
directly into cells. The latter is preferred over virus-mediated approach to induce DNA 
transfer as the former is deemed to be more laborious. Viral vector has been used in gene 
therapy that uses these ‘good’ viruses to deliver un-mutated copies of the genes to replace 
the mutated ones. However there is a down side to this approach, which is the immunity 
response from the human body defences when the technique is applied. Viral Vector has 
been  used  in  vaccine  development.  An  example  is  the  Adenovirus  as  shown  in  the 
diagram below.   46 
Figure 3.1: Gene Therapy from U.S. National Library of Medicine1 
 
An example of using this approach is the use of Viral Vector approach to deliver 
vaccine to prostate cancer cells [96]. 
3.3  METHOD OF EVALUATION  
The  proposed  hypothesis  is  that  a  Botnet  like  containment  strategy  can 
quantitatively  improve  containment  effort  of  a  Malware  incident  over  conventional 
containment strategy. The primary independent variable is the containment strategy to 
                                                 
1 Figure from Wikipedia (http://genmed.yolasite.com/resources/therapyvector.jpg)   47 
Malware  Remediation  specifically  in  the  deployment  of  Incident  Responders.  The 
primary dependent variable is the quantitative measure of the containment strategy in the 
form of the duration of Malware Remediation and extent of data loss impact. In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of using a Malware like containment strategy, an epidemic 
model is developed. These epidemic-like outbreaks can be simulated using mathematical 
models. However, based on this research, there is no model to assess the effectiveness of 
Malware incident response plan. While mathematical models can be extended to support 
the simulation of response plan, there are many variable considerations that the incident 
response plan would need to factor in. The epidemic model used in this research will be 
an  Agent-based  model  that  will  be  validated  by  a  SIR  (Susceptible,  Infected  and 
Recovered) model by Kermack and McKendrick [97]. This validation approach is known 
as model alignment [98].  
The Agent Based Modelling enables ‘what-if’ scenarios to be considered in order 
to  better  simulate  the  responses  of  Incident  Responders.  This  proposed  Agent  Based 
Modelling  is  called  Agent  based  Malware  Containment  Model  (or  AMCM)  and  it  is 
implemented with Netlogo [99] as illustrated below. Sample codes completed in Netlogo 
are shown as follows.   48 
Figure 3.2: Agent Based Malware Containment Model Developed in Netlogo 
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Figure 3.3: Sample Netlogo Code of AMCM 
 
Two  forms  of  quantitative  measurement  approaches  are  used  in  the  proposed 
model to assess their effectiveness under the test scenarios. They are the measure of time 
in terms of simulation ticks, and the extent of data loss in terms of Megabytes (MB) over 
the simulation period.   50 
3.3.1  MODELLING CONTAINMENT 
According to the work by Zelonis [100], Malware outbreak is likened to public 
health threats. The author went further to advocate the use of a public health response 
approach to counter the spread of Malware. Boase and Wellman [101] argued that the 
transmission  characteristics  of  Malware  are  likened  to  that  of  biological  equivalence. 
While it is acknowledged in the paper that the computer viruses and biological viruses 
have  different  constituent  elements  and  processes,  they  are  bound  by  the  same 
connectivity realities. Given this premise, epidemic models may be used to study the 
effectiveness  of  containment  plans  for  the  Malware  epidemic  that  occurs  within  an 
organization. Such epidemic models allow researchers and responders to optimize their 
containment plan to mitigate the risks imposed by the outbreak. A notably popular and 
simple model used frequently in epidemic modelling is the SIR model by Kermack and 
McKendrick [97] that compartmentalizes the community under threat into three states 
namely  “Susceptible”,  “Infected”  and  “Recovered”.  The  model  has  deterministic 
characteristics.  
There  are  many  epidemic  models  developed  to  simulate  the  propagation 
behaviour of Malware in order to forecast the extent of infection caused by the Malware. 
There  are  a  few  models  for  containment.  They  are  used  to  model  the  application  of 
specific remediation activity or mechanisms like patching. However there is no model on 
the impact of incident response’s Malware Remediation plans by Incident Responders to 
the propagation progress of Malware epidemic outbreak. Staniford et al. [102] studied the 
epidemic effects that a Malware has and advocated the creation of “Cyber-Center for   51 
Disease  Control”  to  identifying  outbreaks,  rapidly  analysing  pathogens,  fighting 
infections, anticipating new vectors, proactively devising detectors for new vectors and 
resisting future threats. However they stopped short in defining a model to evaluate the 
effectiveness of ‘Fighting Infections’ as part of the reactive response and containment 
strategy. Arino et al. [103] advocated that simple epidemic models could be used in the 
analysis of containment efforts. However in a containment plan, there are many variables 
that  contribute  to  the  effectiveness  of  response  and  containment  plan.  Using  the 
mathematically based epidemic model to simulate such variations will greatly complicate 
the model and hinder its use. It seems that there is no optimal model to simulate the 
effectiveness of response / containment efforts by Incident Responders against a Malware 
outbreak while supporting the many variables and considerations. Hence the proposal in 
this  study  is  to  have  an  Agent  based  Malware  Containment  Model  to  address  the 
shortcomings from previous research. 
3.3.1.1  Agent based Modelling 
According  to  Macal  and  North  [104],  Agent  Based  Model  (ABM)  is  “a  new 
approach to modelling systems comprising of autonomous, interacting agents”. An ABM 
consists  of  a  collection  of  agents,  an  environment,  and  a  set  of  codified  rules  for 
managing the agents' behaviour and activities. Each agent will carry its own attributes 
representing its current state. It will also have a step function (usually stochastically) that 
moves the agents from their current state to the next state at each time step. An ABM 
provides  the  means  to  analyse  a  system’s  behaviour  using  "what-if"  analysis  under   52 
different conditions. This will aid in the evaluation of control strategy options to fight 
epidemics. In the context of this study, the characteristics of the actors involved in a 
Malware outbreak, namely the Malware itself and Incident Responders, are autonomous 
and interactive among themselves and in the “fight” against each other. Hence the Agent 
Based form of modelling will provide the means and flexibility to simulate ‘what-if’ 
scenarios in order to evaluate the effectiveness of various containment approach options. 
The following are supporting reasons to use ABM in modelling containment strategies by 
Incident Responders. 
a.  Intelligence – Malware has been noted to contain aspects of intelligence to 
achieve its objectives to infiltrate, steal and stay hidden; similarly human 
would  exhibit  greater  intelligence  capacity  to  adapt  and  deal  with  the 
situation. 
b.  Purpose  –  Malware  has  its  objectives  encoded  into  itself  and  will 
progressively update itself over time; human responders’ activities will be 
driven with an intent to contain the Malware from further escalations and 
totally eradicate the malice. 
c.  Situated in space and time – The scenario will exist over an organization’s 
enterprise infrastructure and time is an important variable included in the 
modelling (both mathematical and agent based) 
Thus leads to the proposition to develop the Agent based Malware Containment 
Model or AMCM to model Malware Remediation strategies. Details are given in the 
following sections.   53 
3.3.1.2  Related Work on Agent based Containment Model 
This section looks into the existing solutions and research development on the 
modelling of Malware outbreak and containment.  
PROPAGATION MODEL OF MALWARE OR COMPUTER EPIDEMIOLOGY 
Garetto et al. [105] advocated the use of Interactive Markov Chains to model the 
propagation behaviour of Malware on a network. The Random Constant Spread (RCS) 
model, based on differential equations, was developed by Staniford et al. [102] using 
empirical data derived from the outbreak of the CodeRed worm to model its propagation. 
Chen et al. [106] suggested the use of mathematically based discrete time model called 
Analytical  Active  Worm  Propagation  (AAWP)  to  characterize  worm  propagation. 
Analysis of their model was done against an Epidemiological model. Vlachos et al. [107] 
advocated the use of network graph to model computer epidemiology. Zou et al. [108] 
used a simple epidemic model and exponential models to analyse their monitoring and 
early detection system that studies the trends of malicious activities. Kim et al. [109] 
extended the basic SIR Model to support the analysis of the dynamics of incubation 
period of epidemic Malware code. Most research focused on network based Malware 
propagation.  Faghani  and  Saidi  [110]  used  the  Epidemic  model  to  simulate  Malware 
propagation over social networking sites. 
Malware outbreak can be studied using epidemic model, however there are limits 
and studies by Zou et al. [108] have noted such limits. They cited that such models would 
not be able to characterize the setup of the environment in which the Malware outbreak 
occurs.  Also,  such  models  cannot  be  factored  in  the  collaborative  characteristics  of   54 
Malware. However in another research paper by the same authors (Zou et al.) [111], they 
argued that epidemic models are still relevant to compute the propagation of Malware 
(specifically of a worm). While the simple and generic epidemic models like SIR are 
commonly  used,  these  models  covered  herein  this  section  do  not  model  containment 
scenarios considerations.  
COUNTERMEASURES VARIABLE IN MODELLING 
Goranin and Cenys [112] proposed the use of genetic based algorithms to model 
Botnet  propagation  and  its  impact  when  countermeasures  exist.  However  this  model 
looks at the measure taken by defence mechanism deployed less the contribution from 
Incident  Responders.  Ingols  et  al.  [113]  used  attack  graph  to  model  the  spread  and 
countermeasures.  Like  Goranin  and  Cenys’  model,  it  did  not  consider  Incident 
Responders’ contribution or how best to optimize the deployment of responders. Li et al. 
[114] developed a model to estimate the maximum likely impact of a zero-day Malware 
outbreak based on the size of susceptible host population according to the inter-arrival 
times of distinct scanners detected by the dark port detectors, in order to aid the definition 
of a network and collaborative containment strategy in an enterprise network. Sellke et al. 
[115] proposed the use of the stochastic branching process model to characterize the 
propagation of worms and proposed the idea of restricting scans to unique IP addresses. 
While the model studied a containment strategy, it was limited in its scope or support for 
variation  to  the  strategy.  Brumley  et  al.  [116]  created  a  taxonomy  for  containment 
strategies and evaluated them during a Malware outbreak by using epidemic models. 
However  the  response  strategies  covered  in  that  research  did  not  consider  the   55 
involvement of Incident Responders and their limits. Chen and Jamil [117] suggested the 
use of an epidemic model to simulate the efforts used to quarantine a worm epidemic. 
However, the limits of their model prevented them from conducting comprehensive or 
complex models of ‘what ifs’ scenarios. Also, it did not look into the considerations of 
Incident Responders. Zou et al. [118] modelled the effects of network topologies in the 
spread of Malware propagation via email. They did include a static immunization model 
that entails having computing nodes made non-vulnerable to the Malware passively. They 
advocated future developments to include dynamic process of immunization and that is 
the direction being adopted in this study. 
AGENT BASED MODELLING 
Bose and Shin [119] proposed an Agent based Malware Model (AMM) to study 
the propagation behaviour of Malware on mobile devices. However it lacked containment 
considerations.  Kim  et  al.  [120]  demonstrated  the  use  of  Agent  based  Model  to 
demonstrate  it  can  be  used  to  estimate  and  predict  the  spread  of  Avian  Influenza  in 
various attributes and environments in a given population (South Korea) and to aid in 
identifying an effective means to contain the virus. Khalil et al. [121] is another example 
that illustrated the use of Agent-based Model to identify optimal containment strategies 
for a Pandemic in Egypt. Nevertheless, to the knowledge of the author, there has been no 
attempt on the modelling of containment of Malware by Incident Responders.   56 
3.3.1.3  Agent based Malware Containment Modelling  
Given the unavailability of a model to meet the requirements for this research, the 
proposition is to use an Agent Based Modelling (ABM) to simulate the Malware outbreak 
and a response strategy to contain the outbreak by Incident Responders. The approach 
involves  the  use  of  a  multi-agent  system  to  model  Incident  Responders  carrying  out 
containment of Malware within an organization’s network. The ABM model developed 
uses  the  compartmental  model  that  has  three  states  –  ‘Susceptible’,  ‘Infected’  and 
‘Recovered’ liken to that of SIR. The Agent Based Modelling tool used in this research is 
Netlogo. The ABM adopted in this study is termed “Agent based Malware Containment 
Modelling (AMCM)”. 
CONFIGURATION OF THE MODEL 
One key component considered in the model is the parameters included in the 
AMCM.  They  form  the  basis  to  represent  the  model  and  to  facilitate  scenario 
experiments.  There  are three types  of  parameters.  The  first  type  is  assigned  constant 
values that do not change during the execution of the simulation run. They carry the same 
value in all the tests.  
Table 3.1: AMCM's Constants 
Parameter  Description  Constant Value 
Population size of hosts   Total size of computing hosts  3721 
Random Seed  Random seed variable to support the 
random characteristic of the model 
0 
Infection Rate  Rate of infection  0.04 (or 4%) 
Number  of  Committed 
Incident Responders 
Number of Incident Responders 
committed at the start of the Malware 
Remediation.  
Integer [0 to 100]; 
Set to 20 
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Parameter  Description  Constant Value 
An artibutary 
value given. 
Prioritization Levels  Levels of prioritization assignment to 
computing hosts. Used with Incident 
Responders when prioritization is used 
(refer to Table 3.3: AMCM Parameters Used 
In Experiment Scenarios). Also used with 
computation of extent of data loss.  
 
 
Integer [0 to 3]; 
Set to 2 
 
The priority level 
is set to two to 
simulate a simple 
evaluation of 
whether a 
computing host is 
important or 
otherwise. 
Availability of 
Remediation Solution 
This is the time tick value when the 
remediation solution is available. In 
typical situation, the remediation by the 
incident response team should only 
when the remediation solution is 
available. 
400 
 
An artibutary 
value given. 
 
 
The second type is the global variables used in the model. The initial values for 
these variables are the same in all simulation tests covered in this thesis. The values of 
these variables change as simulation model advances in time event. They reflect the state 
of the model at any particular time step.   
 
Table 3.2: AMCM's Global Variables 
Parameter  Description  Initial Value 
Number of Susceptible 
hosts  
Number of computing hosts which can 
be infected by the Malware 
3720 
Number of Infected hosts  Number of computing hosts already 
infected by the Malware 
1 
Number of Recovered 
hosts 
Number of computing hosts which has 
been remediated from infection 
0 
 
   58 
The model has additional parameters to facilitate the simulation of conventional 
and  Malware  like  (Good  Botnet)  containment  strategies.  This  is  the  third  type  of 
parameters. A description of the parameters is as follows. 
Table 3.3: AMCM Parameters Used In Experiment Scenarios 
Scenario 
Parameter 
Description  Field Type 
Coordinated  On – Incident responders’ activities 
(specifically which hosts to attend to and 
its directional movements) are centrally 
managed. 
 
Off – Incident responders randomly 
selects the infected hosts to deal with. 
Boolean – On / Off 
Prioritization  On – Incident responders attend to the 
highest priority hosts before proceeding 
to the next highest level of priority hosts. 
In this research, only 2 levels are used. 
Hence if this parameter is On, the 
Incident Responders will attend to 
important hosts first before attending to 
the rest.  
 
Off – Incident responders deal with the 
nearest infected hosts. 
Boolean – On / Off 
Proximity Motion  On – Incident responders have the time 
overheads to travel from one host to 
another. Time overheads are computed 
by the number of movements per tick to 
reach the infected host.  
 
Off – There is no time overheads 
between Incident Responders to its 
selected infected hosts. Also only one 
time tick is required to reach the selected 
infected host regardless of how far it is 
from the Incident Responder agent. 
Boolean – On / Off 
Good Infection  On – Incident responders behave like 
Botnets and spread themselves to 
Boolean – On / Off   59 
Scenario 
Parameter 
Description  Field Type 
infected hosts in the same manner as 
malicious Botnets. The number of 
Incident Responders grows at the rate of 
infection rate. The limit to the parameter 
of the number of committed Incident 
Responders does not apply. 
 
Off – Incident responders do not behave 
like Botnets and adheres to the limit of 
the parameter value of committed 
Incident Responders. 
Response Time  This is the start time tick that Incident 
Responders will start remediation 
activities against infected hosts. Under 
typical situation, this parameter will be 
the same as the parameter for 
Availability of Remediation Solution. 
Integer – 0 or Greater 
 
The  AMCM,  implemented  in  Netlogo  has  three  types  of  agents,  namely  the 
vulnerable  computing  hosts,  the  Malware  involved  in  the  epidemic  and  the  Incident 
Responders.  The  computing  hosts  do  not  have  any  coded  rules  in  this  simulation. 
However it carries the status of the epidemic – that is whether it is ‘Susceptible’ to 
infection, ‘Infected’ by the Malware or ‘Recovered’ by the Incident Responders. The 
Malware  agents  will  multiply  themselves  at  the  rate  defined  by  “Infection  Rate” 
parameter. They will only infect ‘Susceptible’ hosts and will not reinfect ‘Recovered’ 
hosts. The spread of Malware will cease when all ‘Susceptible’ hosts in the population is 
infected. The Incident Responder agents seek out ‘Infected’ hosts and turn them into 
‘Recovered’ hosts. In this simulation model, the Incident Responders will always be able 
to  remediate  an  ‘Infected’  host.  The  key  consideration  or  ‘what-if’  options  is  the   60 
coordination of the Incident Responder agents in terms of which infected hosts to attend 
to and its ability to improve its reach to infected hosts. The mentioned parameters and 
agents have been coded into the simulation model in order to simulate the characteristics 
of various agents involved and support ‘what-if’ scenarios.  
There are assumptions incorporated into the model. One key assumption is that 
the ‘Availability of Remediation Solution’ or the lead time, which is a global variable 
parameter, is sufficient to identify the required remediation solution to contain Malware 
and to turn an ‘Infected’ host to ‘Recovered’ status. The effectiveness of the remediation 
is not considered in this model. Hence another assumption is that the remediation solution 
identified by the lead-time is able to totally defunct the Malware involved. 
3.3.1.4  Model Alignment to Existing Models 
The validation of the proposed Agent Based epidemiological simulation model 
cannot be easily done due to the lack of publicly available and reliable field data of past 
Malware  outbreak  incidents  that  occurred  within  contained  environment  like  an 
organization’s network. Sensitivity of such data with respect to an organization, even if it 
was ever captured is a constraint, hence such data is not easily obtained. Also, there are 
procedural  considerations  and  resource  constraints  with  any  attempt  to  reconstruct  a 
Malware outbreak with containment to gather sampling data for the analysis. In order to 
overcome  these  limitations,  an  epidemiological  model  was  developed  to  simulate  the 
Malware outbreak using a mature modelling approach. This is then followed by model 
alignment. The approach was developed by Axtell et al. [98] that involved aligning both   61 
models  or  “docking”.  This  entails  matching  the  output  of  the  proposed  Agent  Based 
Model to that of the mature epidemiological model using available and limited published 
information about the Malware spread characteristics. Such model alignment approach 
has been used in other model propositions. For example, Vlachos et al. [122] proposed a 
graph model to study the spread of Malware as an early warning system. They used 
generic epidemic model from Kermack and McKendrick [97] to verify their model. Chen 
et al. [123] did the same for the simulation of smallpox outbreak. Khalil et al. [121]’s 
paper on Agent-based Modelling of Pandemic used the same approach. Skvortsov et al. 
[124] argued that aligning the inputs and outputs of both Agent Based Model and SIR 
model provide a necessary foundational validation step so that the ABM can be extended 
to handle more complex scenarios that is the intent of this research. In this research, the 
mature model is the basic SIR model that is used extensively in modelling Malware 
propagation  as  mentioned  in  the  previous  section.  Also,  the  available  but  limited 
published information about the Malware to be modelled is the infection rate.  
The model alignment with SIR was done in the following manner.  
MODEL ALIGNMENT 
a.  Generate output of an epidemic model on the spread of Malware using SIR 
with inclusion of CSIRTs containment effort. 
b.  Generate output from the AMCM with the same scenario 
c.  Align Models based on outputs of the models 
Both  the  proposed  new  AMCM  and  SIR  approaches  modelled  the  spread 
characteristics  of  the  notorious  Conficker  that  has  infected  millions  of  computers  in   62 
Internet since Nov 2008. Publicly available information about the characteristics of the 
outbreak of Conficker was computed in context of the global Internet network that is not 
applicable  in  the  context  of  this  study,  however  the  publicised  information  about 
infection rate will be used. According to the technical report by SRI International for 
Office  of  Naval  Research,  USA  [125]  and  a  report  by  InfoSecurity.com  [126],  the 
infection rate of this Malware is 4%. The rate of infection is therefore applied to both 
models. The rate of removal by the Incident Responders’ participation and lead-time or 
value of the ‘Availability of Remediation Solution’ parameter to identify the remediation 
will be factored in into both the AMCM and SIR model. For the SIR model, the main 
mathematical equations are listed as follows. 
Equation 3.1: SIR Epidemiological Equation 
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(3)   63 
 
 
 
The output of AMCM was compared to the SIR model’s output. The general 
characteristics  of  both  outputs  were  similar  but  not  exactly  the  same.  This  could  be 
because  of:  (i)  the  extent  of  parameter  considerations  included  into  the  model  for 
AMCM, (ii) random characteristics of the AMCM for the selection of susceptible hosts to 
be infected vs the deterministic characteristics in SIR model, and (iii) the definition of the 
limits on number of responders in AMCM against that of SIR model.   64 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: AMCM's Output 
Figure 3.4: Output of SIR Model   65 
One significant difference between the two models is the rate of removal of the 
infected  hosts.  The  AMCM  performed  faster  than  the  SIR  model.  This  is  possibly 
because of the discrete characteristics of the AMCM compared with the mathematical 
continuous  characteristics  of  the  SIR  model  (eg,  At  time  0,  there  will  be  10  hosts 
infected, 2 CSIRTs, the recovery ratio is 0.2 or 2 hosts recovered; at time 1, there will be 
8 hosts infected and 2 CSIRTs responding, recovery ratio is 0.16 which is not 2 whole 
hosts being recovered). Hence the Agent Based Modelling may better simulate real-life 
conditions where one responder handles one host compared to partial handling of hosts as 
computed by the mathematical SIR model. With this, the AMCM is model aligned and 
used to support other experimental scenarios in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
However  before  discussing  the  outcome  of  the  experiments,  the  quantitative 
measurement approached used in the experiments will be discussed next. 
3.3.2  QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
The primary objective of Malware Remediation is to minimize the impact of an 
outbreak  due  to  Malware  attack.  The  quantitative  measure  of  a  successful  Malware 
Remediation strategy is typically the duration of Malware incident until the closure of the 
event. Another measure being proposed in this study is the extent of data loss resulting 
from the Malware incident.    66 
3.3.2.1  Time Measurement 
Time  is  measured  from  the  first  instance  of  a  Malware  infection  until  the 
eradication of the Malware completely. Time measured in the AMCM is based on the 
simulation model ticks that implicitly included in the Netlogo model. At the event of a 
new tick, all agents in the AMCM take its programmed steps. The measure of time to 
remediate  a  Malware  incident  is  also  a  frequently  used  measure  as  reported  in  the 
literature [78], [79].  
3.3.2.2  Data Loss Measurement 
In this section, a measure of data loss as an output from the simulation model for 
Malware  containment  analysis  is  proposed.  The  AMCM  is  extended  to  compute  the 
measure of data loss in terms of an amount of quantitative data bytes. The independent 
variable to which the measure of data loss is based on time or event ticks in the AMCM. 
In this research, data loss is considered to be proportional to the amount of data leakage 
from the organization. While other forms of data loss like data destruction may also be 
used, it is recommended for future research.  
The AMCM model has a number of input parameters. The outputs from the model 
include  simulation  duration  (which  is  time  ticks  in  Netlogo)  and  an  account  of  the 
number  of  hosts  according  to  various  infectious  statuses.  The  proposition  is  to  have 
another output variable that is the measure of data loss or leakage. This is illustrated in 
the diagram below.   67 
Figure 3.6: AMCM's Inputs and Outputs 
 
 
As with most epidemiological models, the rate of infection and disinfection is 
included  in  the  AMCM  model.  Each  infected  host  contributes  to  the  extent  of  data 
leakage. The rate of data leakage is a percentage of the maximum output an infected host 
can generate onto the network that includes both malicious and legitimate traffic.  
The following formula extends the AMCM model stated in Section 3.3.1.4 to 
support the computation of data leakage.  
Equation 3.2: Data Leakage Equation 
   
(4) 
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Data  leakage  in  this  research  is  only  computed  with  infected  hosts.  The  unit 
measurement of data leakage is computed in megabytes per simulation unit time. In this 
research, the measure of the extent of data loss is portional to the assigned significance of 
the  computing  host.  Hence  a  computing  host  tagged  as  an  important  priority  will 
contribute to data loss. The computing host without priority tag will not contribute to data 
loss. This may be so if the organization considers the data stored in important infected 
hosts as significant to the organization but otherwise for unimportant ones. 
There are assumptions included in the model to support data loss measurement. 
First, duplicity of the data is not considered. Hence the same data may be leaked into the 
Internet more than once hence the extent of data loss could actually be lower. Second, it 
is assumed that the connectivity to the Internet from the infected hosts or means for data 
leakage to occur will always exist.  
DATA LEAKAGE CONFIGURATION OF SIMULATION MODEL 
The following describes the configuration of the parameters for the measurement 
of data loss by the AMCM model. As mentioned previously, data loss in this research 
effort  refers  to  data  leakage  and  the  parameters  configured  in  the  simulations  are 
considered to be constant throughout all the tests. 
Table 3.4: Parameters used in AMCM for Simulation of Data Loss Measurement 
Parameter  Default Value 
Data transmission rate per host  10 Megabytes per unit time 
Data Leakage rate per host  20% 
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The measure of data leakage is in megabytes per unit time. Unit time is measured 
in terms of event ticks in Netlogo. The extent of data leakage for an infected host is 
computed to be 2 megabyte per unit time (20% of 10 Megabytes per unit time). The 
global variables of AMCM are unchanged as mentioned in Section 3.3.1.3.  
In all test scenarios conducted in this chapter, each and every computing host in 
the AMCM was assigned with a random value of either 0 or 1. This is to support a simple 
form of prioritization to be used with the prioritization variable in AMCM as to whether a 
host  is  important  or  otherwise.  This  form  of  prioritization  assignment  facilitates  the 
computation  of  data  loss.  As  mentioned  earlier,  an  infected  host  with  a  priority  tag, 
deemed as important, will contribute 2 megabytes per unit time to the extent of data 
leakage. An unimportant infected host contributes nothing to data leakage computation.  
3.3.3  EXPERIMENTATION 
The  previous  section  demonstrated  the  evaluation  of  AMCM  through  model 
alignment.  This  was  followed  testing  of  AMCM  against  conventional  containment 
strategies, and then with Malware like containment strategies. In practice, conventional 
containment  strategies  are  limited  by  the  availability  of  adequate  personnel  with  the 
necessary  skills  or  knowledge  to  carry  out  the  containment  effort  on  the  numerous 
infected hosts. Given such limitations, some forms of scheduling algorithms are needed 
to overcome this constraint. In this thesis, the First In First Out (FIFO) and Prioritization 
(or  also  known  as  fixed  priority  pre-emptive)  scheduling  algorithms  was  used.  For 
Malware like containment strategies, the characteristics of Botnet’s modus operandi were   70 
considered. The following outlines the experiments that were carried out to verify the 
proposed hypothesis that Malware like Containment strategies could be used in Malware 
Remediation.  
CONVENTIONAL CONTAINMENT APPROACHES 
a.  Uncoordinated Containment where Incident Responders randomly select 
‘Infected’ hosts to attend to.  
b.  Coordinated  Containment  based  on  FIFO  algorithm  where  Incident 
Responders’ choice of the infected hosts are centrally coordinated. 
c.   Prioritized  Containment  where  Incident  Responders  attend  first  to 
prioritized  ‘Infected’  computing  hosts  before  proceeding  to  the  non-
prioritized ones. 
MALWARE LIKE CONTAINMENT APPROACHES 
a.  Near-Zero Latency Containment where Incident Responders are able to 
reach any ‘Infected’ computing hosts within one time tick regardless of 
distance. 
b.  Infectious  Containment  where  the  number  of  Incident  Responders 
involved in the Malware epidemic grows at the same rate of the Malware.  
c.   Good  Botnet  containment  where  Incident  Responders  have  the  modus 
operandi of the Botnet that is the ability to spread by themselves, having 
near-zero latency reach, and centrally coordinated.  
For  each  of  the  experiments  or  containment  strategy,  five  repeated  tests  were 
carried out. Repeated tests were done as the AMCM has some random characteristics   71 
such as the initial placement of the Malware and Incident Responders, the assignment of 
prioritization values to each computing host, and the choice of the next infected hosts that 
an Incident Responder will respond to. An arithmetic mean value of the test results was 
computed and it is used as the average performance for comparison purpose. 
3.4  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS 
This section describes the results from the six experiments that were carried out.  
3.4.1  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS OF CONVENTIONAL CONTAINMENT 
This  section  analyses  the  results  of  the  experiments  conducted  to  simulate 
conventional containment strategies. In the experiments, the quantitative measure of time 
and data leakage were taken and analysed. The AMCM parameters used in the following 
tests  have  been  mentioned  in  Section  3.3.1.3.  For  each  test  analysis,  the  parameter 
settings will be discussed. 
3.4.1.1  Uncoordinated Containment 
In this test case, Incident Responder agents decide the order of infected hosts to 
attend  hence  there  is  no  formal  ordered  schedule  being  involved.  There  is  also  no 
overarching coordination over the Incident Responders. Incident responders will likely to 
respond to a host more than once. The Incident Responders have no means to ascertain 
the overall situational status of the Malware incident. However, the AMCM model will 
keep an account of such status, specifically the number of remaining infected hosts. The   72 
simulation will stop the model execution when the last infected host has been dealt with, 
or when the count of the number of remaining infected hosts becomes zero. However the 
Incident Responders are not aware of such condition, as they do not have access to the 
global situation. The following table gives the AMCM parameter settings for this test.  
Table 3.5: Uncoordinated Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  OFF  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in an unorganized manner and will not remember 
which infected hosts they have attended to prior. 
Prioritization  OFF  Incident responders will attend to the first and 
nearest infected hosts it encounters. 
Proximity Motion  ON  Incident  responders  have  latency  overheads 
when traversing between infected hosts. 
Good Infection  OFF  Incident  responders  behave  like  human  based 
responders to infected hosts. 
Response Time  400  The  start  tick  time  to  which  incident  response 
will begin by Incident Responders. 
 
The following is the epidemiological chart on the Malware incident simulation for 
this test case generated by the AMCM.   73 
Figure 3.7: Epidemiological Chart for Uncoordinated Containment 
 
The following is the test results measured in terms of time duration (in ticks) and 
extent of data leakage (in MB). This test case will form the comparison basis for the next 
two test cases.  
Table 3.6: Uncoordinated Containment Test Results 
Test   Time (ticks)  Data Leakage (MB) 
1  8,748  4,780,096 
2  9,822  4,639,280 
3  8,350  4,181,410 
4  9,332  4,810,208 
5  9,175  4,752,988 
Average  9,085  4,632,796 
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3.4.1.2  FIFO Containment 
In this test case, there is an overarching coordinator for all Incident Responder 
agents. The coordinator decides which infected host the Incident Responder will attend 
to. Unlike the previous test case, the coordinator will be aware of the situation. The 
selection of the next infected hosts to attend to will be based on a ‘First-In-First-Out’ 
scheduling approach. This will be dependent on the proximity of the nearest infected 
hosts to Incident Responder agent. If the nearest infected hosts is not next to the Incident 
Responder, the Incident Responder will move one step forward toward that infected host. 
Hence time delay is introduced. 
The following is the AMCM parameter settings for this test. 
Table 3.7: FIFO Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  ON  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in a centrally coordinated organized manner. The 
coordinator will not send Incident Responders to 
repeated locations. 
Prioritization  OFF  Incident responders will attend to the first and 
nearest infected hosts it encounters. 
Proximity Motion  ON  Incident  responders  have  latency  overheads 
when traversing between infected hosts. 
Good Infection  OFF  Incident  responders  behave  like  human  based 
responders to infected hosts. 
Response Time  400  The  start  tick  time  to  which  incident  response 
will begin by Incident Responders. 
 
The  following  is  the  epidemiological  chart  for  this  test  case.  This  is  notable 
amount of improvement at start of remediation to complete eradication of Malware.   75 
Figure 3.8: Epidemiological Chart for FIFO Containment 
 
The following table shows the quantitative measure of time and data leakage.  
Table 3.8: FIFO Containment Test Results 
Test   Time (ticks)  Data Leakage (MB) 
1  874  1,631,560 
2  863  1,601,342 
3  879  1,615,624 
4  874  1,632,698 
5  870  1,609,320 
Average  872  1,618,109 
  
In comparison to the first test case of the uncoordinated containment approach, 
there  is  a  significant  improvement  of  overall  time  duration  to  complete  Malware 
Remediation with this containment strategy. Also, the extent of data leakage is reduced 
significantly.   76 
 
3.4.1.3  Prioritized Containment 
In  this  test  case,  the  focus  is  to  have  Incident  Responder  agents  respond  to 
infected  computing  hosts  that  are  of  significance  to  the  organization.  As  mentioned 
earlier, the level of importance in randomly assigned by the model to each and every 
computing  host.  Similarly  the  extent  of  data  leaked  is  parameterized  into  the  model. 
Similar  to  the  second  test  case,  there  is  an  overarching  coordinator  that  directs, 
commands and controls the Incident Responder agents. However unlike to the previous 
test case, the coordinator will direct the Incident Responders to the most important hosts 
first before dealing with the less important ones.  
The following is the AMCM parameter settings for this test. 
Table 3.9: Prioritized Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  ON  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in a centrally coordinated organized manner. The 
coordinator will not send Incident Responders to 
repeated locations. 
Prioritization  ON  Incident  responders  will  attend  to  the  priority 
infected  hosts  until  all  are  dealt  with  before 
proceeding to the rest. 
Proximity Motion  ON  Incident  responders  have  latency  overheads 
when traversing between infected hosts. 
Good Infection  OFF  Incident  responders  behave  like  human  based 
responders to infected hosts. 
Response Time  400  The  start  tick  time  to  which  incident  response 
will begin by Incident Responders. 
 
The following is the epidemiological chart for this test.   77 
Figure 3.9: Epidemiological Chart for Prioritized Containment 
 
The following table shows the test results for this test case and a comparison with 
the  first  test  case  of  an  uncoordinated  containment,  and  the  second  test  of  FIFO 
containment strategy. 
Table 3.10: Prioritized Containment Test Results 
Test   Time (ticks) 
– FIFO (a) 
Data 
Leakage 
(MB) – 
FIFO (b) 
Time (ticks) 
– 
Prioritized 
(c) 
Data 
Leakage 
(MB) – 
Prioritized 
(d) 
Time 
Advantage 
[(c)/(a)] 
Data 
Leakage – 
Advantage 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  874  1,631,560  1,017  1,370,854  -16.36%  15.98% 
2  863  1,601,342  1,014  1,357,526  -17.50%  15.23% 
3  879  1,615,624  1,010  1,340,170  -14.90%  17.05% 
4  874  1,632,698  1,014  1,332,906  -16.02%  18.36% 
5  870  1,609,320  1,016  1,351,450  -16.78%  16.02% 
Average  872  1,618,109  1,014  1,350,581  -16.31%  16.53% 
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It is noted from this test case that when higher prioritized hosts were dealt with 
first, the extent of data leakage after the event is lower. The reduction is significant 
averaging about 15% compared to non-prioritized containment strategy. It is also noted 
that it took relatively longer time to contain a Malware outbreak when prioritization is 
applied. It took about 15% more time than non-prioritized. This is because the Incident 
Responder agents focused on the higher priority hosts before attending to the others even 
when other hosts were nearer to the agent. The longer duration can be reduced if an 
optimal placement of hosts to support prioritized containment is in place. In this test case, 
the Incident Responders will not respond to unimportant infected hosts even when there 
are more Incident Responder agents than the highest level of infected hosts remaining. 
The means to improve this issue may be considered in future research work.   
3.4.2  ANALYSIS OF MALWARE LIKE CONTAINMENT EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, the model is used to verify the research proposition that a Malware 
like containment specifically that of Botnet will aid in improving containment duration 
and reduce the extent of data loss from a Malware outbreak. Conventional containment 
strategies  namely  FIFO  containment  and  Prioritized  containment  will  be  enhanced 
through the incorporation of Botnet’s characteristics. The Botnet has namely two main 
characteristics that are distinctively different from the Incident Responders. Firstly is the 
bots or Malware’s ability to reach any computer device with near zero latency duration. 
For  the  Incident  Responders,  the  limits  of  distance  from  the  physical  world  induces 
significant amount of time to move from one infected host to another. The second key   79 
characteristic is its ability to spread, or to adopt the infectious characteristics of Malware 
to replicate themselves. In this section, experiments using AMCM were carried out to 
show  the  abovementioned  characteristics  could  contribute  significantly  to  improve 
containment efforts. Finally, the combination of both characteristics plus the ability of 
tightly coordinate a distributed containment liken to a Botnet is demonstrated through the 
final experiment in this section. Another qualification to this research proposition is that 
the software agents or specifically software that behaves like a malicious bot used as 
Incident Responders instead of humanoid Incident Responders, that are constrained by 
travelling distance in the physical world. The AMCM parameters used in the following 
tests are mentioned in section 3.3.1.3.  
3.4.2.1  Near Zero Latency Containment 
A key feature of Malware or specifically Bots from Botnet, is its ability to reach 
or communicate with other hosts with near zero latency or at the speed of the network 
transfer rates. This occurs when there is an enabled network connectivity path between 
the source host that the Malware has already infected, and the target host, which may be a 
susceptible  host  or  another  infected  host,  that  the  Malware  is  trying  to  reach  or 
communicate. Given that the modern networks are capable to transfer megabytes of data 
or handle large volumes of data exchanges in a very short period of time, this could 
enable multiple software agents to communicate with each other as if in real time.  
In this study, it was proposed that Incident Responders might achieve the same 
degree of efficiency if they have the same means of connectivity and reach as Malware in   80 
carrying out remediation activities over the infected hosts. Hence this will remove the 
need for them to physically attend each infected host as it requires time to travel from one 
place  to  another.  In  the  digital  world,  while  there  are  limits  with  the  availability  of 
connectivity and bandwidth, the degree of latency overheads compare to the physical 
world  is  significant  smaller  or  negligible.  The  proposed  solution  is  likened  to  using 
remote  login  or  administration  to  perform  Malware  Remediation  on  remote  infected 
hosts.   
In  this  experiment,  the  key  assumption is  all  the hosts  in  the  AMCM have a 
connectivity path to each other. Also, regardless of the distance between the hosts, there 
is  no  time  duration  due  to  distance  in  reaching  any  host.  This  is  different  from  the 
conventional containment experiments done earlier as the time to reach the selected host 
is the next time tick, based on the assumption that latency is near zero. However, it is 
understood that this assumption may not be true in practice as the network connectivity 
path may have many network segment hops that the packages need to traverse. Also, 
there may be no direct network connectivity route between two nodes, or there may be 
network connectivity control restrictions being applied between certain hosts. In the case 
of an Intranet within an organisation, the assumption however may be valid.  
In  this  experiment,  the  two  conventional  containment  strategies  of  FIFO  and 
Prioritized  containments  were  executed  under  two  conditions.  The  first  condition 
(conventional containment) is when there is proximity limitation between distant nodes, 
induced  time  duration  to  traverse  will  be  applied.  This  will  simulate  the  travelling 
overheads induced by physical distance between hosts. The second condition (near-zero   81 
containment) is when the proximity limitation is not applied regardless of the distance 
between hosts. This will simulate the use of network connectivity to reach infected hosts. 
For  each  strategy,  a  series  of  5  tests  were  carried  out  and  an  arithmetic  mean  was 
computed is the AMCM parameter settings for this test are given in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Near-Zero Latency Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  ON  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in a centrally coordinated organized manner. The 
coordinator will not send Incident Responders to 
repeated locations. 
Prioritization  ON / OFF  Incident  responders  will  prioritize  or  not  their 
choice of infected hosts accordingly. 
Proximity Motion  OFF  Incident  responders  do  not  have  any  latency 
overheads  when  traversing  between  infected 
hosts. 
Good Infection  OFF  Incident  responders  behave  like  human  based 
responders to infected hosts. 
Response Time  400  The  start  tick  time  to  which  incident  response 
will begin by Incident Responders. 
 
The  following  is  the  epidemiological  chart  for  one  of  the  tests  for  FIFO  and 
Prioritized strategies with Near-Zero Latency.    82 
Figure 3.10: Epidemiological Chart for Near-Zero Latency (FIFO) 
 
Figure 3.11: Epidemiological Chart for Near-Zero Latency (Prioritized) 
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The following is the test results for all the 5 tests using the FIFO and Prioritized 
strategies with Near-Zero Latency.  
Table 3.12: Near-Zero Latency Containment Time Test Results 
Time 
Test 
FIFO 
(ticks) (a) 
Prioritized 
(ticks) (b) 
FIFO – 
Near-Zero 
Latency 
(ticks) (c) 
Prioritized 
– Near-
Zero 
Latency 
(ticks) (d) 
FIFO 
Advantage 
[(c)/(a)] 
Prioritized  – 
Advantage 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  874  1,017  771  771  11.78%  24.19% 
2  863  1,014  771  771  10.66%  23.96% 
3  879  1,010  771  771  12.29%  23.66% 
4  874  1,014  771  771  11.78%  23.96% 
5  870  1,016  771  771  11.38%  24.11% 
Average  872  1,014  771  771  11.58%  23.98% 
 
Table 3.13: Near-Zero Latency Containment Data Leakage Test Results 
Data 
Leakage 
Test  
FIFO (MB) 
(a) 
Prioritized 
(MB) (b) 
FIFO – 
Near-Zero 
Latency 
(MB) (c) 
Prioritized 
– Near-
Zero 
Latency 
(MB) (d) 
FIFO 
Advantage 
[(c)/(a)] 
Prioritized – 
Advantage 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  1,631,560  1,370,854  1,552,092  1,253,324  4.87%  8.57% 
2  1,601,342  1,357,526  1,584,072  1,237,902  1.08%  8.81% 
3  1,615,624  1,340,170  1,596,804  1,221,740  1.16%  8.84% 
4  1,632,698  1,332,906  1,563,138  1,205,034  4.26%  9.59% 
5  1,609,320  1,351,450  1,568,490  1,226,668  2.54%  9.23% 
Average  1,618,109  1,350,581  1,572,919  1,228,934  2.78%  9.01% 
 
From  the  experiments,  the  Malware  like  Near-Zero  Latency  reach  improves 
containment  efforts  for  both  conventional  containment  strategies.  Quantitatively,  the 
improvement was greater in the overall duration for Malware Remediation. There was 
marginal improvement in the measure of data leakage. Between the strategies, Prioritized 
gained greater improvement over FIFO. This is reasonable as the prioritization strategy   84 
primarily focuses on the important assets and the distance between nodes is constant 
disregarded in terms of prioritization tagging. This characteristic is constantly noted from 
the results of multiple runs of the tests. 
3.4.2.2  Infectious Spread of Incident Responders 
A key advantage that Malware or specifically bots from Botnet has is their ability 
to replicate themselves in terms of numbers and their ability to spread quickly. According 
to report, Conficker spreaded at an infectious rate of 4% based on epidemical models. 
Hence this worm managed to amass a significantly large numbers in a short period of 
time. This section studies the what-if scenario that Incident Responders could spread and 
replicate themselves in the form of software agents in a similar fashion as the Conficker 
worm.  
In this experiment, the key assumption that the upper bound to the number of 
Incident Responders is the maximum number of infected hosts throughout the duration of 
the incident. This is highly plausible as access control rights may be provisioned to allow 
the good Botnet to spread and enter into infected hosts. An extended assumption here is 
that the bad Botnet is not able to stop the good Botnet from spreading.  
In  this  experiment,  as  with  the  previous  ones,  two  conventional  containment 
strategies  were  used  with  two  conditions  included.  The  first  condition  (conventional 
containment)  applies  the  limits  of  the  number  of  Incident  Responders  deployed  in 
Malware  remediation  throughout  the  duration  of  the  incident.  The  second  condition 
(infectious containment) simulates the Incident Responders having the ability to spread   85 
and replicate themselves. Limit on the number of Incident Responders was removed. In 
both conditions, Incident Responders initiate their deployment to infected host at the 
same time the remediation solution is made available (ie, at time tick 400). The first 
scenario is using FIFO containment strategy measured against time and data loss. The 
second  is  the  prioritization  strategy  measured  against  time  and  data  loss.  For  each 
strategy, a series of 5 tests were carried out. An arithmetic mean was computed from the 
5 tests. The following is the AMCM parameter settings for this test. 
Table 3.14: Infectious Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  ON  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in a centrally coordinated organized manner. The 
coordinator will not send Incident Responders to 
repeated locations. 
Prioritization  ON / OFF  Incident  responders  will  prioritize  or  not  their 
choice of infected hosts accordingly. 
Proximity Motion  ON  Incident  responders  have  latency  overheads 
when traversing between infected hosts. 
Good Infection  ON  Incident  responders  spread  themselves  to 
infected computing hosts much like Malware. 
Response Time  400  The  start  tick  time  to  which  incident  response 
will begin by Incident Responders. 
 
The following is the epidemiological chart of a typical test result for FIFO and 
Prioritized strategies with Infectious Incident Responders.    86 
Figure 3.12: Epidemiological Chart for Infectious Containment (FIFO) 
 
Figure 3.13: Epidemiological Chart for Infectious Containment (Prioritized) 
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The following is the test results for all 5 tests using the FIFO and Prioritized 
strategies with Infectious Incident Responders. 
Table 3.15: Infectious Containment Time Test Results 
Time 
Test 
FIFO 
(ticks) (a) 
Prioritized 
(ticks) (b) 
FIFO – 
Infectious 
(ticks) (c) 
Prioritized 
– Infectious 
(ticks) (d) 
FIFO 
Advantage 
[(c)/(a)] 
Prioritized – 
Advantage 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  874  1,017  501  519  42.68%  48.97% 
2  863  1,014  499  516  42.18%  49.11% 
3  879  1,010  503  518  42.78%  48.71% 
4  874  1,014  502  518  42.56%  49.92% 
5  870  1,016  500  520  42.53%  48.82% 
Average  872  1,014  501  518  42.54%  48.91% 
 
Table 3.16: Infectious Containment Data Leakage Test Results 
Data 
Leakage 
Test  
FIFO (MB) 
(a) 
Prioritized 
(MB) (b) 
FIFO – 
Infectious 
(MB) (c) 
Prioritized 
– Infectious 
(MB) (d) 
FIFO 
Advantage 
[(c)/(a)] 
Prioritized – 
Advantage 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  1,631,560  1,370,854  1,086,128  1,073,970  33.43%  21.66% 
2  1,601,342  1,357,526  1,111,532  1,054,884  30.59%  22.29% 
3  1,615,624  1,340,170  1,124,168  1,037,388  30.42%  22.59% 
4  1,632,698  1,332,906  1,091,578  1,001,662  33.14%  24.85% 
5  1,609,320  1,351,450  1,088,000  1,063,398  32.39%  21.31% 
Average  1,618,109  1,350,581  1,100,281  1,046,260  31.99%  22.54% 
 
From the experiments, it is noted that there is a significantly shorter time duration 
and lower amount of data loss to contain a Malware outbreak when Incident Responders 
adopt  Malware-like  spread  and  replication  capability.  This  is  understandable  as  the 
number of Incident Responders grew significantly and is not limited by the availability of 
adequately skilled resources.   88 
3.4.2.3  Botnet of Incident Responders 
Malicious  Botnets’  characteristics  include  being  able  to  be  distributed  over  a 
voluminous size of computing assets. They achieve such characteristics through their 
infectious  spread  behaviour.  They  coordinate  their  activities  through  a  command  and 
control like structure. They are able to reach each other and their victims through the 
network  connectivity.  Given  such  characteristics,  they  are  swift  in  carrying  out  their 
infection and attack vector. They are also agile in that they can change their posture 
through a coordinated and orchestrated manner. This section explores the effects of a 
good Botnet, which adopts the characteristics of a malicious Botnet, and it is deployed to 
contain  a  Malware  outbreak  that  has  infected  an  organization’s  IT  assets.  The 
characteristics  adopted  is  the  similar  infectious  spread  over  distributed  computing 
resources, coordinated execution of its remediation tasks and its ability to reach other 
computing  assets  via  the  network  hence  achieving  near  zero  latency  time  between 
computing assets. Additionally, all activities within the good Botnet is centrally managed, 
that is, the instructed activities to be carried out, and the time in which the execution of 
the  instructions.  In  this  experiment,  the  spread  of  the  good  Botnet  begins  before  the 
remediation solution is identified and sent out to the good Botnet for execution. This is 
much likened to that of malicious Botnet that focuses first on its infection vector. When 
the Botnet controller decides who and when it intends to attack, then the attack vector 
would occur. In this context, the good Botnet’s infection vector is to spread itself to all 
infected hosts. The good Botnet’s attack vector is the remediation activities. As with the 
previous experiments, the infection rate used is that of Conficker worm.    89 
In this experiment, the key assumptions from the previous two experiments are 
included. In addition, the good Botnet does not have any limitations in its ability of 
communicating its activities.  
In this experiment, two conventional containment strategies were used with two 
conditions included. The first condition applied the standard conventional containment 
strategies constraints that resources are limited and the duration to reach distant hosts is 
included. The second condition simulates the use of good Botnet as Incident Responders 
with  the  ability  to  spread  and  replicate  itself,  coordinate  its  activities  in  a  tightly 
coordinated  manner,  and  to  reach  its  targeted  computing  hosts  in  near  zero  latency 
overheads.  In  both  conditions,  Incident  Responders  or  good  Botnet  initiate  their 
deployment to infected host at a earlier time (ie, at time tick 200) before the remediation 
solution is made available (ie, at time tick 400). Prior to the time for remediation, no 
remediation activities will be carried out. The first scenario is using FIFO containment 
strategy measured against time and data loss. The second is the prioritization strategy 
measured against time and data loss. For each strategy, a series of 5 tests were carried 
out. An arithmetic mean was computed from the 5 tests. The following diagram shows 
that a snapshot of GUI of the AMCM when used in this test scenario.   90 
Figure 3.14: Snapshot of AMCM - Good Botnet 
 
The following table is the AMCM parameter settings for this test. 
Table 3.17: Good Botnet Containment Parameter Settings 
Scenario Parameter  Setting  Description 
Coordinated  ON  Incident responders will attend to infected hosts 
in a centrally coordinated organized manner. The 
coordinator will not send Incident Responders to 
repeated locations. 
Prioritization  ON / OFF  Incident  responders  will  prioritize  or  not  their 
choice of infected hosts accordingly.   91 
Proximity Motion  OFF  Incident  responders  do  not  have  any  latency 
overheads  when  traversing  between  infected 
hosts. 
Good Infection  ON  Incident  responders  spread  themselves  to 
infected computing hosts much like Malware. 
Response Time  100  The  spread  of  Incident  Responders  begin  even 
before  the  remediation  solution  has  been 
finalized. 
 
The  following  is  the  epidemiological  chart  for  one  of  the  tests  for  FIFO  and 
Prioritized strategies with Good Botnet.  
Figure 3.15: Epidemiological Chart for Good Botnet (FIFO) 
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Figure 3.16: Epidemiological Chart for Good Botnet (Prioritized) 
 
The followings are the test results for all 5 tests using the FIFO and Prioritized 
strategies with Good Botnet. 
Table 3.18: Good Botnet Containment Time Test Results 
Time 
Test 
FIFO 
(ticks) (a) 
Prioritized 
(ticks) (b) 
FIFO – 
Good 
Botnet 
(ticks) (c) 
Prioritized 
– Good 
Botnet 
(ticks) (d) 
FIFO 
Advantage 
(ticks) 
[(c)/(a)] 
Prioritized– 
Advantage  
(ticks) 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  874  1,017  400  400  54.23%  60.67% 
2  863  1,014  400  400  53.65%  60.55% 
3  879  1,010  400  400  54.49%  60.40% 
4  874  1,014  400  400  54.23%  60.55% 
5  870  1,016  400  400  54.02%  60.63% 
Average  872  1,014  400  400  54.13%  60.56% 
 
Table 3.19: Good Botnet Containment Data Leakage Test Results 
Data  FIFO (MB)  Prioritized  FIFO –  Prioritized  FIFO  Prioritized –   93 
Leakage 
Test  
(a)  (MB) (b)  Infectious 
(MB) (c) 
– Infectious 
(MB) (d) 
Advantage 
(MB) [(c)/(a)] 
Advantage 
(MB) 
[(d)/(b)] 
1  1,631,560  1,370,854  881,298  861,824  45.98%  37.13% 
2  1,601,342  1,357,526  865,692  857,012  45.94%  36.87% 
3  1,615,624  1,340,170  873,810  887,986  45.92%  33.74% 
4  1,632,698  1,332,906  869,318  894,258  46.76%  32.91% 
5  1,609,320  1,351,450  879,594  860,818  45.34%  36.30% 
Average  1,618,109  1,350,581  873,942  872,380  45.99%  35.39% 
 
From the experiments, it is noted that there is a significantly improvement in 
terms of time duration and amount of data loss to contain a Malware outbreak when 
Incident Responders adopt Malware like containment characteristics. This is valid in both 
forms of strategy that is FIFO or Prioritization. This constant characteristic is also noted 
in  the  multiple  runs  of  the  tests.  The  improvement  is  the  best  as  compared  to  the 
improvement noted in the previous two sections.  
3.5  DISCUSSION 
The  AMCM  was  first  validated  against  the  classic  SIR  model.  Generally  the 
results were similar in terms of the characteristics of the graph but the results were not 
exactly the same due to the characteristics of models as explained in the previous section. 
However  this  allowed  the  AMCM  model  to  be  extended  to  simulate  more  complex 
scenarios  for  the  next  stage  of  testing,  namely  conventional  and  Malware  like 
containment strategies. With the conventional containment strategies, it was noted that 
FIFO  containment  strategy  is  best  suited  when  time  is  important.  The  Prioritized 
containment strategy worked better when data leakage is a concern.    94 
The most significant contribution to this thesis in this section is to use the AMCM 
to test the hypothesis that a Malware like containment strategy, specifically using the 
Botnet’s  approach  to  infect  and  attack  their  targeted,  can  be  an  effective  Malware 
Remediation approach. The Good Botnet is first released early into the network in order 
for it to spread among the infected hosts. When more time is given to the Good Botnet to 
spread, it is better able to saturate the community of infected hosts with itself. Hence 
when  the  Malware  Remediation  solution  is  made  available,  the  Good  Botnet  can,  in 
unison, carry out the Malware Remediation immediately. Using such an approach will 
significantly reduce the time it takes to remediate the Malware outbreak while keeping 
the extent of risks exposed to the organization in the form of data loss or leakage kept to a 
minimal. If the Good Botnet is fully deployed over all infected hosts, the coordinated and 
distributed execution of the Malware Remediation may also aid in limiting the Malware 
from launching a counter-attack. 
However  the  condition  for  this  to  occur  is  that  the  remediation  is  done  via 
software instead of human based Incident Responders. Using a software approach, much 
like the Malware, allows for near unlimited reach via network connectivity and near real-
time synchronization of execution of tasks in this case delivery of Malware Remediation. 
In order for such to occur, the environment will need to allow the spread of the Good 
Botnet  to  the  infected  hosts,  and  to  coordinate  the  required  command  and  control 
communication among the hosts. Alternatively, adhoc authentification may be instituted 
when the Good Botnet is deployed. An equivalent existing IT solution that may be used 
as a Good Botnet is the network based system monitoring agents that would typically   95 
operate distributedly on computing hosts and using forms of centralized communication 
structure (star topology).  
As noted with the research of using viral vector in biological disease research, the 
deployed defences in the organization’s environment may prevent the spread or execution 
of the Good Botnet. However this may be overcome through the legitimatization of the 
Good Botnet instances and activities. This is a plausible approach and it is only subject to 
policy requirements and users’ permissions. 
3.6  CONCLUSION 
The characteristic of a containment strategy has significant contribution to the 
outcome of containment efforts and risks impact induced by a Malware outbreak. Using 
an Agent Based Model to simulate the containment strategy that aids Incident Responders 
can  define  a  better  respond  plan  to  Malware  outbreak  in  order  to  minimize  the 
organization’s  risks.  It  has  been  shown  through  this  reported  Agent  based  Malware 
Containment Model (AMCM), which is the first of its kind to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, that having a coordinated response approach will improve the execution of 
containment plans, when there is an increase in responders, or when there is a need to 
prioritize the containment in order to eradicate the Malware that has infected important 
hosts and posing greater risks to the organization. 
The research work reported here also illustrates the possible use of the measure of 
time and data leakage in assessing the Malware containment strategies. It is noted that the 
strategy to focus on more important computing assets will result in lower extent of data   96 
leakage but with longer containment duration. The measure of data leakage can be used 
to facilitate the planning of a reactive containment plan during a Malware outbreak or 
pre-incident response preparation planning. Consideration of data leakage also allows the 
assessment of the containment strategies from a different perspective that is beyond the 
measure of time and number of infected hosts.  
Most  importantly,  the  AMCM  demonstrated  the  use  a  Botnet  like  approach, 
specifically in the ability to spread a ‘Malware Remediation’ software to infected hosts, 
and to distribute and coordinate the initiation of the containment of the Malware, as part 
of the Malware Remediation. It has been observed that Malware like containment can be 
a  very  effective  approach  to  contain  a  Malware  outbreak  and  to  minimize  the  risk 
exposure. The early deployment of the Good Botnet prior to the identification of the 
containment solution will greatly enhance the duration and extent of data loss from the 
Malware  incident.  When  the  solution  becomes  available,  the  risks  also  almost 
immediately contained due to the distributed and coordinated characteristics of the Good 
Botnet.  
Next  chapter  discusses  offensive  approaches  to  the  containment  process  to 
defunct Malware. 
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4  OFFENSIVE CONTAINMENT 
This  chapter  details  the  research  proposition  on  how  to  use  Malware  like 
offensive techniques to defunct Malware. 
4.1  RESEARCH PROPOSITION  
The  supporting  premise  to  this  research  proposition  is  that  Malware  attacks 
specific software like Anti-Malware or security applications in order to preserve itself, 
and it has been proven that they are effective. The proposition in this study is that the 
same technique can be used to defunct the Malware as part of Malware Remediation. A 
detailed analysis report on Conficker [59] reported that the variant C of the Malware 
explicitly  terminates  running  security  software.  In  order  to  define  and  structure  the 
offensive  techniques  used  by  Malware,  the  MITRE’s  Common  Attack  Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [127] is used as a reference as it has the body 
of knowledge on attack patterns. CAPEC is referred to by MITRE’s Malware Attribute 
Enumeration  and  Characterization  (or  MAEC)  [128]  for  its  definition  of  offensive 
behaviour and characteristics of Malware. As new techniques are being developed by 
hackers  and  incorporated  into  Malware,  the  body  of  knowledge  will  be  updated 
accordingly and they can be considered as containment technique options in Malware 
Remediation. Using CAPEC, Malware’s attack techniques can be studied and evaluated 
for use by Incident Responders as techniques for Malware Remediation. The first part of   98 
this study involved an analysis of the attack pattern repository in order to assess the 
suitability of these techniques for containment purposes.  
From the analysis, there are many techniques that can be used for containment of 
Malware. For example, CAPEC-165 (File Manipulation) is about manipulating content 
and attributes of files as required by a software or Operating System, so, the technique 
could also be used to defunct a Malware as it is effectively a software as well. This could 
be  applied  to  the  Malware’s  files  in  which  the  Malware  is  dependent  upon  for  its 
execution. Another technique is CAPEC-96 (Block Access to Libraries). It can be used to 
block the Malware software from attempting to gain access to certain external libraries 
hence limiting its functionality. There are some other techniques from CAPEC that are 
not applicable in the context of containment such as offensive techniques used in physical 
penetration  which  is  not  software  based.  Malware  are  malicious  software  and  such 
techniques are irrelevant within the context of this study. 
4.2  RELATED BIOLOGICAL DISEASE RESEARCH WORK  
Microbial Antagonism entails leveraging a property of microorganisms that will 
enable one microorganism to kill, injure, or inhibit the growth of another. Unlike the 
previous  chapter’s  example  of  viral  vector  where  the  intent  is  on  the  attack  of  the 
targeted, the emphasis here is the destruction of the targeted microorganism. In the area 
of study to improve agriculture and horticulture techniques, there is significant interest in 
the use of such approaches to biologically control the growth of plant pathogens through 
the  application  of  antagonistic  microorganisms  on  plant  surfaces,  growing  media  or   99 
propagative material [130]. Forms of microbial antagonism also exist in the human body. 
In the upper respiratory system where the air inhaled is likely to be contaminated with 
microorganisms with pathogenic bacteria, the body fends off or minimize the possibility 
of the infection through microbial antagonism [131].  A form of Microbial Antagonism is 
Phage therapy. 
Bacteriophage  or  Phage  therapy  is  a  medical  treatment  approach  that  uses 
bacteriophages,  or  phages  for  short,  which  are  viruses  to  treat  pathogenic  bacterial 
infections  [129].  Bacteriophages  were  discovered  by  British  microbiologist  Frederick 
Twort  in  1915  and  independently  reported  by  French-Canadian  microbiologist  Felix 
d’Hérelle  in  1917.  The  phage  therapy  was  developed  extensively  in  countries  in  the 
former Soviet Union since 1920s. With the exception of Georgia, this therapy approach 
has not yet been approved for use. The alternate to such form of therapy is the use of 
antibiotics that was discovered in 1941 and widely accepted and used in the USA and 
Europe. The former is normally used when antibiotics are ineffective. The development 
of antibiotic resistance since 1950s and the advancement of scientific knowledge led to a 
renewed interest in the use of the phage therapy approach.   100 
Figure 4.1: Phage Therapy Illustration2 
  
The Phage therapy approach is hypothetically able to have the bacteriophages 
destroy  specific  pathogenic  bacteria  without  causing  any  harm  to  the  host  organism 
(human, animal or plant). The phages will aim at the targeted through strain matching. 
Due to the characteristics of phage being able to replicate itself, hence small amount of 
doses should only be applied. The key advantages that bacteriophage have over other 
alternative  treatment  approaches  like  antibiotics  is  firstly  its  strength  to  overcome 
bacteria  resistance.  While  bacteria  resistance  may  be  able  to  fend  off  antibiotics, 
bacteriophage has a stronger ability to overcome such resistance. Secondly the treatment 
is targeted. Typically when using antibiotics, numerous molecules are required to kill a 
                                                 
2 Source: Picture from Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Phage_injecting_its_genome_into_bacterial_cell.png)   101 
specific bacterium. Also during initial application of antibiotic dosages, the bacteria will 
seize the opportunity to develop resistance genes to counter the antibiotic molecules. In 
the case of phage therapy, one phage particle is sufficient to kill the targeted bacterium.   
Infectious disease experts recognizes phage therapy is the new class of treatment 
therapy that requires further development in the wake of the noted limitations of other 
treatment techniques like antibiotics. They acknowledged that when using phage therapy, 
there is a need to be host specific in requiring a matchup to be done between phage and 
the bacterial target. They also agreed that more study on the genetic engineering of phage 
is required to exploit the potential of this treatment technique. They proposed the use of 
co-therapy of phage therapy with antibiotics to increase the probability of overcoming the 
bacterium resistive mutation. Their argument goes that it is unlikely that the bacterium is 
able to handle the offensive concurrent coverage of both phage and antibiotic against 
bacterium.  
Phage therapy involves the use of the offensive phage to defunct bacterium. The 
research proposition is similar in that the study looks at the use of Malware’s offensive 
techniques against the targeted Malware in order to defunct them. 
4.3  ANALYSIS OF ATTACK PATTERNS   
From the survey conducted in the course of this study and the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no reported research has explicitly proposed the use of Malware offensive 
techniques to defunct another Malware. To support this premise, a structured knowledge 
of attack patterns used by Malware is adopted for reuse as part of Malware Remediation.   102 
MITRE,  a  non-profit  organization  that  focuses  on  technology  development,  has 
developed a catalogue of offensive techniques used in Malware developers and hackers. 
An analysis exercise was carried out on the attack or offensive patterns used by hackers 
and Malware (CAPEC release 1.6 which was the current release at the time when this 
research was done), to assess whether the patterns could be used for containment of 
Malware. The result of the analysis is shown in Appendix A. The following is an extract 
of the analysis done. 
Figure 4.2: Analysis of CAPEC (Release 1.6) 
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The formally known conventional containment techniques are adopted as a form 
of  offensive  techniques.  The  following  is  a  mapping  of  CAPEC  to  conventional 
containment techniques [132], [81] that could be used to defunct the Malware beyond the 
traditional Anti-Malware tools. 
A.  Containment Through Automated Detection [132] – CAPEC-157 (Sniffing 
Attacks)  
B.  Containment through Disabling Services [132] – CAPEC-272 (Protocol 
Manipulation) 
C.  Containment  through  Disabling  Connectivity  [132]  –  CAPEC-161 
(Infrastructure Manipulation)  
D.  Taking Down the C&C Server [81] – CAPEC-202 (Client-Server Protocol 
Manipulation)  
E.  Sink holing [81] – CAPEC-161 (Infrastructure Manipulation) 
4.4  METHOD OF EVALUATION  
In order to verify that such offensive techniques (taken from the CAPEC attack 
pattern repository) could be used in containment of Malware, three experiments were 
done and the results were analysed to assess their effectiveness. The main hypothesis to 
be  proved  in  the  experiments  is  that  Malware’s  offensive  behaviour  can  be  used  to 
contain a Malware in an infected computer. The primary independent variable is the 
technique  used  in  the  containment.  The  primary  dependent  variable  is  the  state  of 
Malware  infection  on  an  infected  computer.  The  other  controlled  variables  that  were   104 
considered in the three experiments were the different Malware used, and the computing 
platforms  where  the  infection  occurred.  Two  of  the  experiments  were  carried  out  on 
Windows  XP  operating  system  and  the  remaining  one  was  applied  to  a  smartphone 
platform running Android. Details of the experiment configuration are mentioned later. 
These two variables in general do not directly affect the hypothesis. The variation of 
Malware  and  computing  platforms  used  would  only  result  in  a  variation  to  the 
independent variable that is the offensive techniques to be used. The general approach 
used in all three experiments was (A) to collect sample Malware in order to infect a 
designated  host;  (B)  the  gathering  of  Malware  analysis  reports  that  contain  Malware 
characteristic details of the collected Malware samples as the scope of this research is not 
in area of analysis or detection, but on the later stages in the form of the execution of 
containment.  (C)  Offensive  techniques  were  then  identified  based  on  the  gathered 
information about the characteristic of the Malware involved. (D) The designated host 
was purposely infected, and (E) to verify and ensure that the infection was successfully 
carried out (pre-test check). This verification may be done through Anti-Virus scan or 
forensic analysis. This will be the pre-test step of the experiment. (F) Next the offensive 
technique(s) were applied to the designated host. Finally, (G) a final verification (or post-
test check) was done to ensure that the Malware has been eradicated or defunct from the 
designated host using either an Anti-Virus software or forensic analysis. This will be the 
post-test step of the experiment. 
The main challenge encountered was with the last of the three experiments. The 
use  of  Android  emulator  prevents  attempts  to  gain  root  access  rights  to  execute  the   105 
offensive technique. Root access or rooting provides administrative right privileges to 
carry out operating system level actions like terminating of process or changing operating 
system  configuration.  Therefore,  in  order  to  work  around  this  issue,  ADB    (Android 
Debug Bridge) was used. ADB is a command line tool that allows communication with 
the Android emulator instance and execution of shell like commands with root privileges. 
This tool can also be used with connected Android based devices. 
4.5  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS  
This  section  covers  the  analysis  of  the  experiments  that  were  carried  out  to 
validate  the  proposition  in  using  Malware’s  offensive  techniques  against  another 
Malware as part of Malware Remediation. 
The  following  outlines  the  analysis  considerations  done  for  each  and  every 
experiment  carried  out  in  this  section.  They  compromise  of  (a)  effectiveness  of  the 
containment approach - whether the containment techniques applied have managed to 
defunct  the  Malware  on  the  infected  platform,  (b)  enhancement  options  including 
automating the process, (c) ability to carry out the containment remotely on infected hosts 
with the remote host issuing containment instructions, (d) limits or constraints posed by 
the threat, (e) limits or constraints posed by the experiment environment, (f) possible 
residual  or  consequential  effects  from  the  containment  approach  used,  (g)  overheads 
induced by the approach used, and, (h) applicability to an organization’s containment 
tactics.   106 
4.5.1  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
The objective of the experiment is to show that offensive techniques can be used 
to contain a Malware on a desktop computer. The experiment involved a known Malware 
‘IRC/BackDoor.SdBot4.FOV’  according  to  AVG  (an  Anti-Virus  product).  Most  Anti-
Virus solutions have the required signature to detect and eradicate the Malware. The 
Malware is allowed to infect a personal computer running Windows XP with Service 
Pack  2  installed.  The  offensive  techniques  used  in  this  experiment  were  manually 
executed  with  no  assistance  of  any  tools  except  for  registry  editors  or  task  manager 
(process  manager).  The  techniques  were  applied  locally  on  the  targeted  host.  They 
involved terminating the malicious application, forced deletion of malicious files and 
reversing the changes made to the infected Operating System as illustrated below. The 
CAPEC  referenced  techniques  used  in  this  experiment  is  CAPEC-203:  Manipulate 
Application  Registry  Values  and  CAPEC-17:  Accessing,  Modifying  or  Executing 
Executable Files. The first step of the experiment was to infect the targeted host. The 
experiment was done with active protection of Anti-Virus disabled in order to facilitate a 
successful initial infection.  
PRE-TEST CHECK 
An  Anti-Virus  scan  (AVG)  was  initiated  to  show  that  the  infection  exists  as 
shown below.   107 
Figure 4.3: AV Detects Malware 
 
OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
The offensive techniques were applied manually. They involved the termination 
of the active malicious process specifically “Winsec32.exe” through the task manager and 
removal  of  the  Malware’s  installed  registry  setting  found  in 
“\\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\OLE”  and 
“\\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” with 
the key “Microsoft Svchost local services”. Finally the image of Malware is manually 
deleted from its hiding location in the “Windows” directory. They are as shown below.   108 
Figure 4.4: Malware Manually Terminated 
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Figure 4.5: Registry Manipulation 
 
Figure 4.6: Malware Image Removal 
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POST-TEST CHECK 
Following  the  execution  of  offensive  procedures,  Anti-Malware  (AVG)  scan 
confirmed that the computer is clean as shown below.  
Figure 4.7: Malware Removal Confirmed by AV 
 
This test demonstrates the effectiveness of self-preservation offensive techniques 
used by Malware to attack Anti-Malware products can be re-used against Malware as part 
of Malware containment. 
(a)  While  the  techniques  used  in  this  experiment  were  simple  and  seemed 
rudimentary, the techniques worked in that the Malware was completely eradicated to the 
extent that the Anti-Virus did not find any traces of the Malware after the techniques 
were  applied.  (b)  The  benefit  of  having  simple  techniques  is  that  they  too  can  be   111 
automated and applied remotely (c) which was done in the next experiment. (d) The 
selected techniques used in this experiment may not be applicable to more advanced 
Malware like Rootkits which hide themselves under the wraps of the Operating System. 
However  the  intent  to  use  offensive  techniques  is  valid.  (e)  In  this  experiment,  the 
techniques were applied locally on the targeted host. As mentioned earlier, they could be 
applied remotely, which was done so in the next experiment. (f) If the techniques were 
applied to the wrong process or application image or registry settings, the impact could 
be adverse. The Operating System may become unstable if the applied techniques were 
used  against  an  important  component  of  the  Operating  System.  (g)  The  experiment 
demonstrated that such techniques could be used to defunct Malware on an infected host. 
The experiment did not explicitly show how remote and automated application could be 
carried  out  however  the  technique  could  be  scripted  and  dispatched  remotely  and 
automatically. 
4.5.2  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
The  objective  of  this  experiment  was  to  demonstrate  the  use  of  offensive 
techniques using a tool on an infected remote laptop. This is likened to a Bot on an 
infected host performing malicious activities controlled remotely by a Bot controller. The 
Malware  involved  was  known  as  ‘Backdoor-EXI.gen.h’  (according  to  McAfee).  Two 
laptops were used in this experiment. One was installed with Backtrack Version 5 which 
is  a  hacking  /  security  penetration  test  software  platform.  This  laptop  was  to  be  the 
platform from which the offensive technique was launched remotely against the infected   112 
host. The offensive tool used was Metasploit Framework Version 4.0.1. This tool has 
been used to develop Malware or offensive hacking [133], [134], [135]. The other laptop 
host had Windows XP with Service Pack 2 installed. It was designated as the targeted 
host. The Anti-Virus solution used in this experiment was from obtained from another 
company (free version of AVG) and was not able to detect the Malware. This test was 
done in isolation from the Internet. The CAPEC techniques used were the same as the 
previous experiment however with an additional of CAPEC-23: File System Function 
Injection,  Content  Based  where  the  Metasploit  binary  (which  is  considered  as  the 
content) was executed on the remote host to gain remote access and control.  
First the infection was carried out against the targeted host. In this experiment, the 
signature updated was on 8 August 2011 and the free version of AVG could not detect 
this Malware. Hence using the Malware analysis report of the Malware available online 
through ThreatExpert [136], a forensic check was done to see if the Malware was active 
on the targeted host. This situation fits well in a scenario where the organization’s Anti-
Virus solution is not able to detect and contain the Malware.  
PRE-TEST CHECK 
According to the analysis report, additional listening port would be instantiated. 
When  the  Malware  was  executed,  it  was  noted  that  an  additional  listening  port  was 
listening to 61616.    113 
Figure 4.8: Malware's Listening Ports 
 
The  Malware  added  registry  entries  were  found  in 
“\\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” 
with  key  “conhost”  and  “\\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon” with the key “Shell” with added value of the path to the 
Malware image of “dwm.exe”. Additionally, the Internet Explorer’s proxy configuration 
was altered to redirect through the Malware listening port as shown in the following 
figures.   114 
Figure 4.9: One of the Registry Entries Changed By Malware 
 
Figure 4.10: Internet Explorer's Configuration Alteration 
 
As shown in the figures above, the registry entries created by the Malware, there 
were two instances of the Malware executable. The first was the Malware executable 
image of “dwm.exe” which is “C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\”. The   115 
other  image  was  “conhost.exe”  which  was  found  in  “C:\Documents  and 
Settings\user\Application Data\Microsoft\” as shown below.  
Figure 4.11: Malware Executable Image 
 
OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
Offensive techniques were applied remotely using Metasploit Framework toolkit. 
This  was  done  first  by  constructing  the  payload  that  will  enable  Metasploit  to  have 
remote unfretted access to the targeted system.    116 
Figure 4.12: Metasploit Remote Access Payload Construction 
 
The payload executable “reverse_tcp.exe” was manually transferred and executed 
at the targeted host which is the Windows XP machine. The Metasploit machine ran the 
remote access tool “Meterpreter” that provided shell access to the targeted machine.   117 
Figure 4.13: Meterpreter Having Remote Access To Targeted 
 
The next step was to invoke the offensive attack techniques against the Malware 
in the targeted machine. The first technique was to abruptly terminate the two Malware 
processes  (“conhost”  and  “dwm”)  in  the  execution  process  space  remotely  through 
Meterpreter. This was done by using the shell command ‘kill’ followed by its respective 
process ID. 
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Figure 4.14: Remote Termination of Malware 
 
This  was  followed  by  the  removal  of  the  Malware  image  (“conhost.exe”  and 
“dwm.exe”)  from  their  respective  directories.  This  was  done  remotely  through 
Meterpreter as illustrated below.    119 
Figure 4.15: Remote Removal Of Malware Image 
 
Finally the registry settings installed by the Malware were removed. 
  
Figure 4.16: Remote Registry Manipulation 
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POST-TEST CHECK 
A post mortem forensic check was done to see if the Malware has been removed. 
This was done by checking whether there was any Malware established listening ports 
and also by checking the registry settings. 
Figure 4.17: No Malicious Listening Port 
 
A check on the registry was done and finally a check on the directories where the 
Malware resided previously was made. 
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Figure 4.18: Malware's Registry Settings No Longer Exist 
 
Figure 4.19: No Malware Residual Image 
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(a) The techniques used in this experiment effectively eradicated the Malware 
from the infected host. The conclusion was made based on Malware analysis reports 
using a form of forensic analysis. (c) The tool used has enabled remote and automated 
invocation of containment techniques (b). Such approach will be able to help overcoming 
the logistical limits to Incident Responders of having the need to attend to the infected 
host physically. (d) Like the previous experiments, more sophisticated Malware would 
require  more  elaborate  techniques.  (e)  There  were  no  significant  constraints  in  this 
experiment. The Metasploit Framework tool was highly configurable like the listener port 
settings. (f) Like with the rest of the experiments, a wrongly applied technique could have 
detrimental effects. (g) Time was needed to learn how to use the Metasploit Framework 
tool. (h) As the Malware involved in this experiment was not known to the selected Anti-
Virus products at the time of the experiment, the latter could not eradicate the Malware. 
Hence this provides further justification of the need to have an effective containment 
technique. Metasploit framework tool provided the means to carry out the containment 
remotely. The approach and execution could be automated. One possible challenge is the 
dispatching mechanism of the containment package generated by Metasploit Framework 
tool to the infected host, as this again requires agreement and policy adjustment on the 
access of the targeted machine. 
4.5.3  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 3 
The objective of the experiment was to show that offensive techniques could be 
used to contain a Malware on a smartphone mobile platform (specifically an Android   123 
platform). The reason for conducting this test is because there is a notable increasing 
trend  in  Malware  attacking  smartphone  mobile  platforms  [24].  The  setup  of  the 
environment  involved  a  laptop  with  Ubuntu  that  had  Google’s  Android  SDK  and 
Emulator. No Internet access was provisioned in this test. The Malware involved was the 
Trojan  ‘Android/Geinimi.A’  (according  to  McAfee  [137]).  Anti-Virus  software  (free 
version of AVG Mobile) used in this experiment had signature information about the 
Malware. The offensive techniques used were manually applied using Android's ADB 
shell  commands.  The  CAPEC  techniques  used  were  the  same  as  in  previously 
experiments.  
PRE-TEST CHECK 
The  first  part  of  the  experiment  is  the  infection  of  a  targeted  host  (emulated 
Android) and a check to verify a successful infection. The targeted host was running 
Android version 2.2 API Level 8 with 50 MB SD memory and display size of WQVGA-
400.  The  Trojan  software  app  was  “Monkey Jump  2”. Infection will occur when the 
software app was executed as shown below.   124 
Figure 4.20: Trojan App for Android 
 
The Malware was verified that it has gained residence in the targeted victim. This 
was first done with an Anti-Virus scan with AVG Free Mobile App. This was followed 
by a forensic check based on the Malware Analysis report (from McAfee [137]) to verify 
the  execution  of  the  Malware.  The  check  was  to  see  whether  there  is  an  additional 
listening port established at port 5432.   125 
Figure 4.21: Malware Detected by AV 
 
Figure 4.22: Malware Resident In Android 
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OFFENSIVE TECHNIQUES APPLIED 
Offensive techniques were applied to defunct the Malware. This was done by 
manually terminating the Malware active processes. Firstly the termination was done on 
the Malware’s background service that will start when the Android instance is started.  
The background service in Android is to ensure long-running operations or perform work 
for remote processes. It does not provide the front-end user interface functionality.  
Figure 4.23: Manual Termination of Malware's Background Service  
 
Next was to manually terminate the Malware’s Activity that provided the main 
functionality including the GUI interface to the Trojan app. This is done through the 
ADB shell provided by the emulator and using the Unix command ‘kill’ as shown below.    127 
Figure 4.24: Manual Termination Of Malware’s Activity 
   
A final step to uninstall the Trojan was manually initiated as a part of containment 
to completely remove the Malware from the Android smartphone.    128 
Figure 4.25: Manual Removal Of the Trojan App 
 
POST-TEST CHECK 
A  subsequent  scan  by  the  Anti-Virus  (AVG)  showed  the  Malware  had  been 
removed. 
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Figure 4.26: AV Scan To Confirm Removal Of Malware 
  
(a) The experiment demonstrated that the smartphone mobile Malware could be 
defunct  using  offensive  technique.  (b)  Options  to  enhance  this  technique  may  be  to 
automate the offensive techniques to be used against the Malware. This may be done 
using a custom built package containing the codified version of the offensive technique(s) 
that can be remotely sent to the handsets (c). (d) There were limited Malware analysis 
reports to such contemporary Malware. (e) The use of an emulated environment induced 
a  number  of  constraints  like  the  inability  to  use  root  rights.  (f)  As  with  the  other 
experiments, a wrongly applied techniques could defunct the host that the exercise was 
trying to recover. (g) As this smartphone mobile platform was a relatively new platform   130 
at the time of the experiment, there are few knowledge repositories available to aid in 
identifying  the  remediation  offensive  techniques  to  be  used.  (h)  As  smartphones  are 
increasingly used in organisations, such offensive techniques will provide an additional 
defence mechanism for deployment. 
4.6  DISCUSSION   
In this research, the focus was on the determination of the applicability of attack 
patterns as offensive containment techniques to be used against Malware. However, there 
are prerequisites to identify the suitable offensive techniques. First, it is necessary to have 
sufficient understanding of the characteristics of the targeted Malware in order to identify 
its vulnerability attributes of its construct. Next, it is the need to identify the suitable 
techniques required to respond to the specific characteristics of the Malware. Also there 
is a need to assess the implication of the selected technique and to refine the choice of the 
techniques. An example of such conditions that may require a re-evaluation on the choice 
of technique is when the Malware replaces a key Operating System component with its 
malicious version, removing and terminating (like the technique used in Experiment 1) 
that  malicious  component  could  defunct  the  host  completely.  Hence  the  preferred 
offensive technique may be to use the same technique used by the Malware to infect the 
host (that is, to replace the Operating System component with its own). The CAPEC 
referenced technique for such is CAPEC-159 – Redirect Access To Libraries. There are 
known  Malware  like  ‘W32.Miroot.Worm’  or  ‘Backdoor.Lastdoor’  (both  named  by   131 
Symantec) that replaces the Windows Operating System’s Run32dll.exe that is meant to 
support the execution of program codes in DLL files. 
While  it  is  noted  that  the  offensive  techniques  are  effective  against  these 
malicious  software,  there  are  risks  associated  with  the  use  of  malicious  offensive 
techniques. The following are risks to be considered. 
a.  Possible collateral damages to the infected system or other dependent IT 
component. 
b.  Possible failure in attempt to defunct the infected system that will in turn 
induce resource wastage or disruptions. 
c.  The  Malware  may  survive  the  offensive  assaults  and  launch  counter 
attacks. 
d.  Unauthorized use of offensive technique.  
e.  Use of offensive technique against a misidentified host. 
f.  New residual risks as a consequence of the offensive assault made against 
Malware on the infected hosts (for example, Malware launches counter-
offense).  
g.  Disruption to business continuity for organization. 
Detailed study into such concerns or risks should be considered in future research 
by assessing quantitatively the risk associated before launch the proposed approach.   132 
4.7  CONCLUSION   
Malware are going one-on-one against researchers or developers of Anti-Malware 
solutions. The state of the war is currently working in favour with the Malware and their 
developers  as  the  defenders  are  playing  catch  up  defensively  and  passively.  Beyond 
development of preventive measures, reactive measures need to be developed to better 
manage  the  likely  scenario  of  a  successful  attack  or  penetration  by  a  Malware.  The 
industry also need to revolutionize the current reactive approach to contain or remediate 
Malware  as  the  present  techniques  are  proving  to  be  insufficient  and  inadequate  in 
restoring control over IT assets. Hence this part of the research advocates taking the 
‘guns’ (or Malware’s offensive techniques) off from the Malware developers, and study 
how such techniques could be used against the Malware as part of containment. This idea 
goes beyond the conventional approach of studying the ‘guns’ and building defences to 
fend the assets against such attacks. Successful implementation of the proposed approach 
could be the much needed advancement to level off against the adversary. The analogy of 
using fire to fight fire is likened in the case of initiating control burning to manage a fire 
outbreak. Malware techniques should also be used to contain a Malware infection or 
outbreak. In view that smartphone mobile platform is pervasively used and will continue 
to increase in its penetration, in addition to the number of new Malware being introduced 
to such platforms, there is an urgent need to develop additional defence strategies through 
the use of offensive techniques.   133 
The next chapter will discuss how Malware-like resilience could be built in the 
defence against the Malware.  
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5  RESILIENT CONTAINMENT 
This chapter details the research proposition on the use of Malware’s resilient 
design techniques to protect Remediation Tools from offensive attacks by Malware. 
5.1  RESEARCH PROPOSITION  
This research proposition is to learn how the resilient techniques or designs were 
incorporated into Malware to order to preserve themselves, and to adopt such techniques 
or  designs  into  the  defensive  and  remediation  tools.  The  intent  is  to  preserve  the 
availability  and  integrity  of  these  tools  in  order  to  provide  the  organisations  and 
individuals additional means of protection to keep or restore control of its IT assets. 
According  to  Dagon  et  al.  [139],  Botnets  have  considerable  resilience  to 
withstand targeted responses against them. They have been known of their ability to 
revive themselves even when they have decapitated [140]. An example of the resiliency 
of Botnets was reported when researchers analysed, confirmed and initiated the shutdown 
of a key ISP that hosted the Malware, initially the traffic originating from the Malware 
dropped,  it  then  recovered  subsequently  [141].  This  demonstrated  the  resilience  and 
robust architecture design of Malware enables the perpetrator(s) to keep its offensive 
effectiveness  against  its  targeted  victims  and  to  fend  off  response  measures  by  the 
victims’ defenders.  
In the study by Alsagoff [138] on Malware’s self-protection mechanism, he noted 
that Malware developers are developing various techniques to enhance the resiliency of   135 
their  products  against  any  eradication  processes.  The  following  table  summarizes  the 
qualitative evaluation of the techniques used by Malware developers and their potential 
reuse by developers of Anti-Malware or remediation tools to protect themselves from 
Malware self-preservation attacks. 
Table 5.1: Review Of Malware's Techniques 
Techniques used in Malware  Relevance to this Research 
Terminate  adversarial  and  related 
software (eg, Anti-Malware) 
Applicable to Offensive Containment 
Hide  or  obfuscate  Malware  files  and 
configuration (including startup) 
Hide  or  obfuscate  tool  from  detection  by 
Malware 
Protect  malicious  processes,  files  and 
configuration from manipulation 
Protect  important  processes,  files  and 
configuration from Malware’s manipulation 
Exploitation  of  limits  of  operating 
system 
Exploit limits of operating system to protect 
tool 
Disable support tools (eg, task manager, 
registry editor, startup configuration tool) 
Disable support tools that may be used by 
Malware  
Redundancy (eg, multiple startup point)  Include similar redundancy capabilities into 
tool 
Recovery  capabilities  (eg,  reinstate 
removed startup point) 
Include  similar  recovery  capabilities  into 
tool 
 
According  to  Shevchenko  [142],  there  are  various  forms  of  self-preserving 
capabilities  being  incorporated  into  Malware.  The  following  diagram  illustrates  the 
approaches  used.  They  are  shown  in  the  dimensions  of  generic  or  targeted  against 
countermeasures used by defence or containment tools, and whether the self-preservation 
approaches  are  passive  or  active  in  nature.  The  focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  passive 
techniques. The active techniques are relevant to the Chapter 4 on Offensive Containment 
and therefore they are not considered in this chapter.   136 
Figure 5.1: Types of Malware Self Preservation Techniques  
 
Malware has been known of their ability to launch counter offense that includes 
destruction  of  the  infected  system  when  they  detect  any  attempt  of  attack  is  being 
initiated [40]. 
5.2  RELATED RESEARCH WORK ON BIOLOGICAL DISEASES 
Researchers in biological disciplines are working hard to find diverse approaches 
to control pathogenic infections as pathogens have diverse responses to counter such 
attempts rendering the solutions useless or having limited effectiveness. This has led to 
medical researches into the understanding of pathogenic self-defence mechanism in order 
to enhance the biologically based disease control strategies. According to Duffy et al.   137 
[143],  many  plant  pathogens  are  able  to  produce  means  to  strengthen  their  infection 
stance so as to remain stay alive in the infected host.  Pathogenic defence mechanisms 
enable them to defend themselves against antibiosis such as antibiotics. They also include 
other forms of bacteria to enhance their defences against antibiotics. Examples include 
Pseudomonas and Bacillus for plant pathogens.  
Plant  pathogens  have  also  developed  defences  against  other  pathogenic 
competition. It has been observed that pathogens reduce the competitiveness of other 
antagonists  or  competition  by  manipulating  or  orchestrating  microbial  community  to 
disrupt the activities of their competition. They are also known to remove entry means of 
potential  competition  by  blocking  natural  openings  found  in  the  plants.  Pathogens 
manipulate  their  environment  by  reprogramming  their  infected  plant  host  to  produce 
certain carbon compounds that can be useful to that pathogen but not to others. Pathogens 
are known to be able to take over control of the defence mechanisms of the infected plant 
host  and  contribute  to  its  own  advantage  but  detrimental  to  others.  Pathogens  also 
produce toxins to fend off competitors. Plant pathogens also have developed capabilities 
to fend off parasitic viruses that would be used to attack bacteria. Just like the defences 
that  exist  within  plants,  pathogens  are  known  to  use  Melanin  to  defend  themselves 
against attacks. 
The study of the use of pathogenic defences into antagonistic solutions is still in 
its early stages of development and an example is to incorporate resistance capabilities of 
pathogen A. tumefaciens to Agrocin 84 [144]. These characteristics are therefore adopted 
in order to strengthen the containment process of Malware.    138 
5.3  METHOD OF EVALUATION 
In order to verify that the hypothesis that Malware’s self-preservation techniques 
can be used in tools for defence or remediation, three experiments were done and the 
results were analysed to assess their effectiveness – that is, how to enable the tools to 
remain resiliently active when Malware’s offensive attacks are used against these tools. 
The  independent  variable  is  the  resilient  design  technique  used  in  the  tools.  The 
dependent variable is the specific attribute to which the resiliency design is seeking to 
protect or harden itself against Malware attacks. In the experiments that were carried out, 
(A) a specific attribute is selected where the resilient characteristics of the Malware will 
be applied or built into the tools, and where the focus of an attack vector that is typically 
used by Malware will be addressed. The specific attributes used in this experiment are 
either essential software such as the firewall of the targeted host, registry setting or the 
availability of the tool itself. (B) The attack vector was chosen from Mitre’s Common 
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [127] as it represents a body of 
knowledge on attack patterns. CAPEC is used by Malware Attribute Enumeration and 
Characterization  or  MAEC  [128]  which  defines  the  behaviour  and  characteristics  of 
Malware, while CAPEC defines the Malware’s offensive behaviours. (C) An application 
was developed that codified a specific resilient techniques used by Malware to protect a 
specific attribute. The application was developed using Visual Express C# 2010. Prior to 
the start of the experiment, (D) a check is first done that to ensure that the attribute to be 
preserved  for  the  test  is  set  or  running  well.  This  will  be  the  pre-test  step  for  the   139 
experiment. (E) A tool that mimics the Malware’s offensive behaviour to attack software 
was  used  to  carry  out  the  self-preservation  attacks.  The  offensive  tool  used  in  the 
experiments  was  Metasploit  Framework  Version  4.0.1.  This  tool  has  been  used  to 
develop Malware or offensive hacking [133], [134], [135]. (F) The application, which 
was developed to protect the attribute, was activated either pre-emptively or be triggered, 
when the Metasploit tool was used. The activation of the preservative measures by the 
custom  built  software  could  be  triggered  manually  or  automatically.  Finally  (G) 
verification was carried out to check whether the attribute to be protected was effectively 
preserved  against  the  assault.  This  will  be  the  post-test  step  for  the  experiment.  As 
Metasploit Framework’s Meterpreter was used in the experiment, the resident protection 
of the Anti-Virus installed in the test host was disabled to facilitate the use of the former 
tool to carry out offensive attacks against the test application. 
The setup of the experiment was done in a virtualization environment running on 
an Apple MacBook Pro laptop. Virtualization was done using Virtualbox version 3.2.1. 
Two  guest  operating  systems  were  used.  One  was  the  targeted  host,  which  ran  on 
Windows XP SP3, from which the application ran and where the attribute to be protected 
was located. This host was then connected by Meterpreter to the other virtualized host by 
BackTrack 5 with Metasploit Framework Version 4.0.1. Throughout the execution of the 
experiments, Internet connectivity was not enabled and the experiments were carried out 
in an isolated environment.   140 
5.4  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS  
This  section  covers  the  analysis  of  the  experiments  that  were  carried  out  to 
validate this proposed proposition to use resilient design techniques used by Malware to 
protect Malware Remediation tools from Malware’s offensive attacks. 
5.4.1  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
The objective of the experiment was to show that an essential piece of software 
such  as  firewall  could  be  protected  using  self-preservation  techniques  found  among 
Malware. The attribute in this experiment was the firewall service. The attack vector used 
is to turn off the firewall that is also known to CAPEC as CAPEC-56: Removing/short-
circuiting 'guard logic'. The following are the pseudo code for the application used.  
Figure 5.2: Pseudo Code To Protect Firewall 
 
The  followings  are  the  outputs  of  the  experiment  showing  that  initially  the 
firewall was working with no warning notification raised by the operating system, this 
was followed by the attack vector to disable the firewall through Metasploit’s Meterpreter 
and finally re-enable the firewall by the proposed application. The application carried out 
the re-instatement of the firewall by clicking on the button that corresponded to the test.    141 
PRE-TEST CHECK 
The following diagram is the application GUI prior to the start of the experiment. 
Figure 5.3: Custom Application For Malware Like Resilient Design 
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Figure 5.4: Metasploit Remote Access To Targeted Host 
 
The following notification alert by the Operating System indicated that only the 
AV was not running. The firewall is running still. 
Figure 5.5: Warning Message About AV But Not Of Firewall 
 
RESILIENT TEST 
Next, the offensive attack was initiated with a firewall termination instruction 
through Meterpreter’s countermeasures script.    143 
Figure 5.6: Disable Countermeasures Via Meterpreter 
 
The targeted host reported that the firewall is not running as shown below. 
Figure 5.7: Warning Message About Firewall 
 
 The application, running on the targeted host, was manually triggered to reinstate 
the firewall service on the targeted host. This was done by clicking on “Test1” button.   144 
Figure 5.8: Custom Application Reinstated Firewall 
 
POST-TEST CHECK 
(F) The following is the response notification alert from the targeted host showed 
that  the  firewall  was  back  on  again  indicating  our  software  successfully  restored  the 
status of the firewall. 
Figure 5.9: No Warning Message About Firewall 
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5.4.2  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
The objective of Experiment 2 was to demonstrate the use of self-preservation 
techniques to preserve registry settings from undesired changes. The technique used to 
preserve the registry setting was to constantly monitor the setting and to respond when a 
change (update or delete) occurred. In this experiment, the attack vector was to induce a 
change to the registry setting flag value. This attack vector was also known as CAPEC-
203: Manipulate Application Registry Values. The following are the pseudo code for the 
application that was developed in order to preserve the registry setting flag value.  
Figure 5.10: Pseudo Code To Protect Registry Settings 
 
PRE-TEST CHECK   146 
The following are the display outputs of the pre-experiment setup. At the start of 
the execution of the custom developed application and clicking on “Test2” button, the 
application checks whether the registry flag exists. If the registry flag is missing, the 
application will create it and set the desired flag value. The following screen shot shows 
the registry setting outcome after “Test2” button was pressed. 
Figure 5.11: Registry Settings (‘Flag’) To Be Protected 
 
As  with  the  previous  experiment,  Meterpreter  remote  access  connected  to  the 
BackTrack instance was established.  
RESILIENT TEST 
The next step of the experiment was to alter the registry settings monitored by the 
custom  developed  application.  The  alteration  involved  changing  the  flag  value  from   147 
“True”, which is the default, to “False”. This was done through Meterpreter as shown 
below. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Remote Manipulation Of Registry 
 
The  custom  developed  application  noted  the  change  of  state  of  the  registry 
settings and the application responded by restoring the registry from “False” to “True” as 
shown below.   148 
Figure 5.13: Protective Restoration Of Manipulated Registry Setting 
 
POST-TEST CHECK 
A check was done on the registry flag value and it showed that the value was 
preserved to its intended value by the custom developed application as shown below. 
Figure 5.14: Registry Setting Value Preserved 
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5.4.3  ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 3 
The objective of this experiment was to demonstrate the use of self-preservation 
techniques to preserve the application that was developed in this study, from offensive 
termination attack. In this experiment, the offensive attack carried out was to terminate 
the application. This attack vector was also known as CAPEC-17: Accessing, Modifying 
or Executing Executable Files. The self-preservation technique used was to randomize 
the process name of the application and executable file so that it could not be detected by 
the offensive software, Metasploit. Hence, this protected the application from sudden 
abrupt termination. The following is the pseudo code of the application. 
Figure 5.15: Pseudo Code of Protection 
 
PRE-TEST CHECK 
The pre-test activities were carried out prior to the start of the test. The first was 
to start the custom developed application named “ResilientTest.exe”. Task manager was 
started to see if the application was listed in the process list.   150 
Figure 5.16: Starting the ResilientTest.exe Application 
 
Next involved the inclusion of the Metasploit’s Meterpreter “getcountermeasure” 
Ruby  script  to  terminate  the  custom  developed  application.  The  custom  developed 
application was named “ResilientTest.exe”. The following showed the inclusion of the 
Meterpreter script.   151 
Figure 5.17: Inclusion Of ResilientTest.exe into Meterpreter Script 
 
RESILIENT TEST 
An offensive attack was made against the custom developed application through 
Meterpreter’s modified “getcountermeasure” script. The screen snapshot below shows 
the display output after the execution of the script. 
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Figure 5.18: Metasploit Found and Terminated Its Target 
 
The  “ResilientTest.exe”  did  abruptly  terminate.  The  next  step  was  to  get  the 
application to evade detection by randomly naming itself. As indicated in the Pseudo 
Code earlier, this will create a copy of the application with a randomly generated name. 
The application will start the newly created randomly named copy of itself and terminate 
itself from execution. The following diagram shows what the new application filename 
and process name – “HKXTRNUTEC.exe”. 
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Figure 5.19: Application Restarted With a Random Process Name 
 
POST-TEST CHECK 
The  Meterpreter  script  was  re-executed  in  another  attempt  to  terminate  the 
targeted application. However it could not find the “ResilientTest.exe” in the targeted 
host. 
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Figure 5.20: Meterpreter Unable To Identify the Targeted Application 
 
5.5  DISCUSSION  
The  experiments  demonstrated  that  the  Malware’s  resilience  software  design 
techniques could be codified and incorporated to strengthen the defence mechanism. This 
and other Malware’s resilient design approaches can be applied to security defence or 
remediation tools in order to harden them against self-preservation attacks of Malware. 
While it is proposed that the resilient design techniques used in Malware can be 
incorporated  into  the  security  tools,  there  are  some  considerations  as  to  how  these   155 
techniques  should  be  applied.  The  following  are  considerations  gathered  from  the 
experiments. 
•  What attributes require protection? 
•  Which resilient technique is applicable? 
•  When should such resilient techniques be applied? 
•  Where should the resilient design technique be applied? 
•  How to implement such resilient techniques? 
•  How should the tool respond to the self-preserving offensive techniques 
used by the Malware?  
•  Are there any residual risks when such techniques are used? 
In order for the security defence and remediation tools to protect the organization 
or individual from being infiltrated by the extensive variety of Malware and the ever-
changing behaviour of the Malware, more than one of resilient techniques may also be 
required. This adds another dimension of consideration. 
5.6   CONCLUSION  
Malware is attacking security solutions since the turn of the century in order to 
maintain its survival and to induce risks and damages to the organization or individual. 
The current state of play is working in favour with the Malware and their developers as 
the defenders building security solutions are trying to catch up passively. The proposition 
in this thesis is to learn from the Malware developers on how they harden their products, 
and to apply their resiliency design techniques to the security solutions.    156 
However  with  such  knowledge,  there  is  a  need  to  ensure  that  they  are  easily 
understood  and  optimally  applied  by  practitioners  and  researchers.  Hence  the  next 
chapter looks into how this can be achieved.  
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6  PATTERN BASED MALWARE LIKE REMEDIATION  
This chapter details the proposition on how to use of Pattern based package to 
structure the Malware-like containment techniques as proposed in the previous chapters, 
in order to enhance the practice adopted by Incident Responders.   
6.1  PROBLEM  
When  a  Malware  successfully  passes  the  deployed  defences  and  infects  an 
organization’s  computing  host(s),  Malware  Remediation  becomes  the  new  line  of 
defence.  However  the  new  defence  line,  manned  by  Incident  Responders,  is  under 
immense  pressure  with  the  complex  competency  requirements  in  order  to  match  the 
evasive and sophisticated Malware. Additionally, Incident Responders are challenged by 
the need to acquire the needed competency to manage a Malware incident. One key 
competency in Malware incident management is Malware analysis. According to Valli 
and Brand [76], the body of knowledge in the area of Malware analysis covers a wide 
area of topics from core IT subjects to forensic analysis, and the knowledge in the use of 
a wide variety of IT tools, such as administrative and forensic tools.  
When attempting to understand the Malware involved in an incident, Incident 
Responders  may  need  to  identify  the  identity  of  the  Malware,  understand  its 
corresponding behaviour, and subsequently identify or define the appropriate remediation 
options. The number of possible Malware suspects to the incident is high with many new 
ones  being  created  continuously.  This  poses  a  significant  challenge  to  Incident   158 
Responders  in  attempting  to  identify  the  Malware  involved  and  the  associated 
remediation options. To further complicate the situation, the analysis of Malware would 
likely have to be done over infected computers instead on the original malicious source 
file. When information is not readily available, the Incident Responders will need access 
to information recorded such as server logs in order to uncover any useful leads. Under 
such circumstance, the Incident Responders will need skills and knowledge in the setup 
and  operations  of  the  IT  infrastructure  environment  in  which  the  Malware  has  taken 
residence.  Also,  Malware  are  exploiting  zero-day  exploits  from  a  constant  stream  of 
unknown vulnerabilities in which, even at the time of incident, the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) of the software or appliances may not aware of the existence of 
such vulnerability. Hence, the Incident Responder may be required to isolate the exploit 
and to deal with the vulnerability in order to mitigate the risks induced by the Malware 
alone.  
Experience in performing Malware Remediation will aid in the management of 
risks  associated  with  cyber  security  incident  [132].  Knowledge  of  the  IT  operating 
environment  and  the  deployed  security  defences,  though  these  defences  may  have 
originally failed to contain the Malware, may still prove useful as part of the Malware 
containment effort. Prior experience in handling Malware will enhance the responders’ 
ability to shorten the duration needed to defunct the Malware involved. While the number 
of Malware is growing at a rapid rate, most of the new Malware are variants of previous 
versions of Malware [145]. Hence prior experience in handling Malware will help the 
Incident  Responders.  Finally,  experience  will  act  as  an  important  contributor  to  the   159 
relevance  and  usefulness  of  certain  containment  techniques  for  specific  Malware  or 
situational  conditions.  However  Incident  Responders  may  not  be  equipped  with  the 
necessary  skills,  knowledge  and  experience  and  they  are  stretched  by  the  extent  of 
competency requirements to handle the complex Malware incident. 
When  Incident  Responders  lack  the  required  competency,  they  will  have 
difficulty in identifying an effective remediation plan. An ineffective remediation may 
cause more damage or induced more risks to the organization. There are Malware which 
is capable of detecting such remediation attempts and they are able to launch an adverse 
counter  offensive  against  the  organization.  Additionally,  incompetent  Incident 
Responders  may  likely  to  incur  significantly  more  time  to  remediate  the  Malware 
problems.  
What  is  required  of  Incident  Responders  is  the  ability  to  quickly  identify  a 
remediation solution that can effectively contain or defunct the Malware involved. In 
order to address this limitation, it is proposed that a form of knowledge repository is 
required  to  be  established  with  a  comprehensive  set  of  containment  /  remediation 
techniques that can be leveraged upon quickly to improve the outcome of remediation 
plans in terms of effectiveness to defunct the Malware and to reduce the duration in 
which the remediation plan is identified and applied. Therefore, an established structure 
or format to store and represent knowledge in this repository is required.    160 
6.2  RESEARCH PROPOSITION  
The research proposition in this section is to establish a Malware Remediation 
pattern  template  to  address  the  problem.  This  will  enable  the  establishment  of  a 
knowledge  repository  for  Malware  Remediation  although  the  development  is  not 
included in this research due to time constraints. Based on current research, it was found 
that such pattern template does not exist and the proposed Malware Remediation pattern 
template  is  based  on  security  pattern  templates.  Background  information  about  such 
patterns is provided next.  
6.2.1  PATTERNS INTRODUCTION 
Patterns  may  be  used  as  solutions  to  problems  that  occur  regularly  within  a 
specific context. Patterns could encapsulate knowledge as regard to a particular problem 
hence they could be used to express knowledge from experienced individuals or groups 
of practitioners. According to May and Taylor [158], patterns can be used to improve the 
process  of  converting  information  to  knowledge  as  part  of  knowledge  management 
process. Patterns may also be used to describe procedures and artefacts produced by 
processes [146]. Good patterns are like cooking recipes: they inform what elements are 
required and they provide a sequence of step instructions or approaches on how to use the 
ingredients  and  the  expected  outcomes  or  products.  Patterns  could  include  important 
contextual information like when the solutions are applicable and when they are not (also   161 
known as anti-patterns), what they will accomplish and how to adapt them to specific 
situations. They will also state consequential effects when the actions are applied.  
Patterns are useful tools for solving multidisciplinary problems. In areas where 
there  is  a  lack  of  skills  or  knowledge,  patterns  can  help  address  the  deficit  by  pre-
packaging  solutions  to  common  problems.  They  enable  reuse  of  successful  practices. 
Patterns could also be used to capture the experience from experts in a structured way 
[147]. Thus novices can benefit from the know-how and skills of people who have put 
much effort into the understanding contexts, forces, and solutions. Patterns have also 
been used to facilitate teaching by experienced teachers and to aid students learn. These 
are known as Pedagogical Patterns [148].  
There  are  many  forms  of  patterns  that  exist  in  academia  and  implementation 
practices. They include the software design patterns that provide a knowledge repository 
of good software designs approaches. Security patterns are other examples. Schumacher 
and Roedig [147] stated, “A security pattern describes a particular recurring security 
problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its 
solution.” Hence, this proposition for a Malware Remediation pattern template derives 
from the concept of security pattern template. Details to verify this proposition will be 
covered in subsequent sections. 
6.3  RELATED WORK  
There  is  limited  information  or  knowledge  repository  relating  to  Malware 
Remediation. On the other hand, most of the information focuses on Malware Detection   162 
and security hardening solutions than remediation. The following evaluates the limitedly 
available  information  sources  and  their  structure,  other  related  forms  of  knowledge 
representation and a relevant pattern template. 
6.3.1  REMEDIATION GUIDE 
There are a number of guides provided by various organizations and individuals 
to aid Incident Responders in dealing with Malware outbreak. An example is the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention 
and Handling” [132] and “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide” [149]. Other 
related  computer  security  agencies  or  organizations  have  produced  similar  materials. 
Most  of  these  guides  proposed  various  approaches  to  contain  a  Malware  outbreak. 
However these guides lack a unified structure in the way information is organized. In 
some cases, they lack important information that is relevant to the incident, and what 
should have been considered prior to the application of the approaches. For example, 
considerations to the use of such approaches like prerequisites and consequential effects 
details like the residual risks from the use of the approach are examples of the omission. 
Also, they are short of cited examples to illustrate how the solution can be applied and 
links to related approaches. 
6.3.2  KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN IT SECURITY 
Kesh and Ratnasingam [159] argued that knowledge management is an important 
tool that an organization can use to protect itself from hackers, Malware, theft of data and   163 
service  disruption,  by  providing  security  knowledge  to  the  right  people  in  the 
organization.  They  further  argued  that  knowledge  management  practices  should  be 
applied  to  all  stakeholders  in  the  organization  who  are  involved  in  the  security 
management process. There are various attempts to structure security knowledge and 
examples include the use of ontology [160] and patterns. Also, there have been attempts 
to cover different areas of security including software security [161], however, there is no 
knowledge management template for Malware Remediation. 
6.3.3  SECURITY PATTERNS 
Saltzer and Schroeder [150] introduced the concept of using design principles to 
improve  the  security  of  computer  systems  in  their  classic  article,  “The  Protection  of 
Information  in  Computer  Systems”.  Inadequate  security  in  IT  systems  creates 
opportunities  for  exploitation.  Security  exploitation  in  IT  may  occur  in  the  form  of 
Malware outbreak induced by software vulnerabilities and weak mechanisms in protocols 
or software designs that are compromised through exploitation. Schumacher and Roedig 
[147] advocated that when deficiency exists in security engineering in the IT solutions, 
security patterns could aid in addressing this gap. According to Kienzle et al. [151], “A 
security  pattern  is  a  well-understood  solution  to  a  recurring  information  security 
problem”. They are the concepts advocated by Christopher Alexander that were applied 
to the information security domain. While some of such security patterns take the form of 
design patterns, not all security patterns are design patterns.   164 
Schumacher  and  Roedig  argued  that  security  patterns  provide  four  significant 
benefits [147]. Firstly patterns provide security engineering capabilities to non security 
experts. This is because security patterns capture the know-how and skills of security 
experts,  thus  enabling  novices  to  act  as  security  experts.  The  second  benefit  is  that 
security professionals can exchange ideas and work on security issues effectively. This is 
because security patterns encompass both the security problems and solutions. They limit 
ad-hoc solutions as patterns are defined to represent proven solutions in a systematic and 
organized manner. The third benefit is that security patterns address security problems in 
a structured approach. Patterns could explicitly cite qualifications and implications if any, 
so that an informed decision may be made before a particular pattern is applied. Finally 
security  patterns  detail  component  dependencies  and  associations  to  other  security 
patterns  or  issues.  Such  knowledge  and  illustrated  examples  are  typically  acquired 
through experience. When security patterns are linked or formally associated, changes 
that affect certain security patterns or problems will have impacts to other associated 
security patterns. Hence this would induce the need for refactoring of patterns to be done 
regularly to ensure that the security patterns are updated and relevant with respect to the 
constant changes.  
According  to  Heyman  et  al.  [152],  security  patterns  can  be  applied  to  many 
aspects  of  security  from  security  assessment  to  security  development  lifecycle,  and 
security  audits  and  recovery.  However,  there  is  no  security  pattern  for  Malware 
Remediation. Hence to address the problems faced by Malware Incident Responders, it is   165 
advocated that the establishment of the Malware Remediation pattern template as detailed 
in this chapter. 
6.4  MALWARE REMEDIATION PATTERN 
The research proposition entails the use of security pattern template to represent 
Malware Remediation pattern template. The reasons for this proposition are firstly that 
Malware Remediation is a form of IT security incident response to deal with a security 
risk when there is a Malware outbreak. Secondly, security patterns have been used in 
many  aspects  of  security  including  incident  response  and  disaster  recovery  in  which 
Malware outbreak or infection is a form of disaster that could become catastrophic. 
The following details a proposed Malware Remediation pattern template that is 
derived from a generic Security Pattern template advocated by Yoshioka et al. [153].  
•  Pattern Name: This is a primary key to the pattern. It should be self-
explanatory  and  intuitive  in  order  to  improve  communication  and  to 
facilitate search. 
•  Problem: This describes the Malware incident problem that may be solved 
by the application of the Malware Remediation pattern. 
•  Context: Describes the context in which the problem exists. It should state 
the environmental situation in which the pattern can be best used.  
•  Pre-requisite: This describes the properties that must be fulfilled prior to 
the start of the implementation of the pattern. It may entail environmental 
conditions or settings needed to support the pattern.    166 
•  Solution:  This  describes  the  specific  pattern  implementation  details.  It 
may include various forms of details depending on the context in which 
the pattern is applied. It may be qualitatively and quantitatively described. 
For example, for software designs, UML or pseudo codes may be used. 
•  Example: This provides an illustration or references on how the pattern 
solution may be or has been applied. 
•  Consequence: This provides details of likely residual risks or impact from 
the use of the pattern. This is important to ensure that the pattern user 
makes an informed decision prior to the use of the pattern and prepares the 
necessary to handle the consequences. 
•  Related Patterns or References: This provides references or linkages to 
materials used to produce this pattern or other patterns may be relevant or 
used in congruent to this pattern. 
 
These  elements  are  required  to  provide  details  on  why  the  pattern  is  relevant 
[Problem], where the pattern should apply [Context], when to apply [Pre-requisite], what 
is the impact after its application [Consequence], and finally how, with details, is the 
pattern applied [Solution]. The [Examples] and [References] provide relevant associations 
to other patterns or techniques. The followings are two examples of published techniques 
for  containment  by  NIST  mapped  into  the  proposed  Malware  Remediation  pattern 
template. Quotes are used when the exact text from the guide are included into the pattern   167 
draft.  In  addition,  Malware  like  Remediation  techniques  are  also  packaged  into  the 
pattern template. 
6.4.1  PATTERN SET 1 – NON MALWARE LIKE CONTAINMENT 
The following containment pattern is documented in NIST’s “Guide to Malware 
Incident Prevention and Handling” that advocated the use of disabling services used by 
the Malware to mitigate the risks induced by Malware. The following is a pattern write-
up for this. 
Table 6.1: Malware Remediation Pattern Sample 1 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Containment through Disabling Services 
 
Problem  Malware has infiltrated environment and managed to get pass deployed defences with no 
detection and containment occurring from the latter. 
 
Context  Malware is exploiting specific network service(s) as part of its infection or attack vector. 
“An incident might generate so much network traffic or application activity, such as e-
mails or file transfers that many applications could effectively be made unavailable.” 
 
Pre-
requisite 
a.  Able to identify which services that Malware is using for its infection or attack vectors 
b.  Identified service can be disabled as part of remediation. Business continuity plans 
may be required to mitigate the effects of service outage. 
 
Solution  “Containing such an incident quickly and effectively might be accomplished through a loss 
of services, such as shutting down a service used by Malware, blocking a certain service at 
the network perimeter, or disabling portions of a service (e.g., large mailing lists)”. 
“Shutting down the affected services might be the best way to contain the infection without 
losing all services.” 
 
Depending on the situation and severity, network service outage in selected subnet instead 
of the entire network will aid in the remediating the effects of the Malware outbreak. The 
extent of the service outage is dependent on the characteristics of the Malware involved. 
 
Example  A response guide recommendation by NIST  
 
Con-
sequence 
“Disabling a service is generally a simple process; understanding the consequences of 
doing so tends to be more challenging” 
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Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
a.  Malware may adapt or update its strategy when it detects that its dependent network 
services are not available. 
b.  Malware may launch countermeasure offensive when it detects service unavailability. 
c.  “Disabling a service that the organization relies on has an obvious negative impact 
on the organization’s functions. Also, disabling a service might inadvertently disrupt 
other services that depend on it” “Organizations should maintain a list of 
dependencies between major services so that incident handlers are aware of them 
when making containment decisions. Also, organizations might find it helpful to 
provide alternative services with similar functionality.” 
d.  “Organizations should also be prepared to respond to problems caused by other 
organizations disabling their own services in response to a Malware incident.” 
 
Related 
Patterns or 
References 
•  Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling by NIST (Para. 4.3.4) 
•  Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (Para. 3.3.4) 
 
 
The following containment pattern is documented in NIST’s “Guide to Malware 
Incident Prevention and Handling” that advocated the use of disabling connectivity used 
by the Malware to mitigate the risks induced by Malware. The following is a pattern 
write-up for this. 
Table 6.2: Malware Remediation Pattern Sample 2 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Containment through Disabling Connectivity  
 
Problem  Malware has infiltrated environment and managed to get pass deployed defences with no 
detection and containment occurring from the latter. 
 
Context  Malware is using connectivity as part of its infection or attack vector. This may pose 
significant risks especially when the Malware is stealing data and sending data out through 
the network connectivity into the intended destination. 
 
Pre-
requisite 
a.  Able to identify which the connectivity route that Malware is using  
b.  “Organizations can design and implement their networks to make containment 
through loss of connectivity easier to do and less disruptive.” 
 
Solution  “Containing incidents by placing temporary restrictions on network connectivity”. “If 
infected systems within the organization attempt to spread their Malware, the organization 
might block network traffic from the systems’ IP addresses to control the situation while 
the infected hosts are physically located and disinfected.”   169 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
 
“An alternative to blocking network access for particular IP addresses is to disconnect the 
infected systems from the network, which could be accomplished by reconfiguring network 
devices to deny network access or physically disconnecting network cables or ejecting 
removable network interface cards from infected systems.” “The most drastic containment 
step is purposely breaking needed network connectivity for uninfected systems”. “In 
worst-case scenarios, isolating subnets from the primary network or even disconnecting 
the entire organization from the Internet might be necessary to stop the spread of 
Malware, halt damage to systems, and provide an opportunity to mitigate vulnerabilities.” 
 
Example  A response guide recommendation by NIST  
 
Con-
sequence 
a.  Malware may adapt or update its strategy when it detects that its dependent network 
connectivity is not available. 
b.  Malware may launch countermeasure offensive when it detects connectivity 
unavailability. 
c.  Business or IT operations dependent on the connectivity will be affected. Hence 
contingency plans will need to invoke. 
 
Related 
Patterns or 
References 
•  Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling by NIST (Para. 4.3.4) 
•  Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (Para. 3.3.4) 
 
6.4.2  PATTERN SET 2 – MALWARE LIKE CONTAINMENT 
The following are samples of Malware Remediation pattern set for Malware like 
Containment or Remediation techniques.  
Table 6.3: Pattern of a Good Botnet 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Good Botnet  
 
Problem  Malware has infected the organization’s computing hosts. It may still be spreading. The 
key important risk to mitigate is to minimize impact to the organization from the 
Malware infection. Restoration of control of computing devices back to the organization 
is vital. Any inability to restore control or prolonged lack of control may induce 
significant risks to the organization. Hence time is of essence.  
 
Context  Malware infection has spread over many computing assets exceeding the number of 
Incident Responders available. The computing assets may be geographically separated. 
This creates a logistical challenge. However beyond the risk impact of having many still 
infected computing assets, is the risk of losing data. Some computing assets contribute 
more to this risk of losing data. Examples of such to be true are servers storing   170 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
organizationally important business data, file servers hosting files used by business, 
computing desktops / laptops / smart mobile devices belonging to individuals like senior 
executives or system administrators with privileged access rights. 
 
In this context, Incident Responders are software components instead of human. The 
characteristics of these software Incident Responders (or Good Bots) are its ability to 
spread like the malicious Botnet Malware, effective (near real-time) communication 
channel and tight operating structure through a centralized command control structure. 
 
Pre-requisite  a.  There is adequate communication channels established to be able to 
communicate instructions to each and every Incident Responders deployed (via 
network connectivity path). 
b.  The remediation instructions do not need to be able available prior to the 
deployment of Incident Responders. Early deployment of Incident Responders 
will improve over remediation effort. 
c.  Incident responders take instructions from a coordination centre or command 
post. Much like a Botnet command and control structure. 
d.  Means to compute estimate or actual extent of time or data loss measurement 
for quantitative computation. 
 
Solution  Establish a central coordination centre or command post in order to direct each and 
every Incident Responders in handling of all infected computing hosts. The command 
post will direct all aspects of the response actions taken by the Incident Responders, 
which are software components, including which hosts to focus on.  
 
Optimization algorithms may be used to direct the focus of the Incident Responder 
software. Optimization may be in the form of prioritization of a pre-assigned priority 
order to each and every computing host. Two quantitative forms of measurements are 
used namely of time and data loss extent.  
 
Recommended Steps to take when Malware Remediation is initiated. 
 
Step 1: Immediate deployment of good bots across all computing hosts (regardless of 
infection status) 
Step 2: Push down remediation package, when available, to good bots through 
centralized command server. Good bots will need to stay constantly in contact with 
command server. 
Step 3: Initiate concurrent execution of remediation package over infected hosts. 
Step 4: Remediated or recovered hosts to remediate other still infected hosts till 
complete eradication of Malware. 
 
Examples  Verified through Agent based Malware Containment Model (AMCM). 
 
Consequences  a.  Traversal time duration to each infected host drops to near zero. 
b.  Reduced time to Malware eradication due to early deployment of good bots and 
infectious spread characteristics of good bots. 
c.  Significant reduction of overall Malware Remediation time from time of 
availability of remediation package to execution of remediation package over 
infected hosts.   171 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
 
Related 
Patterns or 
References 
Nil 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Local Malware Image Removal Containment 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Local Malware Image Removal Containment  
 
Problem  Malware need to be remediated as preventive defensive measures are insufficient in 
keeping Malware contained. Malware still active in the organization.  
 
Context  Deployed Anti-Malware solutions (firewall, IPS and Anti-Virus) and using conventional 
containment techniques are ineffective against Malware.  
 
Pre-requisite  a.  Containment technique applied within the context of a managed environment, 
example, computing assets belonging to the organization. 
b.  Proper authorization provided to invoke offensive containment. 
c.  Forms of Malware analysis available to order to identify offensive techniques 
to apply. 
d.  Conventional containment techniques ineffective. 
e.  Image of Malware known to initiate image removal (environmental 
configuration, static or dynamic Malware image) 
 
Solution  Remove all images of Malware (static or Dynamic) that will include environmental 
settings, Malware image files or dependent files which are not used by any legitimate 
software and execution image of the Malware. 
 
Examples  Verified through Offensive Containment paper. 
 
Consequences  a.  Collateral damage to the infected system or other dependent IT component 
b.  Fruitless attempt to defunct the infected system hence inducing resource 
wastage or disruptions 
c.  Malware survive offensive assaults and launch counter attack 
d.  Unauthorized use of offensive technique 
e.  Use of offensive technique against a wrongly identified host 
f.  New residual risks following the offensive assault made against Malware on 
infected hosts 
g.  Causing disruption to business continuity for organization. 
 
Related 
Patterns or 
References 
a.  CAPEC-203 : Manipulate Application Registry Values 
b.  CAPEC-17 : Accessing, Modifying or Executing Executable Files 
c.  S. N. Alsagoff, “Manual Removal of Malware – Is It Still Relevant?”,   172 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
International Journal of Research and Reviews in Information Security and 
Privacy (IJRRISP) Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2011. 
d.  Reference to Offensive Containment paper. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Resilient Guard Over Important Services 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Resilient Guard Over Important Services  
 
Problem  Malware are attacking defences and key services rendering them useless or ineffective 
hence preventing the individual or organization from defending themselves. The 
Malware is turning off specific services like firewall to weaken the posture of the 
infected computing host. 
 
Context  Deployed Anti-Malware solutions (firewall, IPS and Anti-Virus) and using conventional 
containment tools are ineffective against Malware in fact they are becoming victims of 
Malware. However when such tools are ineffective, the organization or individual loses 
all means to redeem itself from the control of the Malware. 
 
Pre-requisite  a.  Design time resolution. 
b.  Identification of important services to protect against Malware attacks like 
firewall or Anti-Virus 
 
Solution  To reinstate important or monitored software or services when Malware or malicious 
activity turns it off. The following is the Pseudo Code for the pattern. 
 
 
 
 
Examples  Verified through Resilient Containment paper. 
 
Consequences  a.  If the service is legitimately required to be turned off, this resilience design to 
prevent this intent from occurring. 
 
Related 
Patterns or 
References 
a.  Reference to Resilient Containment paper. 
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6.5  DISCUSSION  
The mapping exercise from NIST’s guide document to the pattern template was 
seamlessly done, as the NIST guide write-up was comprehensive and detailed. It is also 
shown  that  the  proposed  containment  pattern  template  for  Incident  Responders  is 
adequate enough to represent such forms of knowledge as the NIST’s guide was intended 
for such a purpose. The benefits that the proposed pattern offered above and beyond what 
is included in the NIST’s guide is the structure and linkages to other materials in order to 
enable  fast  adoption  of  knowledge  and  leverage  on  documented  experience.  Detailed 
steps of the remediation were not included in the NIST’s guide hence it was not included 
in the pattern drafts. Future iterations of the patterns should include detailed steps to 
further simplify the adoption. The set of patterns proposed for Malware like containment 
was crafted from the previous chapters.  
While  such  patterns  could  be  made  easily  available  to  all  including  Malware 
developers,  the  information  published  here  are  originated  from  Malware  developers 
themselves hence the intent to keep the information hidden is not necessary. 
6.6  CONCLUSION  
Malware  Remediation  or  containment  is  now  recognized  as  the  new  line  of 
defence as organizations are subjected to persistent onslaught of Malware attacks [154]. 
This part of the research addressed the key challenge faced by Incident Responders, who 
requires a high level of competency requirements of knowledge, skills and experience to   174 
contain the attacking Malware. To overcome the limitations, Incident Responders will 
need a repository of Malware Remediation patterns that will aid them to shorten the 
learning  curve  requirements  and  possibly  shorten  the  Malware  Remediation  duration. 
When the repository is timely updated with new threats from Malware, the Malware 
Remediation competency will remain to be relevant. This proposition is an important step 
to establish such a repository. Finally, the research propositions made in this thesis will 
contribute  towards  the  Malware  Remediation  pattern  repository  with  Malware  like 
Remediation techniques. 
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7  CONCLUSION  
This chapter concludes the research work done with a summary discussion about 
all research propositions and future research options.  
7.1  MALWARE LIKE REMEDIATION  
The  research  thesis  advocates  the  use  of  Malware  characteristics  as  part  of 
Malware  Remediation.  The  supporting  argument  is  that  if  the  Malware  are  effective 
against the defences and the last line of defences is Malware Remediation, such Malware 
characteristics could be used to address a number of problems that Incident Responders 
face. The characteristics considered in this thesis are to adopt a Botnet’s distributed and 
coordinated  strategy  to  effect  Malware  Remediation,  use  of  Malware  offensive 
techniques to defunct Malware and adoption of Malware resiliency design to harden the 
remediation tools. Also, the approach and techniques could be packaged into Malware 
Remediation  pattern  templates  that  will  facilitate  quick  adoption  in  the  use  of  such 
techniques. 
The situation with the Malware is against the defence as the latter is trying to 
catch up with the attacks. Beyond the development of preventive measures, proactive 
measures need to be developed to better manage the likely scenario of a successful attack 
or penetration. Hence this research advocates taking the offensive weapon away from the 
Malware  developers  and  study  how  it  can  be  used  against  Malware  as  part  of  the 
containment process. This idea goes beyond the convention approach of studying the   176 
Malware and building defences against them. The pre-emptive and proactive approach 
will give the advancement to level off against the adversary. The analogy of using fire to 
fight fire in containing Malware is just like the case of controlled burning to manage a 
fire outbreak, Malware techniques are therefore proposed to be used to contain Malware 
infection or outbreaks. 
7.2  CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPOSITIONS  
The use of Malware like Remediation techniques needs to be managed with the 
following  considerations,  as  there  are  risks  associated  with  the  use  of  malicious 
techniques. They are listed as follows. 
a.  Collateral  damage  to  the  infected  system.  For  example,  launching  an 
offensive attack against a dependent component within the infected system 
could in turn induce system dysfunction.  
b.  Fruitless attempt to defunct the infected system hence inducing resource 
wastage.  This  could  happen  if  the  remediation  solution  selected  is 
ineffective. 
c.  Unauthorized use of Malware like Remediation techniques. An example is 
that Good Botnet could be exploited for malicious intent. 
d.  Excessive  defensive  posture  that  in  turn  induces  significant  burden  or 
overload to existing computing deployments. 
e.  Inducing  further  loss  or  organizational  damage  /  disruption  if  Malware 
responses with a counterattack.   177 
Such undesirable effects are similar to the possible effects of performing surgery or 
the prescription of heavy dosage of medication to a patient. There could be risks involved 
but the treatment may be necessary. 
 
7.3  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
The  following  are  future  research  directions  for  each  of  the  research  solution 
propositions made in this thesis. 
7.3.1  FUTURE – AGENT BASED MALWARE CONTAINMENT MODEL 
Agent based Malware Containment Model could be enhanced to include more 
parameters  to  better  emulate  the  real-world  conditions  and  to  support  tests  of  other 
hypotheses. Possible examples of parameters to be incorporated include the following. 
a.  Inclusion of topology of network to better assess the spread efficiency. 
b.  User participation and human behaviours in the process.  
c.  Enterprise  Security  Infrastructure  to  deter  spread  or  to  assist  in 
containment. 
d.  Adaptive Malware that is able to fend off the containment attempts. 
e.  Re-infection of hosts by same Malware which could be induced by the 
shortcoming the remediation or sophistication of Malware involved. 
The  future  research  options  are  (1)  to  assess  other  containment  strategies 
approaches beyond the selected use of prioritization and FIFO optimization strategies, (2)   178 
extend the data leakage measurement to consider other forms of data loss including data 
destruction. Data destruction may occur when certain types of Malware detects attempt to 
contain  it.  (3)  The  AMCM  simulation  model  could  be  enhanced  to  mimic  the 
environmental conditions of a Malware outbreak such as the environmental limits to the 
extent of data leakage due to the bandwidth limit of the Internet or from the Infected 
hosts.  Finally,  (4)  other  forms  of  measurements  beyond  data  loss,  like  remediation 
operating cost, that could be considered to provide more analysis options to the AMCM 
model. 
7.3.2  FUTURE – DISTRIBUTED AND COORDINATED CONTAINMENT 
A future option is to look into the other forms of Botnet characteristics and its 
anatomy that can be incorporated into the containment of Malware through the Good 
Botnet. According to Li et al. [155], Botnets’ characteristics can be categorized into the 
following. 
Figure 7.1: Botnet Characteristic Chart 
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From the above study, other forms of the command and control models of the 
Good Botnet can be explored to include peer-to-peer command and control structure and 
unstructured command and control model. Additionally, the qualitative measurement or 
comparison of the Good Botnet structure may be studied in greater details [156]. 
Specifically in the development of the Good Botnet, areas of development may 
include the communication protocol to be used and how to harden the communication 
channel to minimize disruption and undesired manipulation. 
Finally, another step will be to develop a real deployment of the Good Botnet and 
to  demonstrate  its  ability  to  contain  a  Malware  outbreak  beyond  using  a  simulation 
model. 
7.3.3  FUTURE – OFFENSIVE CONTAINMENT 
Future  research  options  to  this  research  proposition  include  (1)  identifying 
relevant tools that could be used in Offensive Containment, (2) define evaluation criteria 
of  Offensive  techniques,  (3)  ways  to  reduce  collateral  effects  when  such  offensive 
techniques are applied, and (4) propose an extension of MAEC to include containment 
techniques to Malware behaviour characteristics.  
For  mobile  Malware,  actual  mobile  handset  may  be  used  to  conduct  the 
experiments.   180 
7.3.4  FUTURE – RESILIENT CONTAINMENT 
Malware resiliency design techniques could also be formalized into a body of 
knowledge  in  the  form  of  design  patterns  or  in  the  proposed  Malware  Remediation 
pattern.  They  can  then  be  subsequently  incorporated  into  defence  or 
containment/remediation tools in order to prolong the effectiveness of the tools similar to 
the intent of the Malware. Additionally the attack vectors of the Malware could be used 
to evaluate the resilience strength of the tool as part of the security development lifecycle. 
Other future research options are to conduct experiments with real Malware and to create 
a mapping table of Malware offensive vectors to resilient software designs.  
7.3.5  FUTURE – PATTERN BASED CONTAINMENT 
A Malware Remediation pattern repository should be created and maintained to 
ensure the continued development of Malware Remediation patterns. The patterns may be 
formally specified and verified. Patterns can be coded into forms of ontology to extend 
this knowledge repository to integrate with other knowledge repositories like Common 
Vulnerabilities  and  Exposures  (CVE)  and  Malware  Attribute  Enumeration  and 
Characterization (MAEC) from Mitre.  
In order for the Malware Remediation pattern template and pattern knowledge 
repository to stay relevant, they should be maintained and updated by an open community 
of  practitioners  from  the  academia,  security  industry  and  security  incident  response 
practice. 
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7.4  CONCLUDING REMARK  
This  study  has  advocated  and  studied  the  characteristics  and  approaches  of 
Malware in order to contain and remediate the attack by Malware on IT resources. It is 
understandable that the use of such measures has associated risks and should be limited to 
the  environment  of  an  organisation  and  boundary  of  policies  and  regulations. 
Nevertheless,  the  Internet  is  not  an  ideal  world  where  criminal  elements  exist  with 
malicious  intents.  This  study  has  demonstrated  and  argued  the  use  of  Malware-like 
techniques is possible as part of the containment process to address the issue.  
Based on the above, this study contributed a new approach of defence, or offence, 
to the information security discipline, and has provided initiatives to study improved 
means to contain Malware outbreaks, for a more secure online environment tomorrow. 
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APPENDIX A – ANALYSIS OF CAPEC RELEASE 1.6 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
Data Leakage Attacks 
1.    CAPEC-
215 
Fuzzing and 
observing 
application log 
data/errors for 
application mapping 
This technique (fuzzing) can be 
used against Malware to topple 
stability of the malicious code. 
 
Pre-condition – Conditions to 
support fuzzing assessment like 
an input component belonging to 
Malware. 
 
Offensive, 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
2.    CAPEC-
258 
Passively Sniffing 
and Capturing 
Application Code 
Bound for an 
Authorized Client 
During Dynamic 
Update 
This can be used to gather 
information about the Malware 
during its update in order to 
exploit any vulnerability in the 
Malware (perhaps as part of 
fuzzing). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes 
updates through a stream of data 
exchange. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
3.    CAPEC-
259 
Passively Sniffing 
and Capturing 
Application Code 
Bound for an 
Authorized Client 
During Patching 
This can be used to gather 
information about the Malware 
during its patching stage as part 
attempt to exploit any 
vulnerability (fuzzing). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes 
patching through a stream of data 
exchange. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
4.    CAPEC-
260 
Passively Sniffing 
and Capturing 
Application Code 
Bound for an 
Authorized Client 
During Initial 
Distribution 
This can be used to gather 
information about the Malware 
during its initial distribution stage 
as part attempt to exploit any 
vulnerability (fuzzing). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware does a 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive   183 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
stream of data exchange during 
initial start-up or distribution. 
 
Resource Depletion 
5.    CAPEC-
125 / 
CAPEC 
- 130 
Resource Depletion 
through Flooding 
Can be used to defunct Malware 
by invoking or consuming 
services or resources dependent 
upon by the Malware or services 
rendered by Malware (eg, 
listening ports). However there 
will affect the other non-Malware 
or legitimate applications too in 
infected hosts hence forms of 
collateral damages may occur. 
 
Pre-condition – Forms of resource 
consumption exist within the 
Malware in order for resource 
depletion to occur. One form is 
servicing a listening port. 
 
Offensive 
6.    CAPEC-
131 
Resource Depletion 
through Leak 
Utilize a resource leak on the 
target Malware to deplete the 
quantity of the resource available 
to service ‘legitimate’ Malware 
requests. This may only occur 
after some fuzzing assessment has 
been done. 
 
Pre-condition – Forms of resource 
consumption exist within the 
Malware in order for resource 
depletion to occur. One form is 
servicing a listening port. 
 
Offensive 
7.    CAPEC-
227 
Denial of Service 
through Resource 
Depletion 
Consume resources dependent by 
Malware to defunct it.  
 
Pre-condition – Resource 
dependency of Malware 
identified. Or perhaps resource 
dependency from a service 
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offering by the Malware. 
 
Side effects – collateral damages 
affecting legitimate applications 
that are just as dependent on the 
same resource as the Malware in 
the same infected hosts. 
 
8.    CAPEC-
147 
XML Ping of Death  Such exploit (to use a malformed 
XML) to kill or defunct an 
application is applicable to 
Malware if XML are consumed or 
used by Malware. This is done 
through initiation of a resource 
depletion attack where a large 
number of small XML messages 
are delivered at a sufficiently 
rapid rate to cause a denial of 
service or crash of the target 
Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
Malware consumes XML. 
 
Offensive 
9.    CAPEC-
229 
XML Attribute 
Blow-up 
Allocation of Resources Without 
Limits or Throttling against 
Malware. Only applicable if 
Malware takes XML feeds and 
have weak XML filtering 
capabilities. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
Malware consumes XML. 
 
Offensive 
10.   CAPEC-
230 
Recursive Payloads 
Sent to XML Parsers 
Allocation of Resources Without 
Limits or Throttling against 
Malware. Only applicable if 
Malware takes XML feeds and 
have weak XML filtering 
capabilities. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
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Malware consumes XML. 
 
11.   CAPEC-
231 
Oversized Payloads 
Sent to XML Parsers 
Allocation of Resources Without 
Limits or Throttling against 
Malware. Only applicable if 
Malware takes XML feeds and 
have weak XML filtering 
capabilities. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
Malware consumes XML. 
 
Offensive 
Injection 
12.   CAPEC-
135 
Format String 
Injection 
Inject formatting characters in a 
string input field on the target 
Malware. Here context is that the 
Malware involved takes in string 
inputs. An assumption is that 
Malware will process static text 
and respond unpredictably to the 
presence of formatting character 
in input string. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
Malware takes string input or 
there are exploitable means to 
conduct string insertion as part of 
the Malware logic flow. 
 
Offensive  
13.   CAPEC-
6 
Argument Injection  Change the behaviour or state of a 
targeted Malware through 
injecting data or command syntax 
through the targets use of non-
validated and non-filtered 
arguments of exposed services or 
methods that may exist in 
Malware. Pre-condition is that 
exposed services and methods are 
known prior to such attempt. 
 
Pre-condition – Targeted 
Malware takes argument input or 
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there are exploitable means to 
conduct argument insertion as 
part of the Malware logic flow. 
 
14.   CAPEC-
117 
Data Interception 
Attacks 
Monitor data streams to or from a 
targeted Malware in order to 
gather information about the 
latter. This attack may be 
undertaken to gather information 
to support a later attack or the 
data collected may be the end 
goal of the attack. 
 
Pre-condition – Observable data 
exchange occurring with the 
Malware. However there may be 
instances that data exchanges 
occur only during certain stages 
of execution of Malware (eg, 
APT). 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
15.   CAPEC-
157 
Sniffing Attacks  Monitors information transmitted 
between logical or physical nodes 
of a network involving the 
targeted Malware. This activity 
will not include attempt to 
prevent reception or change 
content but must simply be able 
to observe and read the traffic 
involving the targeted Malware. 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
16.   CAPEC-
137 
Parameter Injection  Exploit weaknesses in input 
validation by manipulating the 
content of request parameters 
with the intent to undermine the 
security of the targeted Malware. 
Some parameter encodings use 
text characters as separators. This 
applies only if the Malware 
accepts forms of inputs. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware accepts 
parameter inject. 
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17.   CAPEC-
190 
Reverse Engineer an 
Executable to 
Expose Assumed 
Hidden 
Functionality or 
Content 
Analyses a binary file or 
executable (belonging to the 
Malware) for the purpose of 
discovering the structure, 
function, and possibly source-
code of the file by using a variety 
of analysis techniques to 
effectively determine how the 
software functions and operates. 
Disassembly may be used. 
 
Pre-condition – The means to 
conduct reverse engineering on 
Malware binaries possible. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive, 
Active 
18.   CAPEC-
191 
Read Sensitive 
Stings Within an 
Executable 
Engage in activities to discover 
any sensitive strings are present 
within the compiled code of an 
executable, such as literal ASCII 
strings within the file itself 
(belonging to Malware), or 
possibly strings hard-coded into 
particular routines that can be 
revealed by code refactoring 
methods including static and 
dynamic analysis. 
 
Pre-condition – The means to 
conduct analysis on Malware 
binaries possible. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive, 
Active 
19.   CAPEC-
251 
Local Code 
Inclusion 
Force Malware to load arbitrary 
code files from the local machine.  
 
Pre-condition – Only applicable if 
this (loading of arbitrary code 
files) is required or supported by 
Malware. 
 
Offensive 
20.   CAPEC-
15 
Command 
Delimiters 
Exploits a Malware's 
vulnerabilities that allow an 
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attacker's commands to be 
concatenated onto a legitimate 
command with the intent of 
targeting other resources or itself 
(Malware). 
 
Pre-condition – Only applicable if 
command line parameters are 
supported by Malware. 
 
Spoofing 
21.   CAPEC-
156 
Spoofing  Construct a message such that the 
constructed message is capable of 
masquerading as an authorized 
message from some other 
principal (eg, Malware bot 
controller) 
 
Pre-condition – Data exchanges 
occurring with the targeted 
Malware with other instances of 
Malware or its controller. 
 
Offensive 
22.   CAPEC-
148 
Content Spoofing  Modifies content to make it 
contain something other than 
what the original content 
producer intended while keeping 
the apparent source of the content 
unchanged (eg, source may be the 
Malware bot controller). Can be 
used to mislead Malware to think 
a message from Malware 
controller or other instances of 
Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Data exchanges 
occurring with the targeted 
Malware with other instances of 
Malware or its controller. 
 
Offensive 
23.   CAPEC-
145 
Checksum Spoofing  Spoofs a checksum message for 
the purpose of making a payload 
Offensive   189 
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appear to have a valid 
corresponding checksum. 
Checksums are used to verify 
message integrity.  
 
Pre-Condition – This only applies 
if Malware uses such error 
checking mechanism. Also that 
payload exchanges occurs. 
 
24.   CAPEC-
194 
Fake the Source of 
Data 
Provides data under a falsified 
identity (to the Malware) in order 
to prevent traceability of the 
provided data (from the Malware 
attacker) or it might be an attempt 
by the Malware attacker to 
assume the rights granted to 
another identity (identity that is 
legitimate to the Malware perhaps 
a bot controller or another 
instance of Malware). 
 
Pre-condition – Data exchanges 
occurring with the targeted 
Malware with other instances of 
Malware or its controller. 
 
Offensive 
25.   CAPEC-
38 
Leveraging/Manipul
ating Configuration 
File Search Paths 
Load an alternative resource into 
a program's (belonging to the 
Malware) standard path used to 
bootstrap and/or provide 
contextual information. This 
provides a means to load another 
package to disrupt the Malware 
execution cycle. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware requires 
a bootstrap loading as part of its 
operating lifecycle (eg, during 
start-up). 
 
Offensive 
26.   CAPEC- Identity Spoofing  Crafts a message that  Offensive   190 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
151 / 
CAPEC-
195 
masquerades as a message from a 
principal (Malware attacker) other 
than the actual message sender 
(legitimate source to Malware).  
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
communicates with other 
instances of Malware or its 
controller and identity notification 
/ authentication is used as part of 
its communication. 
 
27.   CAPEC-
220 
Client-Server 
Protocol 
Manipulation 
Take advantage of weaknesses in 
the protocol by which a client and 
server are communicating to 
perform unexpected actions. 
Either the client or server may be 
the targeted Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Such client-server 
protocol is required. Also 
knowledge or understanding of 
protocol or hand shaking is 
required. 
 
Offensive 
28.   CAPEC-
187 
Malicious 
Automated Software 
Update 
Exploit a weakness in a server or 
client's process of delivering and 
verifying the integrity of code 
supplied by an update-providing 
server or mechanism to cause 
code of the Malware attacker's 
choosing to be downloaded and 
installed as a software update 
(update to Malware). This can be 
exploited to initiate an update to 
Malware that causes its own 
destruction. 
 
Pre-condition – Update of 
Malware is furnished by some 
means of digital transport like via 
network. Also sufficient 
Offensive   191 
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knowledge / understanding of 
mechanism of update required. 
 
29.   CAPEC-
94 
Man in the Middle 
Attack 
Attack done between Malware 
client and its server component 
like bot controller. The ‘man’ in 
this middle position is controlled 
by the Malware attacker. 
 
Pre-condition – The chain of 
communication needs to be 
identified and understood in order 
for exploitation to occur. 
 
Offensive 
30.   CAPEC-
384 
Application API 
Message 
Manipulation via 
Man-in-the-Middle 
Manipulates either egress or 
ingress data from a Malware in 
order to change the content of 
messages as part of man-in-the-
middle attack. This is done via 
application API message 
exchange. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses this 
form of communication. 
Knowledge and understanding of 
the communication mechanism is 
required. 
 
Offensive 
Time and State Attacks 
31.   CAPEC-
172 
Time and State 
Attacks 
Exploits weaknesses in timing or 
state maintaining functions to 
perform actions that would 
otherwise be prevented by the 
execution flow of the target code 
and processes belonging to the 
Malware. Perhaps the time of the 
system.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware is time 
or state or event dependent before 
proceeding to the next stage of 
malicious activity. 
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32.   CAPEC-
25 
Forced Deadlock  Attempts to trigger and exploit a 
deadlock condition in the targeted 
Malware to cause a denial of 
service state.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware has a 
resource that it is dependent upon 
which can induce a deadlock 
state. 
 
Offensive 
33.   CAPEC-
29 
Leveraging Time-of-
Check and Time-of-
Use (TOC/TOU) 
Race Conditions 
Targets a race condition occurring 
between the time of check (state) 
for a resource and the time of use 
of a resource that Malware 
requires. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware requires 
such TOC/TOU service. 
 
Offensive 
Abusing of Functionality 
34.   CAPEC-
2 
Inducing Account 
Lockout 
Leveraging on the security 
functionality of the system aimed 
to launch a denial of service 
attack against the ‘legitimate’ 
system / user account that the 
Malware used. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
system / user account to exist and 
operate. 
 
Side effects – If Malware uses an 
account that is used by other 
legitimate applications. Or 
Malware uses root or 
administrator account. 
 
Offensive 
35.   CAPEC-
215 
Fuzzing and 
observing 
application log 
data/errors for 
Send random, malformed, or 
otherwise unexpected messages to 
the targeted Malware and 
observes the Malware's log or 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive   193 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
application mapping  error messages returned. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
generates error or log messages 
that is accessible or viewable. 
 
36.   CAPEC-
113 
API Abuse/Misuse  Manipulates the processing of 
Application Programming 
Interface (API) resulting in the 
API's function having an alternate 
behaviour or outcome in which 
the Malware is dependent upon or 
uses.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
API that can be manipulated. 
 
Side effects – Other legitimate 
application or operating system 
may use the same API. 
 
Offensive 
37.   CAPEC-
121 
Locate and Exploit 
Test APIs 
Exploits a sample, demonstration, 
or test API that is insecure by 
default but still resident in 
Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Identify the 
existences of such test APIs in 
Malware. Also to categorize the 
API as test. 
 
Offensive 
38.   CAPEC-
179 
Discovering, 
querying, and finally 
calling micro-
services, such as w/ 
AJAX 
To discover and query micro-
services at a web location and 
thereby expose the Micro-services 
to further exploitation by 
gathering information about the 
Malware’s implementation and 
supported function. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
publishes such micro-web 
services. 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive, 
Active   194 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
 
39.   CAPEC-
133 
Try All Common 
Application 
Switches and 
Options 
Attempts to invoke all common 
switches and options in the 
targeted Malware for the purpose 
of discovering weaknesses. 
Malware may use command line 
switches or options. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware supports 
input parameters in the form of 
command switches / options. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
40.   CAPEC-
141 
Cache Poisoning  Exploits the functionality of 
cache technologies to cause 
specific data to be cached that 
aids the attacker’s objectives. An 
example is DNS store in infected 
hosts or infected environment. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware depends 
on such cached or lookup data to 
support its execution or lifecycle. 
 
Offensive 
41.   CAPEC-
184 
Software Integrity 
Attacks 
Initiate a series of events designed 
to cause the targeted Malware 
software to perform actions that 
undermine its integrity to achieve 
an insecure state. 
 
Pre-condition – Such forms of 
integrity checks are implemented 
in the Malware. 
 
Offensive 
42.   CAPEC-
281 
Analytic Attacks  Perform an analysis of the 
targeted system (with infected 
status), protocol, message, or 
application (Malware) in order to 
overcome protections on the 
targeted Malware / infected host 
or as a precursor to other attacks. 
 
Pre-condition – Nil. 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active   195 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
 
43.   CAPEC-
170 
Web 
Server/Application 
Fingerprinting 
Sends a series of probes to a web 
server or application in order to 
elicit version-dependent and type-
dependent behaviour that assists 
in identifying the targeted 
Malware’s web or application 
characteristics. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
publishes forms of services over 
the network or within the infected 
host’s operating environment. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
44.   CAPEC-
169 
Footprinting  Engage in probing and 
exploration activity to identify 
constituents and properties of the 
targeted Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Nil. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
45.   CAPEC-
188 
Reverse Engineering  Discover the structure, function, 
and composition of the Malware 
by using a variety of analysis 
techniques to effectively 
determine how the analysed entity 
was constructed or operates. 
 
Pre-condition – Instances (static 
or dynamic) of Malware available 
for reverse engineering to occur. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
46.   CAPEC-
189 / 
CAPEC-
190 / 
CAPEC-
191 
Software Reverse 
Engineering 
Discover the structure, function, 
and composition of the targeted 
Malware by using a variety of 
analysis techniques to effectively 
determine how the software 
functions and operates, or if 
vulnerabilities or security 
weakness are present within the 
implementation. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active   196 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
Pre-condition – Instances (static 
or dynamic) of Malware available 
for reverse engineering to occur. 
 
47.   CAPEC-
192 
Protocol Reverse 
Engineering  
Engage in activities to decipher 
and/or decode protocol 
information for a network or 
application communication 
protocol used for transmitting 
information between 
interconnected nodes or systems 
on a packet-switched data 
network within the context of the 
Malware operating environment 
(within infected network or 
among infected hosts). 
 
Pre-condition – Identification of 
protocol and means to sniff 
protocol while in operation is 
required. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
48.   CAPEC-
97 
Cryptanalysis  Cryptanalysis is a process of 
finding weaknesses in 
cryptographic algorithms and 
using these weaknesses to 
decipher the cipher text without 
knowing the secret key (instance 
deduction).  
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
cryptographic algorithms. Useful 
to identify the specific algorithm. 
Need to identify context in which 
it is used. Also sufficient samples 
of cipher text required. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
49.   CAPEC-
214 
Fuzzing for 
garnering 
J2EE/.NET-based 
stack traces, for 
application mapping  
Sends random, malformed, or 
otherwise unexpected messages to 
a target application and observes 
any stack traces produced by error 
messages. 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active   197 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
 
Pre-condition – Operating 
environment supporting the 
Malware need to support stack 
trace generation. 
 
Probabilistic Techniques 
50.   CAPEC-
112 
Brute Force  Attempt to gain access to an asset 
(function or data) owned by the 
targeted Malware by using trial-
and-error to exhaustively explore 
all the possible secret values in 
the hope of finding the secret (or 
a value that is functionally 
equivalent) that will unlock the 
asset. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
implements an access control 
mechanism to its internal function 
or data. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active 
51.   CAPEC-
20 
Encryption Brute 
Forcing 
Armed with the cipher text and 
the encryption algorithm used, 
performs an exhaustive (brute 
force) search on the key space to 
determine the key that decrypts 
the cipher text to obtain the 
plaintext. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
cryptographic algorithms. Need to 
know the specific algorithm and 
the context in which it is used. 
Also sufficient samples of cipher 
text required for brute forcing to 
occur. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive 
52.   CAPEC-
49 
Password Brute 
Forcing 
Tries every possible value for a 
password until they succeed. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive   198 
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forms of password as an 
authentication mechanism to 
protect itself. 
 
53.   CAPEC-
16 
Dictionary-based 
Password Attack 
Tries each of the words in a 
dictionary as passwords to gain 
access to the system via some 
user's account. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
forms of password as an 
authentication mechanism to 
protect itself. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive 
54.   CAPEC-
55 
Rainbow Table 
Password Cracking 
Gets access to the database table 
where hashes of passwords are 
stored. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
forms of password as an 
authentication mechanism to 
protect itself. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive 
55.   CAPEC-
155 
Screen Temporary 
Files for Sensitive 
Information 
Exploit the temporary, insecure 
storage of information by 
monitoring the content of files 
used to store temp data during an 
application's routine execution 
flow. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware 
generates temporary files as part 
of its operating lifecycle. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive 
56.   CAPEC-
28 
Fuzzing  Fuzzing is a software testing 
method that feeds randomly 
constructed input to the system 
and looks for an indication that a 
failure in response to that input 
has occurred. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active   199 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
inputs. 
 
Exploitation of Authentication 
57.   CAPEC-
102 
Session Sidejacking  Sniff on the wireless or wired 
network to detect unencrypted 
traffic that contains session 
tokens used by Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
session tokens to conduct its 
communication or data exchange 
with other entities. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Passive 
58.   CAPEC-
226 
Session Credential 
Falsification through 
Manipulation  
Manipulate an existing credential 
in order to gain access to a target 
application (ie, the Malware itself 
or other malicious entities that the 
Malware is conversing with eg 
Malware controller or other 
instances of Malware). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
session tokens to conduct its 
communication or data exchange 
with other entities. 
 
Offensive 
59.   CAPEC-
59 
Session Credential 
Falsification through 
Prediction  
Target predictable session ID in 
order to gain privileges used by 
Malware either in the infected 
hosts or to its controller. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
session tokens to conduct its 
communication or data exchange 
with other entities. 
 
Offensive 
Exploitation of Privilege/Trust 
60.   CAPEC-
132 
Symlink Attacks   Position a symbolic link in such a 
manner that the targeted user or 
application (relating to the 
Malware) accesses to the link's 
endpoint, assuming that it is 
Offensive   200 
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accessing a file with the link's 
name. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
symlink mechanism. 
 
Side-effects – Other legitimate 
applications or operating system 
processes may use or require the 
same symlink. 
 
61.   CAPEC-
17 
Accessing, 
Modifying or 
Executing 
Executable Files  
Exploit a system's configuration 
that allows either direct access an 
executable file, for example 
through shell access. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware’s 
executable files can be found and 
modified. 
 
Offensive 
62.   CAPEC-
75 
Manipulating 
Writeable 
Configuration Files  
Generally these are manually 
edited files that are used by the 
Malware but not in the context of 
the operating system 
environment.  
 
Pre-condition – Such 
configuration files are viewable 
and modifiable.  
 
Offensive 
63.   CAPEC-
180 
Exploiting 
Incorrectly 
Configured Access 
Control Security 
Levels  
Exploit a weakness in the 
configuration of access controls 
and is able to bypass the intended 
protection that these measures 
guard against and thereby obtain 
unauthorized access to the system 
or network. In this case, 
tightening of a weaken ACL can 
be applied to constrain and limit 
Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – ACL can be used 
Offensive   201 
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against the targeted Malware. 
 
64.   CAPEC-
22 
Exploiting Trust in 
Client (aka Make the 
Client Invisible)  
Exploit a program's (in this 
context, the Malware’s) 
vulnerabilities in client/server 
communication channel 
authentication and data integrity. 
It leverages the implicit trust a 
server places (eg, Malware 
controller) in the client (eg, 
targeted Malware), or more 
importantly, that which the server 
believes is the client. This can be 
used to exploit connectivity that 
the Malware (client) may have its 
controller (server). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware engages 
in trust communication with other 
Malware entities like Malware 
controller or other Malware 
instances. 
 
Offensive 
65.   CAPEC-
37 
Lifting Data 
Embedded in Client 
Distributions  
Stealing of data embedded in 
client distributions (Malware 
network) or client code (targeted 
Malware) in order to gain certain 
information. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware involved 
in distributed communication. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive 
66.   CAPEC-
204 
Lifting cached, 
sensitive data 
embedded in client 
distributions (thick 
or thin)  
Examine a target application's 
(Malware’s) cache for sensitive 
information. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware involved 
in distributed communication. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive, 
Malware 
Analysis 
67.   CAPEC-
205 
Lifting 
credential(s)/key 
material embedded 
Examine a target application's 
code or configuration files to find 
credential or key material that has 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or   202 
S/N  Ref  Description  Offensive Anti-Malware  Category 
in client 
distributions (thick 
or thin)  
been embedded within the 
application or its files. 
 
Pre-condition – Instance of 
Malware and supporting elements 
like configuration files available 
for analysis. 
 
Passive, 
Malware 
Analysis 
68.   CAPEC-
65 
Passively Sniff and 
Capture Application 
Code Bound for 
Authorized Client  
Malware attackers can capture 
application code bound for the 
client (targeted Malware) and can 
use it, as-is or through reverse-
engineering, to glean sensitive 
information or exploit the trust 
relationship between the client 
and server (eg, Malware 
controller or other instances of 
Malware). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware engages 
in application code exchanges 
over the wire. 
 
Intelligence 
Gathering / 
Active or 
Passive, 
Attack 
69.   CAPEC-
202 
Create Malicious 
Client  
Create a fake client application 
(trusted by the targeted Malware) 
to interface with a target service 
(belonging to the targeted 
Malware) where the client 
violates assumptions the service 
makes about clients. 
 
Pre-condition – Client-server 
relationship exists with the 
targeted Malware with the latter 
assuming server role. 
 
Offensive 
70.   CAPEC-
207 
Removing Important 
Functionality from 
the Client  
Remove or disable functionality 
on the client (in this context, the 
infected host) that the server (in 
this context, Malware) assumes to 
be present and trustworthy. 
 
Offensive   203 
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Pre-condition – Identify server 
services required by the targeted 
Malware. 
 
Side-effects – Other legitimate 
applications or operating system 
processes dependent on same 
server services. 
 
71.   CAPEC-
56 
Removing/short-
circuiting 'guard 
logic'  
Malware attackers can, in some 
cases, get around logic put in 
place to 'guard' sensitive 
functionality or data. Use such 
approach to circumvent Malware 
protective ‘guard’ to gain access 
its protected data or logic. 
 
Pre-condition – Sufficient 
understanding and knowledge of 
the workings of the Malware 
required to identify the guard 
mechanism and what is likely to 
reside behind the ‘guard’. 
 
Offensive 
72.   CAPEC-
200 
Removal of filters: 
Input filters, output 
filters, data masking  
Removes or disable filtering 
mechanisms on the target 
application (Malware). Such 
mechanisms may exist to protect 
the Malware against fuzzing 
attempts or improper handling of 
inputs. 
 
Pre-condition – Identify the input 
mechanisms that exist with the 
targeted Malware and the 
filtration mechanisms included. 
 
Offensive 
73.   CAPEC-
90 
Reflection Attack in 
Authentication 
Protocol  
Malware attacker can abuse the 
authentication protocol 
susceptible to reflection attack in 
order to defeat the protocol and 
subsequently the targeted 
Offensive   204 
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Malware. Doing so allows the 
Malware attacker access to the 
targeted Malware or Malware 
network, without possessing the 
requisite credentials. 
 
Pre-condition – Identify the 
authentication protocol used by 
the Malware and its associates. 
 
74.   CAPEC-
39 
Manipulating 
Opaque Client-based 
Data Tokens  
In circumstances where an 
application holds important data 
client-side in tokens (cookies, 
URLs, data files, and so forth) 
that data can be manipulated. If 
client or server-side application 
components (either role that the 
targeted Malware takes) 
reinterpret that data as 
authentication tokens or data 
(such as store item pricing or 
wallet information) then even 
opaquely manipulating that data 
may bear fruit for the Malware 
attacker. 
 
Pre-condition – Data tokens used 
by Malware in its distributed 
communication. 
 
Offensive 
75.   CAPEC-
77 
Manipulating User-
Controlled Variables  
This attack targets controlled 
variables used by the targeted 
Malware. The Malware attacker 
can override environment 
variables leveraging user-supplied 
or user controlled environmental 
variables.  
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the variables that Malware uses or 
dependent upon. 
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Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
variables are altered. 
 
76.   CAPEC-
10 
Buffer Overflow via 
Environment 
Variables  
This attack pattern involves 
causing a buffer overflow through 
manipulation of environment 
variables. Once the Malware 
attacker finds that they can 
modify an environment variable, 
they may try to overflow 
associated buffers that belong to 
the targeted Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the variables that Malware uses or 
dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
variables are altered. 
 
Offensive 
77.   CAPEC-
69 
Target Programs 
with Elevated 
Privileges  
This attack targets the Malware 
application running with elevated 
privileges. The attacker would try 
to leverage a bug in the running 
program (Malware) and get 
arbitrary code to execute with 
elevated privileges in order to 
defunct the Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
bug in Malware and means to 
exploit it against the Malware. 
 
Offensive 
78.   CAPEC-
9 
Buffer Overflow in 
Local Command-
Line Utilities  
This attack targets command-line 
utilities available in a number of 
shells. An attacker can leverage a 
vulnerability found in a 
command-line utility (to the 
Offensive   206 
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Malware) to exploit the weakness 
against the Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Command-line 
utility or Malware application that 
exists to invoke an exploit. Also a 
bug exists in the command-line 
arguments. 
 
79.   CAPEC-
13 
Subverting 
Environment 
Variable Values  
The Malware attacker directly or 
indirectly modifies environment 
variables used by or controlling 
the targeted Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the environmental variables that 
Malware uses or dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
environmental variables are 
altered. 
 
Offensive 
80.   CAPEC-
38 
Leveraging/Manipul
ating Configuration 
File Search Paths  
This Malware attack loads an 
offensive resource into the 
Malware program's standard path 
used to bootstrap and/or provide 
contextual information for a 
Malware program like a path 
variable or classpath. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware requires 
bootstrap or environment variable 
to operate or exist. 
 
Offensive 
81.   CAPEC-
76 
Manipulating Input 
to File System Calls  
The Malware attacker 
manipulates inputs to the targeted 
Malware that the targeted 
Malware passes to file system 
calls in the OS. The goal is to 
gain access to, and perhaps 
Offensive   207 
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modify, areas of the file system 
that the targeted Malware did not 
intend to be accessible. (eg, 
listening port) 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes 
inputs that can be exploited. 
 
82.   CAPEC-
389 
Content Spoofing 
Via Application API 
Manipulation  
The Malware attacker 
manipulates either egress or 
ingress data from a client 
(Malware) within an application 
framework (eg, J2EE) in order to 
change the content of messages. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses an 
application framework to operate 
and exist. 
 
Offensive 
83.   CAPEC-
30 
Hijacking a 
Privileged Thread of 
Execution  
The Malware attacker can hijack 
a privileged thread from the 
underlying system through 
synchronous (calling a privileged 
function that returns incorrectly) 
or asynchronous (callbacks, 
signal handlers, and similar) 
means. This can be used against 
the Malware to take control 
against the latter. 
 
Pre-condition – An understanding 
of the inner workings of the 
Malware required specifically 
relating the thread or process 
management used by the 
Malware. 
 
Offensive 
Data Structure Attacks 
84.   CAPEC-
123 
Buffer Attacks  The Malware attacker 
manipulates a data buffer to 
change the execution flow of a 
process (Malware) to a sequence 
Offensive   208 
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of events the attacker controls. 
Data buffers in software 
applications (Malware) provide a 
storage-space for external input. 
 
Pre-condition – An understanding 
of the inner workings of the 
Malware required specifically 
relating to the use of data buffers. 
 
85.   CAPEC-
100 
Overflow Buffers   Buffer Overflow attacks target 
improper or missing bounds 
checking on buffer operations, 
typically triggered by input 
injected by an attacker.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
inputs that can be exploited. 
 
Offensive 
86.   CAPEC-
14 
Client-side 
Injection-induced 
Buffer Overflow 
This type of attack exploits a 
buffer overflow vulnerability in 
targeted Malware through 
injection of malicious content 
from a custom-built hostile 
service (server side). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses a 
server side service to operate or 
exist. 
  
Offensive 
87.   CAPEC-
24 
Filter Failure 
through Buffer 
Overflow  
In this attack, the idea is to cause 
an active filter to fail by causing 
an oversized transaction. An 
attacker may try to feed overly 
long input strings to the program 
(targeted Malware) in an attempt 
to overwhelm the filter (by 
causing a buffer overflow) and 
hoping that the filter does not fail 
securely (i.e. lets the user input 
into the system unfiltered). 
 
Offensive   209 
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Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
input strings from external 
sources or other components that 
the Malware has but can be 
exploited to affect the targeted 
Malware component. 
 
88.   CAPEC-
44 
Overflow Binary 
Resource File  
An attack of this type exploits a 
buffer overflow vulnerability in 
the handling of binary resources. 
Binary resources may include 
patch update to Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Binary file input 
required or used by Malware. 
 
Offensive 
89.   CAPEC-
45 
Buffer Overflow via 
Symbolic Links  
This type of attack leverages the 
use of symbolic links to cause 
buffer overflows. An attacker can 
try to create or manipulate a 
symbolic link file such that its 
contents result in out of bounds 
data. When the targeted Malware 
processes the symbolic link file, it 
could potentially overflow 
internal buffers with insufficient 
bounds checking. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
symbolic links to operate or exist. 
 
Offensive 
90.   CAPEC-
46 
Overflow Variables 
and Tags  
This type of attack leverages the 
use of tags or variables from a 
formatted configuration data to 
cause buffer overflow. The 
attacker crafts a malicious HTML 
page or configuration file that 
includes oversized strings, thus 
causing an overflow. This is then 
fed into the targeted Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
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configuration data or input data 
source. 
 
91.   CAPEC-
47 
Buffer Overflow via 
Parameter 
Expansion  
In this attack, the targeted 
Malware software is given input 
that the attacker knows will be 
modified and expanded in size 
during processing. This attack 
relies on the target Malware 
software failing to anticipate that 
the expanded data may exceed 
some internal limit, thereby 
creating a buffer overflow. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
input that can be exploited. 
 
Offensive 
Resource Manipulation 
92.   CAPEC-
262 
Resource 
Manipulation 
An attacker manipulates one or 
more resources, or some attribute 
thereof, in order to perform an 
attack. This is a broad class of 
attacks wherein the attacker is 
able to change some aspect of a 
resource's state and thereby affect 
application behaviour or 
information integrity. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the resources used by the 
Malware uses or dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
resources are altered. 
 
Offensive 
93.   CAPEC-
52 
Embedding NULL 
Bytes  
An attacker embeds one or more 
null bytes in input to the target 
Malware software. This attack 
relies on the usage of a null-
valued byte as a string terminator 
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in many environments. The goal 
is for certain components of the 
targeted Malware software to stop 
processing the input when it 
encounters the null byte(s). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
input to operate or exist. 
 
94.   CAPEC-
53 
Postfix, Null 
Terminate, and 
Backslash 
If a string is passed through a 
filter of some kind, then a 
terminal NULL may not be valid. 
Using alternate representation of 
NULL allows an attacker to 
embed the NULL midstring while 
postfixing the proper data so that 
the filter is avoided.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
string inputs. 
 
Offensive 
95.   CAPEC-
71 
Using Unicode 
Encoding to Bypass 
Validation Logic  
The Malware attacker may 
provide a unicode string to a 
system component that is not 
unicode aware and use that to 
circumvent the filter or cause the 
classifying mechanism to fail to 
properly understanding the 
request. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware takes in 
string inputs and has weak 
filtration mechanisms. 
 
Offensive 
96.   CAPEC-
161 
Infrastructure 
Manipulation  
The Malware attacker exploits 
characteristics of the 
infrastructure of a network entity 
in order to perpetrate attacks or 
information gathering on network 
objects (specifically relating to 
the Malware) or effect a change 
in the ordinary information flow 
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between network objects. In this 
context, inetsim may be used to 
deceive Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware depends 
on such infrastructure to operate 
or exist. 
 
97.   CAPEC-
142 
DNS Cache 
Poisoning 
The Malware attacker modifies a 
public DNS cache to cause certain 
names to resolve to incorrect 
addresses that the attacker 
specifies.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
DNS to operate or exist. 
 
Offensive 
98.   CAPEC-
89 
Pharming   A pharming attack occurs when 
the victim is fooled into entering 
sensitive data into supposedly 
trusted locations, such as an 
online site. In this context, it is 
reverse-pharming (or to deceive 
the Malware to believe that it is 
accessing a legitimate site that it 
requires). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware require 
access to certain online site to 
operate or exist. 
 
Offensive 
99.   CAPEC-
165 
File Manipulation   Modify file contents or attributes 
(such as extensions or names) of 
files in a manner to cause 
incorrect processing by an 
application (Malware). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware file 
image exists. 
 
Offensive 
100.    CAPEC-
177 
Create files with the 
same name as files 
Exploit file location algorithms in 
an operating system or 
Offensive / 
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protected with a 
higher classification  
application by creating a file with 
the same name as a protected or 
privileged file. In this context, the 
inverse will be done (ie, lower 
protection or privileges given). 
 
Pre-condition – Malware file 
image exists and is dependent 
upon the rights given to its image. 
 
101.    CAPEC-
23 / 44 
File System 
Function Injection, 
Content Based  
An attack of this type exploits the 
host's trust in executing remote 
content including binary files. 
 
Pre-condition – The infected 
hosts allow remote invocation of 
containment tools. 
 
Offensive 
102.    CAPEC-
263 
Force Use of 
Corrupted Files  
This describes an attack where an 
application (Malware) is forced to 
use a file that the Malware 
attacker has corrupted. In this 
context, the Malware dependent 
files may be corrupted to disrupt 
‘normal’ operations of Malware. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware has 
dependent files to operate or 
exist. 
 
Offensive 
103.    CAPEC-
35 
Leverage Executable 
Code in 
Nonexecutable Files  
An attack of this type exploits a 
system's trust in configuration and 
resource files, when the 
executable loads the resource 
(such as an image file or 
configuration file) the attacker 
has modified the file to either 
execute malicious code directly or 
manipulate the target process (e.g. 
application server) to execute 
based on the malicious 
configuration parameters. 
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Pre-condition – Malware uses 
non-executable files to operate or 
exist. 
 
104.    CAPEC-
171 / 13 
/ 10 
Variable 
Manipulation  
An attacker manipulates variables 
used by an application to perform 
a variety of possible attacks. This 
can either be performed through 
the manipulation of function call 
parameters or by manipulating 
external variables, such as 
environment variables, that are 
used by an application. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the variables that Malware uses or 
dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
variables are altered. 
 
Offensive 
105.    CAPEC-
176 
Configuration/Envir
onment 
manipulation 
An attacker manipulates files or 
settings external to a target 
application that affect the 
behaviour of that application. For 
example, many applications use 
external configuration files and 
libraries - modification of these 
entities or otherwise affecting the 
application's ability to use them 
would constitute a 
configuration/environment 
manipulation attack. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the variables that Malware uses or 
dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
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to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
variables are altered. 
 
106.    CAPEC-
159 
Redirect Access to 
Libraries  
An attacker exploits the execution 
flow of a call to an external 
library to point to an attacker 
supplied library or code base, 
allowing the attacker to 
compromise the application 
(Malware) or server (related 
Malware component or 
controller) via the execution of 
unauthorized code. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware requires 
access to such libraries to operate 
or exist. 
 
Offensive 
107.    CAPEC-
203 
Manipulate 
Application Registry 
Values  
An attacker manipulates the 
registry values used by an 
application to perform a variety of 
possible attacks.  
 
Pre-condition – Malware uses 
registry settings to operate or 
exist. 
 
Offensive 
108.    CAPEC-
96 
Block Access to 
Libraries  
An application typically makes 
calls to functions that are a part of 
libraries external to the 
application. These libraries may 
be part of the operating system or 
they may be third party libraries. 
 
Pre-condition – Need to identify 
the libraries that Malware uses or 
dependent upon. 
 
Side effects – Collateral damages 
to other applications or operating 
system processes when such 
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access to libraries is removed. 
 
109.    CAPEC-
272 
Protocol 
Manipulation  
The attacker subverts a 
communications protocol to 
perform an attack. These attacks 
can allow the attacker to 
impersonate others (Malware 
trusted entities), discover 
sensitive information, control the 
outcome of a session, or perform 
other attacks. 
 
Pre-condition – Protocol used by 
Malware known and understood. 
 
Offensive 
110.    CAPEC-
275 
DNS Rebinding   An attacker serves content whose 
IP address is resolved by a DNS 
server that it controls and after 
initial contact by a web browser 
or similar client it changes the IP 
address to which its name 
resolves to an address within the 
target browser's organization that 
is not publicly accessible, thus 
allowing the web browser to 
examine this internal address on 
its behalf. 
 
Pre-condition – Malware requires 
an IP address to be resolved to 
operate or exist. 
 
Offensive 
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